Publications by EENPS members
Information about recent publications by the members of the EENPS
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We are starting a new activity in scope of the EENPS with the goal of promoting and amplifying the research by our members.
The idea is that we circulate our new and recent research output through website and our social media accounts (Facebook, Twitter). We plan to also circulate your research through our mailing list, but to not clutter your inboxes too much, we will just make an occasional digest containing the info about multiple new papers.
If you would like us to showcase your recent research, please send the following to eenphilsci@gmail.com:
1. Name(s) and affiliation(s) of the author(s)
2. Title of your paper
3. Short abstract (feel free to use the abstract of the paper)
4. Link to the paper (DOI link is the most reliable, but other links are OK too)
5. If you are on Twitter, your username, so we can tag you.
All EENPS members are welcome to participate.
The idea is that we circulate our new and recent research output through website and our social media accounts (Facebook, Twitter). We plan to also circulate your research through our mailing list, but to not clutter your inboxes too much, we will just make an occasional digest containing the info about multiple new papers.
If you would like us to showcase your recent research, please send the following to eenphilsci@gmail.com:
1. Name(s) and affiliation(s) of the author(s)
2. Title of your paper
3. Short abstract (feel free to use the abstract of the paper)
4. Link to the paper (DOI link is the most reliable, but other links are OK too)
5. If you are on Twitter, your username, so we can tag you.
All EENPS members are welcome to participate.
Publications are listed by year, then in alphabetical order
Published in 2022/forthcoming
Adam P. Kubiak (Faculty of Administration and Social Sciences, Warsaw University of Technology)
& Paweł Kawalec (Faculty of Philosophy, John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin)
“Prior Information in Frequentist Research Designs: The Case of Neyman’s Sampling Theory”. Journal for General Philosophy of Science.
Abstract:
We analyse the issue of using prior information in frequentist statistical inference. For that purpose, we scrutinise different kinds of sampling designs in Jerzy Neyman’s theory to reveal a variety of ways to explicitly and objectively engage with prior information. Further, we turn to the debate on sampling paradigms (design-based vs. model-based approaches) to argue that Neyman’s theory supports an argument for the intermediate approach in the frequentism vs. Bayesianism debate. We also demonstrate that Neyman’s theory, by allowing non-epistemic values to influence evidence collection and formulation of statistical conclusions, does not compromise the epistemic reliability of the procedures and may improve it. This undermines the value-free ideal of scientific inference.
Link: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10838-022-09600-x
Jaana Eigi-Watkin (University of Tartu)
“Applying the notion of epistemic risk to argumentation in philosophy of science”. European Journal for Philosophy of Science.
Abstract:
I analyse an empirically informed argument in philosophy of science to show that it faces several varieties of risk commonly discussed as inductive risk. I argue that this is so even though the type of reasoning used in this argument differs from the reasoning in some of the arguments usually discussed in connection with inductive risk. To capture the variety of risks involved, I use the more general notion of epistemic risk proposed by Justin Biddle and Quill Kukla. I show how the argument in question faces several of the epistemic risks already described in connection with empirical reasoning. Importantly, I also argue that the subtype of inductive reasoning used in the argument merits a separate discussion. To analyse it, I recommend using the model of colligation, or reasoning through offering synthesising expressions. I then argue that it is desirable to recognise the risk in colligating inductive reasoning as a distinct type of epistemic risk that is relevant for understanding risk in other fields as well. Thus, I suggest that philosophy of science is one of the fields subject to non-trivial epistemic risk; I characterise several of these risks on the example of a specific argument; and I describe epistemic risk that accompanies colligation – colligating inductive risk.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-022-00455-z
Yılmaz, Özlem . "Biyoloji Felsefesinde Organizma Kavramı". Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi 1 / 1 (April 2022): 78-86 .
Kilikya Journal of Philosophy
Özet: Çevre sorunlarının katlanarak arttığı ve biyoloji biliminin büyük sıçramalarla geliştiği günümüzde organizma kavramının incelenmesi, hem kendi doğamızı (dolayısıyla da diğer canlılarla etkileşimlerimizi) hem de günümüz biyolojisindeki değişimleri daha iyi anlayabilmemiz için faydalı olacaktır. Bu çalışma, organizma kavramını özellikle organizma-çevre etkileşimi üzerinden inceleyerek günümüz biyolojisindeki önemini vurgulayacaktır. Organizma kavramı özellikle Modern Sentezden, Genişletilmiş Evrimsel Senteze geçişle birlikte ayrı bir önem kazanmıştır. Köklerini yirminci yüzyılın başlarındaki organizma-merkezci biyolojiden alan bu kavramın gelişimi, son birkaç on yıldır biyoloji biliminde gerçekleşmiş olan gelişmelerle (özellikle gelişim biyolojisi, sistem biyolojisi ve ekoloji dallarında) iyice dinamikleşmiştir. Organizma kavramının gelişimini incelemek sadece biyoloji biliminin felsefesi açısından değil, bunun yanında, insan olarak kendi biyolojik varlığımızı -organizma- ve çevremizle (hem abiyotik hem de biyotik) olan etkileşimlerimizi, tekrar düşünmek açısından değerlidir.
Link: https://dergipark.org.tr/en/pub/kilikya/issue/69763/1111764
Kostić, Daniel. and Khalifa, Kareem. (2022).
"Decoupling Topological Explanations from Mechanisms.” Philosophy of Science.
Abstract:
We provide three innovations to recent debates about whether topological or “network” explanations are a species of mechanistic explanation. First, we more precisely characterize the requirement that all topological explanations are mechanistic explanations and show scientific practice to belie such a requirement. Second, we provide an account that unifies mechanistic and non-mechanistic topological explanations, thereby enriching both the mechanist and autonomist programs by highlighting when and where topological explanations are mechanistic. Third, we defend this view against some powerful mechanist objections. We conclude from this that topological explanations are autonomous from their mechanistic counterparts.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2022.29
Khalifa, Kareem. Islam, Farhan. Gamboa, J.P. Wilkenfeld, Daniel. Kostić, Daniel. (2022).
“Integrating Philosophy of Understanding with the Cognitive Sciences”, Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience.
Abstract:
We provide two programmatic frameworks for integrating philosophical research on understanding with complementary work in computer science, psychology, and neuroscience. First, philosophical theories of understanding have consequences about how agents should reason if they are to understand that can then be evaluated empirically by their concordance with findings in scientific studies of reasoning. Second, these studies use a multitude of explanations, and a philosophical theory of understanding is well suited to integrating these explanations in illuminating ways.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3389/fnsys.2022.764708.
Marek Pokropski (Faculty of Philosophy, University of Warsaw, Poland).
Mechanisms and Consciousness. Integrating Phenomenology with Cognitive Science, Routledge.
Abstract:
This book develops a new approach to naturalizing phenomenology. The author proposes to integrate phenomenology with the mechanistic framework for explanation in cognitive sciences, and offers new methodological perspectives for studying complex mental phenomena such as consciousness.
Link:
https://www.routledge.com/Mechanisms-and-Consciousness-Integrating-Phenomenology-with-Cognitive-Science/Pokropski/p/book/9780367465254#
Milena Ivanova (University of Cambridge).
“What is a Beautiful Experiment?” Erkenntnis.
Abstract:
This article starts an engagement on the aesthetics of experiments and offers an account for analysing how aesthetics features in the design, evaluation and reception of experiments. I identify two dimensions of aesthetic evaluation of experiments: design and significance. When it comes to design, a number of qualities, such as simplicity, economy and aptness, are analysed and illustrated with the famous Meselson-Stahl experiment. Beautiful experiments are also regarded to make significant discoveries, but I argue against a narrow construal of experimental aims. By drawing on the plurality of goals experimenters have and diversity of aesthetic responses, I argue that experiments are aesthetically appreciated both when they discover and when they produce disruptive results.
URL: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10670-021-00509-3
M. Efe Ates (Department of Philosophy, MSKÜ, Turkey).
“Pioneers of the ice age models: a brief history from Agassiz to Milankovitch”. History of Geo- and Space Sciences.
Abstract:
It is now widely accepted that astronomical factors trigger the emergence of glacial and interglacial periods. However, nearly two centuries ago, the overall situation was not as apparent as it is today. In this article, I briefly discuss the astronomical model of ice ages put forward in the 19th and early 20th centuries. This period was indeed anni mirabiles for scientists to understand the ice age phenomenon. Agassiz, Adhémar and Croll laid the foundation stones for understanding the dynamics of ice ages. But it was Milankovitch who combined empirical geology with mathematical astronomy. Specifically, he identified the shortcomings of the preceding ice age models and modified his model accordingly. In what follows, I review earlier approaches to the ice age problem and show how they failed to meet their objectives. Next, I show how Milankovitch's model managed to capture all sufficient astronomical elements. The final sections focus on Milutin Milankovitch's successful approach, including his accomplishment of tackling the problem mathematically.
Link: https://doi.org/10.5194/hgss-13-23-2022
Martin Zach (Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Faculty of Arts, Charles University in Prague)
“Revisiting abstraction and idealization: how not to criticize mechanistic explanation in molecular biology”. European Journal for Philosophy of Science.
Abstract:
Abstraction and idealization are the two notions that are most often discussed in the context of assumptions employed in the process of model building. These notions are also routinely used in philosophical debates such as that on the mechanistic account of explanation. Indeed, an objection to the mechanistic account has recently been formulated precisely on these grounds: mechanists cannot account for the common practice of idealizing difference-making factors in models in molecular biology. In this paper I revisit the debate and I argue that the objection does not stand up to scrutiny. This is because it is riddled with a number of conceptual inconsistencies. By attempting to resolve the tensions, I also draw several general lessons regarding the difficulties of applying abstraction and idealization in scientific practice. Finally, I argue that more care is needed only when speaking of abstraction and idealization in a context in which these concepts play an important role in an argument, such as that on mechanistic explanation.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-022-00453-1
Richard David-Rus (Francisc I. Rainer Institute of Anthropology, Romanian Academy, Bucharest, Romania)
“Understanding without Explanation: A Still Open Issue”. Filozofia Nauki.
Abstract:
This paper takes a stance in the debate concerning scientific understanding. It claims that the case for a specific type of understanding, understanding without explanation (UwE), is still open, despite the tendency in the current literature that might suggest otherwise. The paper begins by situating the distinction between an explanatory and non-explanatory understanding in the debate on understanding by introducing Lipton’s account of UwE. The paper then discusses the significance of Lipton’s proposals for the debate and argues that Kelp’s interpretation does not exhaust the challenge they pose to any theory of understanding. The paper then examines the best articulated critique of Lipton’s account provided by Khalifa and rejects it as inadequate. It ends by sketching out a list of positive reasons that support the continued examination of UwE.
Link: https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2021.0009
Published in 2021
Adam P. Kubiak and Paweł Kawalec (Faculty of Philosophy, John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin)
The epistemic consequences of pragmatic value-laden scientific inference
European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 11(52), 2021.
Abstract:
In this work, we explore the epistemic import of the value-ladenness of Neyman-Pearson’s Theory of Testing Hypotheses (N-P) by reconstructing and extending Daniel Steel’s argument for the legitimate influence of pragmatic values on scientific inference. We focus on how to properly understand N-P’s pragmatic value-ladenness and the epistemic reliability of N-P. We develop an account of the twofold influence of pragmatic values on N-P’s epistemic reliability and replicability. We refer to these two distinguished aspects as “direct” and “indirect”. We discuss the replicability of experiments in terms of the indirect aspect and the replicability of outcomes in terms of the direct aspect. We argue that the influence of pragmatic values is beneficial to N-P’s epistemic reliability and replicability indirectly. We show that while the direct influence of pragmatic values can be beneficial, its negative effects on reliability and replicability are also unavoidable in some cases, with the direct and indirect aspects possibly being incongruent.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-021-00370-9
Adam P. Kubiak, Paweł Kawalec (Faculty of Philosophy, John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin) and Adam Kiersztyn (Department of Computer Science, Lublin University of Technology)
Neyman-Pearson Hypothesis Testing, Epistemic Reliability and Pragmatic Value-Laden Asymmetric Error Risks. Axiomathes.
Abstract:
We show that if among the tested hypotheses the number of true hypotheses is not equal to the number of false hypotheses, then Neyman-Pearson theory of testing hypotheses does not warrant minimal epistemic reliability (the feature of driving to true conclusions more often than to false ones). We also argue that N-P does not protect from the possible negative effects of the pragmatic value-laden unequal setting of error probabilities on N-P’s epistemic reliability. Most importantly, we argue that in the case of a negative impact no methodological adjustment is available to neutralize it, so in such cases the discussed pragmatic-value-ladenness of N-P inevitably compromises the goal of attaining truth.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-021-09541-y
Borut Trpin (MCMP/LMU Munich)
Against methodological gambling. Erkenntnis.
Abstract:
Should a scientist rely on methodological triangulation? Heesen et al. (2019) recently provided a convincing affirmative answer. However, their approach requires belief gambles if the evidence is discordant. We instead propose epistemically modest triangulation (EMT), according to which one should withhold judgement in such cases. We show that for a scientist in a methodologically diffident situation the expected utility of EMT is greater than that of Heesen et al.’s (2019) triangulation or that of using a single method. We also show that EMT is more appropriate for increasing epistemic trust in science. In short: triangulate, but do not gamble with evidence.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-021-00386-w
Daniel Kostić (Radboud University, The Netherlands).
“Topological Explanations, an Opinionated Appraisal.” In Lawler, I., Shech, E. and Khalifa, K. (eds): Scientific Understanding and Representation: Mathematical Modeling in the Life and Physical Sciences, Routledge.
Abstract:
In this chapter I provide a systematic overview of topological explanations in the philosophy of science literature. I do so by presenting an account of topological explanation that I have developed in other publications and then comparing this account to other accounts of topological explanation. Finally, this appraisal is opinionated because it highlights some problems in alternative accounts of topological explanations, and also it outlines responses to some of the main criticisms raised by the so-called new mechanists.
Daniel Kostić (Radboud University, The Netherlands) and Kareem Khalifa (Middlebury College, USA.).
"The directionality of topological explanations”. Synthese.
Abstract:
Proponents of ontic conceptions of explanation require all explanations to be backed by causal, constitutive, or similar relations. Among their justifications is that only ontic conceptions can do justice to the ‘directionality’ of explanation, i.e., the requirement that if X explains Y, then not-Y does not explain not-X. Using topological explanations as an illustration, we argue that non-ontic conceptions of explanation have ample resources for securing the directionality of explanations. The different ways in which neuroscientists rely on multiplexes involving both functional and anatomical connectivity in their topological explanations vividly illustrate why ontic considerations are frequently (if not always) irrelevant to explanatory directionality. Therefore, directionality poses no problem to non-ontic conceptions of explanation.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03414-y
Daria Jadreškić (University of Klagenfurt)
"Adapt to Translate – Adaptive Clincal Trials and Biomedical Innovation", European Journal of Analytic Philosophy.
Abstract:
The article presents the advantages and limitations of adaptive clinical trials for assessing the effectiveness of medical interventions and specifies the conditions that contributed to their development and implementation in clinical practice. I advance two arguments by discussing different cases of adaptive trials. The normative argument is that responsible adaptation should be taken seriously as a new way of doing clinical research insofar as a valid justification, sufficient understanding, and adequate operational conditions are provided. The second argument is historical. The development of adaptive trials can be related to lessons learned from research in cases of urgency and to the decades-long efforts to end the productivity crisis of pharmaceutical research, which led to the emergence of translational, personalized, and, recently, precision medicine movements.
https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.17.3.2
Daria Jadreškić (University of Klagenfurt)
"Diversity as an Epistemic Value – From Individual to Social Objectivity", in Radhika Natarajan (ed.) Sprache – Bildung – Geschlecht: Interdisziplinäre Ansätze in Flucht- und Migrationskontexten. Springer VS, Wiesbaden.
Abstract:
The paper presents the role of diversity in ensuring the objectivity of scientific research as understood in recent ‘values in science’ debates within philosophy of science. Along with traditional epistemic values, i.e. values that promote the attainment of truth, such as accuracy and consistency, the new picture of desirable epistemic values includes diversity as an indispensable indicator of critical scrutiny which is not only beneficial for the goal of attaining knowledge, but also for the goal of attaining social justice. Objectivity is in this new understanding achieved through diversity and inclusion of different perspectives open to mutual criticism. Diversity as a safeguard against individual and group biases is especially acknowledged in its critical role by feminist contributions to philosophy of science.
The paper starts by introducing the focus of philosophy of science in general and values in science debates in particular, followed by an overview of standard accounts of epistemic and non-epistemic values and their often conflicting roles in decision making in science. Subsequently, the benefits of diversity are discussed and exemplified by Anke Bueter’s case study (Bueter, 2015) on female health research. Several normative ideals for science are put forward and certain problems and solutions of each are outlined.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-28341-4_11
Gabriel Târziu (University of Bucharest)
Can We Have Physical Understanding of Mathematical Facts?
Acta Analytica. Forthcoming.
Abstract:
A lot of philosophical energy has been devoted recently in trying to determine if mathematics can contribute to our understanding of physical phenomena. Not many philosophers are interested, though, if the converse makes sense, i.e., if our cognitive interaction (scientific or otherwise) with the physical world can be helpful (in an explanatory or non-explanatory way) in our efforts to make sense of mathematical facts. My aim in this paper is to try to fill this important lacuna in the recent literature. My answer to the question of this paper is negative. As I will argue, there are serious problems with the main reasons for believing in the first place that it is possible to have physical understanding of mathematical facts.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-021-00470-4
Gabriel Târziu (University of Bucharest)
How Do We Obtain Understanding with the Help of Explanations?
Axiomathes 31 (2): 173-197. 2021.
Abstract:
What exactly do we need in order to enjoy the cognitive benefit that is supposed to be provided by an explanation? Some philosophers (most notably Khalifa 2012; 2013; 2015; 2017) would say that all that we need is to know the explanation. Others (e.g. Newman 2012; Strevens 2013) would say that achieving understanding with the help of an explanation requires more than that, that it requires a grasping or an understanding of the explanation. My aim in this paper is to come up with a new answer to this problem by exploring the shortcomings of the received view of understanding. In my view, besides having (at least) testimonial knowledge of an explanation, obtaining explanatory understanding requires full cognitive access to the explanation.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-020-09488-6
Magdalena Małecka (University of Helsinki & Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton)
Knowledge, behaviour, and policy: questioning the epistemic presuppositions of applying behavioural science in public policymaking. Synthese (online first, open access).
Abstract:
The aim of this article is to question the epistemic presuppositions of applying behavioural science in public policymaking. Philosophers of science who have examined the recent applications of the behavioural sciences to policy have contributed to discussions on causation, evidence, and randomised controlled trials. These have focused on epistemological and methodological questions about the reliability of scientific evidence and the conditions under which we can predict that a policy informed by behavioural research will achieve the policymakers’ goals. This paper argues that the philosophical work of Helen Longino can also help us to have a better and fuller understanding of the knowledge which the behavioural sciences provide. The paper advances an analysis of the knowledge claims that are made in the context of policy applications of behavioural science and compares them with the behavioural research on which they are based. This allows us to show that behavioural policy and the debates accompanying it are based on an oversimplified understanding of what knowledge behavioural science actually provides. Recognising this problem is important as arguments that justify reliance on the behavioural sciences in policy typically presume this simplification.
Link: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-021-03026-6
Magdalena Małecka (University of Helsinki & Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton)
Values in economics: a recent revival with a twist. Journal of Economic Methodology (online first, open access).
Abstract:
This article reviews the relatively recent trend in economic methodology that consists in bringing insights from the debate in philosophy of science on values in science in order to analyse value-ladenness of economic research. The text claims that these insights from philosophy of science offer a slightly new approach to the topic of value judgments in economics that has been discussed in philosophy of economics for decades. It suggests that the perspective of philosophy of science reviewed in the article invites to rethinking analyses of feminist economists as important contributions to economic methodology.
Link: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1350178X.2020.1868776?needAccess=true
Mariusz Maziarz (Interdisciplinary Centre for Ethics and Institute of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland),
Martin Zach (Department of Analytic Philosophy, Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences)
Assessing the quality of evidence from epidemiological agent-based models for the COVID-19 pandemic. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, 43(1).
Abstract:
Agent-based models (ABMs) are one of the main sources of evidence for decisions regarding mitigation and suppression measures against the spread of SARS-CoV-2. These models have not been previously included in the hierarchy of evidence put forth by the evidence-based medicine movement, which prioritizes those research methods that deliver results less susceptible to the risk of confounding. We point out the need to assess the quality of evidence delivered by ABMs and ask the question of what is the risk that assumptions entertained in ABMs do not include all the key factors and make model predictions susceptible to the problem of confounding.
Link: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40656-020-00357-4
Milena Ivanova (University of Cambridge)
Duhem and Holism. Cambridge Elements: Cambridge University Press.
Abstract:
The holistic thesis developed by Pierre Duhem challenges the idea that our evidence can conclusively falsify a theory. Given that no scientific theory is tested in isolation, a negative experiment can always be attributed to components other than the theory we test – to the auxiliary hypotheses and background assumptions. How do scientists decide whether the experimental result undermines the theory or points at an error in the underlying assumptions? Duhem argues that we cannot offer a rule that directs when the scientist should employ a radical or conservative strategy in light of a negative result, and ultimately they will appeal to their intuition. More recently philosophers have offered a number of strategies of how to locate error and justify the abandonment of a theory or an auxiliary hypothesis. This Element analyses Duhem's response to holism and subsequent accounts of how the problem can be resolved.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009004657
Milena Ivanova (University of Cambridge).
The Aesthetics of Scientific Experiments. Philosophy Compass.
Abstract
This article explores the aesthetic dimensions of scientific experimentation, addressing specifically how aesthetic features enter the construction, evaluation and reception of an experiment. I highlight the relationship between experiments and artistic acts in the early years of the Royal Society where experiments do not serve only epistemic aims but also aim to generate feelings of awe and pleasure. I turn to analysing which aspects of experiments are appreciated aesthetically, identifying several contenders, from the ability of an experiment to uncover nature's beauty, to encapsulating original designs and human creativity. Following this analysis, I focus on the notion of beauty: what makes an experiment beautiful? Several common qualities are explored, from the simplicity and economy of the experiment, to the significance of the experimental results.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12730
Natalia Carrillo and Tarja Knuuttila (University of Vienna)
“An artefactual perspective on idealization: Galvanic cells and electric circuits in nerve signal research.” In: Alejandro Cassini y Juan Redmond (ed.) Models and Idealizations in Science: Fictional and Artefactual Approaches (Cham: Springer).
Abstract:
There are two traditions of thinking about idealization offering almost opposite views on their functioning and epistemic status. While one tradition views idealizations as epistemic deficiencies, the other one highlights the epistemic benefits of idealization. Both of these accounts agree in that idealizations are deliberate misrepresentations. In this article, we approach idealization from the artifactual account of models, comparing it to the traditional accounts of idealization as misrepresentation, and exemplifying it through the case of the Hodgkin and Huxley model of nerve impulse. From the artifactual perspective, the epistemic benefits and deficiencies introduced by idealization frequently come in a package due to the way idealization draws together different resources in model construction. Accordingly, idealization tends to be holistic in that it is not often easily attributable to just some specific parts of the model. We argue that the artifactual approach lends a unifying view into idealization in that it is able to recover several basic philosophical insights motivating both the deficiency and epistemic benefit accounts, being simultaneously detached from the idea of distortion by misrepresentation.
Keywords: scientific modeling, representation, artifactual account, Hodgkin and Huxley Model
Links: https://philpapers.org/rec/KNUAAP, https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783030658014
Poliseli, L (Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution and Cognition Research); Russo, F. (University of Amsterdam).
Philosophy of science in practice and weak scientism together apart. In. Mizrahi M (ed) For and Against Scientism: science, methodology and the future of philosophy (Roman & Littlefield). forthcoming
Abstract:
The term ‘scientism’ has not attracted consensus about its meaning or about its scope of application. In this paper, we consider Mizrahi’s suggestion to distinguish ‘Strong’ and ‘Weak’ scientism, and the consequences this distinction may have for philosophical methodology. While we side with Mizrahi that his definitions help advance the debate, by avoiding verbal dispute and focussing on questions of method, we also have concerns about his proposal as it defends a hierarchy of knowledge production. Mizrahi’s position is that Weak Scientism should be adopted, stating that “of all the knowledge we have, scientific knowledge is the best knowledge”. This version of scientism, however, has consequences for philosophical methodology. In particular, if one conceives of philosophy as an a priori discipline and holds Weak Scientism, the introduction of empirical methods in philosophy may threaten its very essence or soul. In this chapter, we will defend the move to adopt empirical methods in philosophy and argue that, rather than threatening its essence or soul, these methods put philosophy in a better position to contribute to knowledge production, an endeavour shared with the sciences, and in a very interdisciplinary spirit. Our point of disagreement with Mizrahi is that we should avoid any hierarchy of knowledge, and instead focus on what each perspective -- scientific, philosophical, historical, or other -- can contribute to understanding phenomena.
Ludwig, D. (Wageningen University & Research); Inkeri, K (Tampere University); Mncube, Z (University of Johannesburg); Poliseli, L. (Konrad Lorenz Insitute for Evolution and Cognition Research); Reyes-Galindo, L. (Wageningen University).
Global Epistemologies and Philosophies of Science. Routledge, 2021.
Abstract:
In bringing together a global community of philosophers, Global Epistemologies and Philosophies of Science develops novel perspectives on epistemology and philosophy of science by demonstrating how frameworks from academic philosophy (e.g. standpoint theory, social epistemology, feminist philosophy of science) and related fields (e.g. decolonial studies, transdisciplinarity, global history of science) can contribute to critical engagement with global dimensions of knowledge and science
Global challenges such as climate change, food production, and infectious diseases raise complex questions about scientific knowledge production and its interactions with local knowledge systems and social realities. As academic philosophy provides relatively little reflection on global negotiations of knowledge, many pressing scientific and societal issues remain disconnected from core debates in epistemology and philosophy of science.
This book is an invitation to broaden agendas of academic philosophy by presenting epistemology and philosophy of science as globally engaged fields that address heterogeneous forms of knowledge production and their interactions with local livelihoods, practices, and worldviews. This integrative ambition makes the book equally relevant for philosophers and interdisciplinary scholars who are concerned with methodological and political challenges at the intersection of science and society.
Link: https://www.routledge.com/Global-Epistemologies-and-Philosophies-of-Science/Ludwig-Koskinen-Mncube-Poliseli-Reyes-Galindo/p/book/9780367461379
Poliseli, L (Konrad Lorenz Insitute for Evolution and Cognition Research); Leite, CMP (Federal University of Bahia).
Developing transdisciplinary practices: an interplay between disagreement and trust. In.: Ludwig, D; Inkeri, K; Mncube, Z; Poliseli, L; Reyes-Galindo, L. . Global Epistemologies and Philosophies of Science. Routledge, 2021.
Abstract:
Inter- and transdisciplinary research arise as necessary conditions to address societal problems. These collaborations, by definition, encompass experts from distinct domains, demanding an epistemic dependence between researchers. In such cases where, additionally, epistemic asymmetry exists, this might then lead to tensions and enhance epistemic disagreements. How should scholars behave when in peer disagreement? On the one hand, in philosophical literature on epistemology of disagreement, normative accounts about how one should respond when facing an epistemic disagreement are usually built upon hypothetical scenarios that do not portray real-life disagreements in scientific settings. On the other hand, Science and Technology Studies (STS) research that deals with academic and scientific disagreement typically uses a descriptive, empirical approach. We argue that before a normative account of responses to disagreement is developed, we need to understand how academic disagreement actually takes place in real interdisciplinary scientific practice. In this chapter, we address a case of academic disagreement within an interdisciplinary research team in Brazil during their development of a framework for transdisciplinary collaboration. Data was collected with ethnographic tools, while the analytic perspective of the investigation is grounded on recent debates about research groups in social epistemology and in the epistemology of disagreement. We will show that an interplay between trust and disagreement is required for dealing with inter- and transdisciplinary research practices. We hold that shedding light into disagreements and communications between collaborators may improve the epistemic performance of collaborative research teams by refining the dynamics of inter- and transdisciplinary investigations.
Link: https://www.routledge.com/Global-Epistemologies-and-Philosophies-of-Science/Ludwig-Koskinen-Mncube-Poliseli-Reyes-Galindo/p/book/9780367461379
Duško Prelević (Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade)
The Chalmers Trilemma Re-examined
Journal of Philosophical Research 46: 345‒361, 2021.
Abstract:
The Continuum Hypothesis seems to be a counterexample to David Chalmers's A Priori Scrutability thesis, according to which there is a compact class of truths (the scrutability base) from which all truths are a priori scrutable. Chalmers's three-part answer to this problem (which I call the “Chalmers trilemma”) runs as follows: either the Continuum Hypothesis is indeterminate; or adding a new axiom will settle the issue; or, if these two options do not work, we should add the Continuum Hypothesis (or its negation) to the scrutability base. I argue that Chalmers's answer is unsatisfactory: the first horn of the trilemma can be interpreted in several ways, and either it departs from common mathematical practice and rests on weak analogies, or it shares the same problems with two other horns; the second horn does not provide good reasons to believe that from a fixed system of axioms all truths about our world are scrutable; the third horn of the trilemma renders Chalmers's project empty.
Link: https://doi.org/10.5840/jpr2021825172
Tomáš Marvan (Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences)
Was Wegner Rejecting Mental Causality? Theory and Psychology.
Abstract:
Daniel Wegner’s theory of apparent mental causation is often misread. His aim was not to question the causal effectiveness of conscious mental states, such as intentions. Rather, he attempted to show that our subjective sense of agency is not a completely reliable indicator of the causality of action, and needs to be replaced by more objective means of inquiry.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1177/09593543211000820
Tomáš Marvan (Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences)
Marek Havlík (National Institute of Mental Health, Klecany)
Is Predictive Processing a Theory of Perceptual Consciousness? New Ideas in Psychology 61.
Abstract:
Predictive Processing theory, hotly debated in neuroscience, psychology and philosophy, promises to explain a number of perceptual and cognitive phenomena in a simple and elegant manner. In some of its versions, the theory is ambitiously advertised as a new theory of conscious perception. The task of this paper is to assess whether this claim is realistic. We will be arguing that the Predictive Processing theory cannot explain the transition from unconscious to conscious perception in its proprietary terms. The explanations offer by PP theorists mostly concern the preconditions of conscious perception, leaving the genuine material substrate of consciousness untouched.
Link: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0732118X20302129?via%3Dihub
Published in 2020
Agustina Borella (ESEADE University Institute, Argentina)
TRAZOS Ensayos de Filosofía para el Mundo Social. Grupo Unión, Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires.
Abstract:
Entender algo sobre un mundo que se nos presenta de modo desordenado e incompleto constituye buena parte de la tarea de la filosofía y de la ciencia.
La racionalidad, los modelos, y el mundo social introducen preocupaciones propias de la filosofía de la ciencia en general y de la epistemología de la economía en particular.
Los aportes de Popper, Lawson, Mäki, Hayek y Cartwright se expresan en estos trazos como intentos abiertos para alcanzar a comprender nuestro mundo.
English:
To understand something about a world, that is presented to us in a disorderly and incomplete way, is a large part of the task of philosophy and science.
Rationality, models and the social world introduce specific issues of philosophy of science in general and of epistemology of economics in particular.
The contributions of Popper, Lawson, Maki, Hayek and Cartwright are expressed in these strokes as open attempts to understand our world.
Link to the book: https://www.amazon.com/dp/B08FMSXNQV/ref=cm_sw_r_fa_dp_DcSnFb3XRPQQH?fbclid=IwAR1XsryCgzcCZjlbztz_hI17g1XMm0FFSpPDKNff11um1p03I3_qHmiqDi8
Anguel S. Stefanov (Institute of Philosophy and Sociology at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences)
Space and Time: Philosophical Problems. Minkowski Institute Press, Montreal.
Abstract:
The monograph comprises interconnected philosophical analyses of issues related to the nature of space, time and spacetime – that of the very existence of space and time, transcendental philosophy of space and time, whether there exists a middle way between the A- and B-theories of time, the growing block theory, the phenomenology of temporal passage, whether time flows at any rate, the relationalist-substantivalist debate and time travel. Two essays on Zeno’s paradoxes and on the arrow of time and irreversible processes are included as appendices. The book can also serve as a textbook of a course on the philosophy of space, time and spacetime.
Link: http://www.minkowskiinstitute.org/mip/books/stefanov2.html
Benjamin Wilck (Humboldt-Universitaet zu Berlin, Department of Philosophy)
Euclid’s Kinds and (Their) Attributes. History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis, 23(2), 362-397.
Abstract:
Relying upon a very close reading of all of the definitions given in Euclid’s Elements, I argue that this mathematical treatise contains a philosophical treatment of mathematical objects. Specifically, I show that Euclid draws elaborate metaphysical distinctions between (i) substances and non-substantial attributes of substances, (ii) different kinds of substance, and (iii) different kinds of non-substance. While the general meta-physical theory adopted in the Elements resembles that of Aristotle in many respects, Euclid does not employ Aristotle’s terminology, or indeed, any philosophical terminology at all. Instead, Euclid systematically uses different types of definition to distinguish between metaphysically different kinds of mathematical object.
Link: https://philpapers.org/rec/WILEKA
Benjamin Wilck (Humboldt-Universitaet zu Berlin, Department of Philosophy)
Can the Pyrrhonian Sceptic Suspend Belief Regarding Scientific Definitions?: Geometry and Scepticism Reconsidered. History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis, 23(1), 253-288.
Abstract:
In this article, I tackle a heretofore unnoticed difficulty with the application of Pyrrhonian scepticism to science. Sceptics can suspend belief regarding a dogmatic proposition only by setting up opposing arguments or considerations for and against that proposition. Since Sextus provides arguments exclusively against particular geometrical definitions in Adversus Mathematicos III, commentators have argued that Sextus’ method is not scepticism, but negative dogmatism. However, commentators have overlooked the fact that arguments or considerations in favour of particular geometrical definitions were absent in ancient geometry, and hence unavailable to Sextus. While this might explain why they are also absent from Sextus’ text, I survey and evaluate various strategies to supply arguments in support of particular geometrical definitions.
Link: https://philpapers.org/rec/WILCTP-9
Borut Trpin (MCMP/LMU Munich)
Jeffrey conditionalization: proceed with caution. Philosophical Studies, 177(10), 2985-3012.
Abstract:
It has been argued that if the rigidity condition is satisfied, a rational agent operating with uncertain evidence should update her subjective probabilities by Jeffrey conditionalization (JC) or else a series of bets resulting in a sure loss could be made against her (the Dynamic Dutch Book Argument). We show, however, that even if the rigidity condition is satisfied, it is not always safe to update probability distributions by JC because there exist such sequences of non-misleading uncertain observations where it may be foreseen that an agent who updates her subjective probabilities by JC will end up nearly certain that a false hypothesis is true. We analyze the features of JC that lead to this problem, specify the conditions in which it arises and respond to potential objections.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01356-3
Daniel Kostić (Institute for Science in Society (ISiS), Radboud University, The Netherlands)
General Theory of Topological Explanations and Explanatory Asymmetry. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 375: 20190321.
Abstract:
In this paper, I present a general theory of topological explanations, and illustrate its fruitfulness by showing how it accounts for explanatory asymmetry. My argument is developed in three steps. In the first step, I show what it is for some topological property A to explain some physical or dynamical property B. Based on that, I derive three key criteria of successful topological explanations: a criterion concerning the facticity of topological explanations, i.e. what makes it true of a particular system; a criterion for describing counterfactual dependencies in two explanatory modes, i.e. the vertical and the horizontal and, finally, a third perspectival one that tells us when to use the vertical and when to use the horizontal mode. In the second step, I show how this general theory of topological explanations accounts for explanatory asymmetry in both the vertical and horizontal explanatory modes. Finally, in the third step, I argue that this theory is universally applicable across biological sciences, which helps in unifying essential concepts of biological networks.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2019.0321
Daniel Kostić (Institute for Science in Society (ISiS), Radboud University, The Netherlands)
Claus C. Hilgetag (Institute of Computational Neuroscience, University Medical Center Hamburg-Eppendorf, Hamburg, Germany)
Marc Tittgemeyer (Max-Planck-Institut for Metabolism Research, Translational Neurocircuitry, and Cluster of Excellence in Cellular Stress and Aging-Associated Disease (CECAD), Cologne, Germany)
Unifying the Essential Concepts of Biological Networks. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 375: 20190314.
Abstract:
Over the last decades, network-based approaches have become highly popular in diverse fields of biology, including neuroscience, ecology, molecular biology and genetics. While these approaches continue to grow very rapidly, some of their conceptual and methodological aspects still require a programmatic foundation. This challenge particularly concerns the question of whether a generalized account of explanatory, organizational and descriptive levels of networks can be applied universally across biological sciences. To this end, this highly interdisciplinary theme issue focuses on the definition, motivation and application of key concepts in biological network science, such as explanatory power of distinctively network explanations, network levels and network hierarchies.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2019.0314
Jaana Eigi (University of Tartu)
Are Experts Representative of Non-Experts? Elective Modernism, Aspects of Representation, and the Argument from Inductive Risk
Perspectives on Science 28(4), 459-481
Abstract:
The approach to expert communities and political representation of non-experts in Harry Collins and Robert Evans’ elective modernism reflects the conviction that experts are not representative of ordinary citizens. I use an analysis of aspects of representation and the argument from inductive risk to argue that experts can be seen as representative of (some) non-experts, when we understand representation as resemblance based on shared social perspectives and acknowledge the inevitable involvement of such perspectives in decisions under inductive risk. This, in turn, has implications for some of the proposals about practices and institutions made in elective modernism.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1162/posc_a_00347
Luana Poliseli (Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution and Cognition Research (KLI), Klosterneuburg, Austria)
Emergence of scientific understanding in real-time ecological research practice. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences
Abstract:
Scientific understanding as a subject of inquiry has become widely discussed in philosophy of science and is often addressed through case studies from history of science. Even though these historical reconstructions engage with details of scientific practice, they usually provide only limited information about the gradual formation of understanding in ongoing processes of model and theory construction. Based on a qualitative ethnographic study of an ecological research project, this article shifts attention from understanding in the context of historical case studies to evidence of current case studies. By taking de Regt’s (Understanding scientific understanding. Oxford University Press, New York, 2017) contextual theory of scientific understanding into the field, it confirms core tenets of the contextual theory (e.g. the crucial role of visualization and visualizability) suggesting a normative character with respect to scientific activities. However, the case study also shows the limitations of de Regt’s latest version of this theory as an attempt to explain the development of understanding in current practice. This article provides a model representing the emergence of scientific understanding that exposes main features of scientific understanding such as its gradual formation, its relation to skills and imagination, and its capacity for knowledge selectivity. The ethnographic evidence presented here supports the claim that something unique can be learned by looking into ongoing research practices that can’t be gained by studying historical case studies.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40656-020-00338-7
Tomáš Marvan (Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences)
Michal Polák (University of West Bohemia, Pilsen)
Generality and content-specificity in the study of the neural correlates of perceptual consciousness. Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, 1(II).
Abstract:
The claim of this paper is that the NCC notion, as applied to conscious perceptual episodes, needs to be reconceptualized. It mixes together the processing related to the perceived contents and the neural substrate of consciousness proper, i.e. mechanisms making the perceptual contents conscious. We thus propose that the perceptual NCC be divided into two constitutive subnotions. The main theoretical idea that emerges as a consequence of this reconceptualization is that the neural correlate of a perceptual episode is formed in the neural interaction between content-processing and consciousness-conferring mechanisms. The paper elaborates this distinction, marshals some initial arguments in its favour, and tests it against some of the most debated theories of consciousness.
Link: https://philosophymindscience.org/index.php/phimisci/article/view/61
Vassil Vidinsky (Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski”)
(Post) phenomenological Approach to Homo Sapiens Technicus. Balkan Journal of Philosophy, 12(1), 31-36.
Abstract:
In this paper I use a (post)phenomenological approach to clarify the objective cultural expansion of our technology. Thus, I establish a conceptual analogy between two different philosophical analyses of human–machine relations – one historical and one phenomenological. I develop the analogy between them and their corresponding concepts in several steps. (1) First, I present the Homo sapiens technicus tendency and then the phenomenological differentiation between body schema and body image. All of these elucidate our involvement with machines. (2) Then, I conceptualize the term ‘context’, coupling its structural stability with the idea of distextaulity in order to achieve a better empirical understanding of our technological contradictions. (3) I continue to develop and enrich the analogy by illuminating the functional similarities – fluid boundary, automation, complexity – between contextual structures on the one hand and body schemata on the other. (4) Finally, I explore a deeper causal and narrative connection between those strands, shedding light on an interesting twofold circularity: a circular causation and a double narrative within Homo sapiens technicus.
Link: https://doi.org/10.5840/bjp20201215
Vlasta Sikimić (University of Tübingen)
Tijana Nikitović (University of Belgrade)
Miljan Vasić (University of Belgrade)
Vanja Subotić (University of Belgrade)
Do Political Attitudes Matter for Epistemic Decisions of Scientists? Review of Philosophy and Psychology.
Abstract:
The epistemic attitudes of scientists, such as epistemic tolerance and authoritarianism, play important roles in the discourse about rivaling theories. Epistemic tolerance stands for the mental attitude of an epistemic agent, e.g., a scientist, who is open to opposing views, while epistemic authoritarianism represents the tendency to uncritically accept views of authorities. Another relevant epistemic factor when it comes to the epistemic decisions of scientists is the skepticism towards the scientific method. However, the question is whether these epistemic attitudes are influenced by their sociopolitical counterparts, such as the researcher’s degree of conservatism. To empirically investigate the interplay between epistemic and sociopolitical attitudes of scientists, we conducted a survey with researchers (N = 655) across different disciplines. We propose scales for measuring epistemic tolerance and epistemic authoritarianism, as well as a scale for detecting the participants' readiness to question the scientific method. Furthermore, we investigate the relationship between epistemic tolerance and epistemic authoritarianism on the one hand, and career stage and sociopolitical views on the other hand. Interestingly, our study found only small correlations between the participants' degree of conservatism and their epistemic attitudes. This suggests that sociopolitical views, against common argumentation, actually do not play an important role in one’s scientific decisions. Moreover, social scientists scored higher on the epistemic tolerance and lower on the epistemic authoritarianism scale than natural scientists. Finally, the results indicate that natural scientists question the scientific method less than social scientists.
Link: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13164-020-00504-7
Published in 2022/forthcoming
Adam P. Kubiak (Faculty of Administration and Social Sciences, Warsaw University of Technology)
& Paweł Kawalec (Faculty of Philosophy, John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin)
“Prior Information in Frequentist Research Designs: The Case of Neyman’s Sampling Theory”. Journal for General Philosophy of Science.
Abstract:
We analyse the issue of using prior information in frequentist statistical inference. For that purpose, we scrutinise different kinds of sampling designs in Jerzy Neyman’s theory to reveal a variety of ways to explicitly and objectively engage with prior information. Further, we turn to the debate on sampling paradigms (design-based vs. model-based approaches) to argue that Neyman’s theory supports an argument for the intermediate approach in the frequentism vs. Bayesianism debate. We also demonstrate that Neyman’s theory, by allowing non-epistemic values to influence evidence collection and formulation of statistical conclusions, does not compromise the epistemic reliability of the procedures and may improve it. This undermines the value-free ideal of scientific inference.
Link: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10838-022-09600-x
Jaana Eigi-Watkin (University of Tartu)
“Applying the notion of epistemic risk to argumentation in philosophy of science”. European Journal for Philosophy of Science.
Abstract:
I analyse an empirically informed argument in philosophy of science to show that it faces several varieties of risk commonly discussed as inductive risk. I argue that this is so even though the type of reasoning used in this argument differs from the reasoning in some of the arguments usually discussed in connection with inductive risk. To capture the variety of risks involved, I use the more general notion of epistemic risk proposed by Justin Biddle and Quill Kukla. I show how the argument in question faces several of the epistemic risks already described in connection with empirical reasoning. Importantly, I also argue that the subtype of inductive reasoning used in the argument merits a separate discussion. To analyse it, I recommend using the model of colligation, or reasoning through offering synthesising expressions. I then argue that it is desirable to recognise the risk in colligating inductive reasoning as a distinct type of epistemic risk that is relevant for understanding risk in other fields as well. Thus, I suggest that philosophy of science is one of the fields subject to non-trivial epistemic risk; I characterise several of these risks on the example of a specific argument; and I describe epistemic risk that accompanies colligation – colligating inductive risk.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-022-00455-z
Yılmaz, Özlem . "Biyoloji Felsefesinde Organizma Kavramı". Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi 1 / 1 (April 2022): 78-86 .
Kilikya Journal of Philosophy
Özet: Çevre sorunlarının katlanarak arttığı ve biyoloji biliminin büyük sıçramalarla geliştiği günümüzde organizma kavramının incelenmesi, hem kendi doğamızı (dolayısıyla da diğer canlılarla etkileşimlerimizi) hem de günümüz biyolojisindeki değişimleri daha iyi anlayabilmemiz için faydalı olacaktır. Bu çalışma, organizma kavramını özellikle organizma-çevre etkileşimi üzerinden inceleyerek günümüz biyolojisindeki önemini vurgulayacaktır. Organizma kavramı özellikle Modern Sentezden, Genişletilmiş Evrimsel Senteze geçişle birlikte ayrı bir önem kazanmıştır. Köklerini yirminci yüzyılın başlarındaki organizma-merkezci biyolojiden alan bu kavramın gelişimi, son birkaç on yıldır biyoloji biliminde gerçekleşmiş olan gelişmelerle (özellikle gelişim biyolojisi, sistem biyolojisi ve ekoloji dallarında) iyice dinamikleşmiştir. Organizma kavramının gelişimini incelemek sadece biyoloji biliminin felsefesi açısından değil, bunun yanında, insan olarak kendi biyolojik varlığımızı -organizma- ve çevremizle (hem abiyotik hem de biyotik) olan etkileşimlerimizi, tekrar düşünmek açısından değerlidir.
Link: https://dergipark.org.tr/en/pub/kilikya/issue/69763/1111764
Kostić, Daniel. and Khalifa, Kareem. (2022).
"Decoupling Topological Explanations from Mechanisms.” Philosophy of Science.
Abstract:
We provide three innovations to recent debates about whether topological or “network” explanations are a species of mechanistic explanation. First, we more precisely characterize the requirement that all topological explanations are mechanistic explanations and show scientific practice to belie such a requirement. Second, we provide an account that unifies mechanistic and non-mechanistic topological explanations, thereby enriching both the mechanist and autonomist programs by highlighting when and where topological explanations are mechanistic. Third, we defend this view against some powerful mechanist objections. We conclude from this that topological explanations are autonomous from their mechanistic counterparts.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2022.29
Khalifa, Kareem. Islam, Farhan. Gamboa, J.P. Wilkenfeld, Daniel. Kostić, Daniel. (2022).
“Integrating Philosophy of Understanding with the Cognitive Sciences”, Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience.
Abstract:
We provide two programmatic frameworks for integrating philosophical research on understanding with complementary work in computer science, psychology, and neuroscience. First, philosophical theories of understanding have consequences about how agents should reason if they are to understand that can then be evaluated empirically by their concordance with findings in scientific studies of reasoning. Second, these studies use a multitude of explanations, and a philosophical theory of understanding is well suited to integrating these explanations in illuminating ways.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3389/fnsys.2022.764708.
Marek Pokropski (Faculty of Philosophy, University of Warsaw, Poland).
Mechanisms and Consciousness. Integrating Phenomenology with Cognitive Science, Routledge.
Abstract:
This book develops a new approach to naturalizing phenomenology. The author proposes to integrate phenomenology with the mechanistic framework for explanation in cognitive sciences, and offers new methodological perspectives for studying complex mental phenomena such as consciousness.
Link:
https://www.routledge.com/Mechanisms-and-Consciousness-Integrating-Phenomenology-with-Cognitive-Science/Pokropski/p/book/9780367465254#
Milena Ivanova (University of Cambridge).
“What is a Beautiful Experiment?” Erkenntnis.
Abstract:
This article starts an engagement on the aesthetics of experiments and offers an account for analysing how aesthetics features in the design, evaluation and reception of experiments. I identify two dimensions of aesthetic evaluation of experiments: design and significance. When it comes to design, a number of qualities, such as simplicity, economy and aptness, are analysed and illustrated with the famous Meselson-Stahl experiment. Beautiful experiments are also regarded to make significant discoveries, but I argue against a narrow construal of experimental aims. By drawing on the plurality of goals experimenters have and diversity of aesthetic responses, I argue that experiments are aesthetically appreciated both when they discover and when they produce disruptive results.
URL: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10670-021-00509-3
M. Efe Ates (Department of Philosophy, MSKÜ, Turkey).
“Pioneers of the ice age models: a brief history from Agassiz to Milankovitch”. History of Geo- and Space Sciences.
Abstract:
It is now widely accepted that astronomical factors trigger the emergence of glacial and interglacial periods. However, nearly two centuries ago, the overall situation was not as apparent as it is today. In this article, I briefly discuss the astronomical model of ice ages put forward in the 19th and early 20th centuries. This period was indeed anni mirabiles for scientists to understand the ice age phenomenon. Agassiz, Adhémar and Croll laid the foundation stones for understanding the dynamics of ice ages. But it was Milankovitch who combined empirical geology with mathematical astronomy. Specifically, he identified the shortcomings of the preceding ice age models and modified his model accordingly. In what follows, I review earlier approaches to the ice age problem and show how they failed to meet their objectives. Next, I show how Milankovitch's model managed to capture all sufficient astronomical elements. The final sections focus on Milutin Milankovitch's successful approach, including his accomplishment of tackling the problem mathematically.
Link: https://doi.org/10.5194/hgss-13-23-2022
Martin Zach (Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Faculty of Arts, Charles University in Prague)
“Revisiting abstraction and idealization: how not to criticize mechanistic explanation in molecular biology”. European Journal for Philosophy of Science.
Abstract:
Abstraction and idealization are the two notions that are most often discussed in the context of assumptions employed in the process of model building. These notions are also routinely used in philosophical debates such as that on the mechanistic account of explanation. Indeed, an objection to the mechanistic account has recently been formulated precisely on these grounds: mechanists cannot account for the common practice of idealizing difference-making factors in models in molecular biology. In this paper I revisit the debate and I argue that the objection does not stand up to scrutiny. This is because it is riddled with a number of conceptual inconsistencies. By attempting to resolve the tensions, I also draw several general lessons regarding the difficulties of applying abstraction and idealization in scientific practice. Finally, I argue that more care is needed only when speaking of abstraction and idealization in a context in which these concepts play an important role in an argument, such as that on mechanistic explanation.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-022-00453-1
Richard David-Rus (Francisc I. Rainer Institute of Anthropology, Romanian Academy, Bucharest, Romania)
“Understanding without Explanation: A Still Open Issue”. Filozofia Nauki.
Abstract:
This paper takes a stance in the debate concerning scientific understanding. It claims that the case for a specific type of understanding, understanding without explanation (UwE), is still open, despite the tendency in the current literature that might suggest otherwise. The paper begins by situating the distinction between an explanatory and non-explanatory understanding in the debate on understanding by introducing Lipton’s account of UwE. The paper then discusses the significance of Lipton’s proposals for the debate and argues that Kelp’s interpretation does not exhaust the challenge they pose to any theory of understanding. The paper then examines the best articulated critique of Lipton’s account provided by Khalifa and rejects it as inadequate. It ends by sketching out a list of positive reasons that support the continued examination of UwE.
Link: https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2021.0009
Published in 2021
Adam P. Kubiak and Paweł Kawalec (Faculty of Philosophy, John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin)
The epistemic consequences of pragmatic value-laden scientific inference
European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 11(52), 2021.
Abstract:
In this work, we explore the epistemic import of the value-ladenness of Neyman-Pearson’s Theory of Testing Hypotheses (N-P) by reconstructing and extending Daniel Steel’s argument for the legitimate influence of pragmatic values on scientific inference. We focus on how to properly understand N-P’s pragmatic value-ladenness and the epistemic reliability of N-P. We develop an account of the twofold influence of pragmatic values on N-P’s epistemic reliability and replicability. We refer to these two distinguished aspects as “direct” and “indirect”. We discuss the replicability of experiments in terms of the indirect aspect and the replicability of outcomes in terms of the direct aspect. We argue that the influence of pragmatic values is beneficial to N-P’s epistemic reliability and replicability indirectly. We show that while the direct influence of pragmatic values can be beneficial, its negative effects on reliability and replicability are also unavoidable in some cases, with the direct and indirect aspects possibly being incongruent.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-021-00370-9
Adam P. Kubiak, Paweł Kawalec (Faculty of Philosophy, John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin) and Adam Kiersztyn (Department of Computer Science, Lublin University of Technology)
Neyman-Pearson Hypothesis Testing, Epistemic Reliability and Pragmatic Value-Laden Asymmetric Error Risks. Axiomathes.
Abstract:
We show that if among the tested hypotheses the number of true hypotheses is not equal to the number of false hypotheses, then Neyman-Pearson theory of testing hypotheses does not warrant minimal epistemic reliability (the feature of driving to true conclusions more often than to false ones). We also argue that N-P does not protect from the possible negative effects of the pragmatic value-laden unequal setting of error probabilities on N-P’s epistemic reliability. Most importantly, we argue that in the case of a negative impact no methodological adjustment is available to neutralize it, so in such cases the discussed pragmatic-value-ladenness of N-P inevitably compromises the goal of attaining truth.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-021-09541-y
Borut Trpin (MCMP/LMU Munich)
Against methodological gambling. Erkenntnis.
Abstract:
Should a scientist rely on methodological triangulation? Heesen et al. (2019) recently provided a convincing affirmative answer. However, their approach requires belief gambles if the evidence is discordant. We instead propose epistemically modest triangulation (EMT), according to which one should withhold judgement in such cases. We show that for a scientist in a methodologically diffident situation the expected utility of EMT is greater than that of Heesen et al.’s (2019) triangulation or that of using a single method. We also show that EMT is more appropriate for increasing epistemic trust in science. In short: triangulate, but do not gamble with evidence.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-021-00386-w
Daniel Kostić (Radboud University, The Netherlands).
“Topological Explanations, an Opinionated Appraisal.” In Lawler, I., Shech, E. and Khalifa, K. (eds): Scientific Understanding and Representation: Mathematical Modeling in the Life and Physical Sciences, Routledge.
Abstract:
In this chapter I provide a systematic overview of topological explanations in the philosophy of science literature. I do so by presenting an account of topological explanation that I have developed in other publications and then comparing this account to other accounts of topological explanation. Finally, this appraisal is opinionated because it highlights some problems in alternative accounts of topological explanations, and also it outlines responses to some of the main criticisms raised by the so-called new mechanists.
Daniel Kostić (Radboud University, The Netherlands) and Kareem Khalifa (Middlebury College, USA.).
"The directionality of topological explanations”. Synthese.
Abstract:
Proponents of ontic conceptions of explanation require all explanations to be backed by causal, constitutive, or similar relations. Among their justifications is that only ontic conceptions can do justice to the ‘directionality’ of explanation, i.e., the requirement that if X explains Y, then not-Y does not explain not-X. Using topological explanations as an illustration, we argue that non-ontic conceptions of explanation have ample resources for securing the directionality of explanations. The different ways in which neuroscientists rely on multiplexes involving both functional and anatomical connectivity in their topological explanations vividly illustrate why ontic considerations are frequently (if not always) irrelevant to explanatory directionality. Therefore, directionality poses no problem to non-ontic conceptions of explanation.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03414-y
Daria Jadreškić (University of Klagenfurt)
"Adapt to Translate – Adaptive Clincal Trials and Biomedical Innovation", European Journal of Analytic Philosophy.
Abstract:
The article presents the advantages and limitations of adaptive clinical trials for assessing the effectiveness of medical interventions and specifies the conditions that contributed to their development and implementation in clinical practice. I advance two arguments by discussing different cases of adaptive trials. The normative argument is that responsible adaptation should be taken seriously as a new way of doing clinical research insofar as a valid justification, sufficient understanding, and adequate operational conditions are provided. The second argument is historical. The development of adaptive trials can be related to lessons learned from research in cases of urgency and to the decades-long efforts to end the productivity crisis of pharmaceutical research, which led to the emergence of translational, personalized, and, recently, precision medicine movements.
https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.17.3.2
Daria Jadreškić (University of Klagenfurt)
"Diversity as an Epistemic Value – From Individual to Social Objectivity", in Radhika Natarajan (ed.) Sprache – Bildung – Geschlecht: Interdisziplinäre Ansätze in Flucht- und Migrationskontexten. Springer VS, Wiesbaden.
Abstract:
The paper presents the role of diversity in ensuring the objectivity of scientific research as understood in recent ‘values in science’ debates within philosophy of science. Along with traditional epistemic values, i.e. values that promote the attainment of truth, such as accuracy and consistency, the new picture of desirable epistemic values includes diversity as an indispensable indicator of critical scrutiny which is not only beneficial for the goal of attaining knowledge, but also for the goal of attaining social justice. Objectivity is in this new understanding achieved through diversity and inclusion of different perspectives open to mutual criticism. Diversity as a safeguard against individual and group biases is especially acknowledged in its critical role by feminist contributions to philosophy of science.
The paper starts by introducing the focus of philosophy of science in general and values in science debates in particular, followed by an overview of standard accounts of epistemic and non-epistemic values and their often conflicting roles in decision making in science. Subsequently, the benefits of diversity are discussed and exemplified by Anke Bueter’s case study (Bueter, 2015) on female health research. Several normative ideals for science are put forward and certain problems and solutions of each are outlined.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-28341-4_11
Gabriel Târziu (University of Bucharest)
Can We Have Physical Understanding of Mathematical Facts?
Acta Analytica. Forthcoming.
Abstract:
A lot of philosophical energy has been devoted recently in trying to determine if mathematics can contribute to our understanding of physical phenomena. Not many philosophers are interested, though, if the converse makes sense, i.e., if our cognitive interaction (scientific or otherwise) with the physical world can be helpful (in an explanatory or non-explanatory way) in our efforts to make sense of mathematical facts. My aim in this paper is to try to fill this important lacuna in the recent literature. My answer to the question of this paper is negative. As I will argue, there are serious problems with the main reasons for believing in the first place that it is possible to have physical understanding of mathematical facts.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-021-00470-4
Gabriel Târziu (University of Bucharest)
How Do We Obtain Understanding with the Help of Explanations?
Axiomathes 31 (2): 173-197. 2021.
Abstract:
What exactly do we need in order to enjoy the cognitive benefit that is supposed to be provided by an explanation? Some philosophers (most notably Khalifa 2012; 2013; 2015; 2017) would say that all that we need is to know the explanation. Others (e.g. Newman 2012; Strevens 2013) would say that achieving understanding with the help of an explanation requires more than that, that it requires a grasping or an understanding of the explanation. My aim in this paper is to come up with a new answer to this problem by exploring the shortcomings of the received view of understanding. In my view, besides having (at least) testimonial knowledge of an explanation, obtaining explanatory understanding requires full cognitive access to the explanation.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-020-09488-6
Magdalena Małecka (University of Helsinki & Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton)
Knowledge, behaviour, and policy: questioning the epistemic presuppositions of applying behavioural science in public policymaking. Synthese (online first, open access).
Abstract:
The aim of this article is to question the epistemic presuppositions of applying behavioural science in public policymaking. Philosophers of science who have examined the recent applications of the behavioural sciences to policy have contributed to discussions on causation, evidence, and randomised controlled trials. These have focused on epistemological and methodological questions about the reliability of scientific evidence and the conditions under which we can predict that a policy informed by behavioural research will achieve the policymakers’ goals. This paper argues that the philosophical work of Helen Longino can also help us to have a better and fuller understanding of the knowledge which the behavioural sciences provide. The paper advances an analysis of the knowledge claims that are made in the context of policy applications of behavioural science and compares them with the behavioural research on which they are based. This allows us to show that behavioural policy and the debates accompanying it are based on an oversimplified understanding of what knowledge behavioural science actually provides. Recognising this problem is important as arguments that justify reliance on the behavioural sciences in policy typically presume this simplification.
Link: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-021-03026-6
Magdalena Małecka (University of Helsinki & Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton)
Values in economics: a recent revival with a twist. Journal of Economic Methodology (online first, open access).
Abstract:
This article reviews the relatively recent trend in economic methodology that consists in bringing insights from the debate in philosophy of science on values in science in order to analyse value-ladenness of economic research. The text claims that these insights from philosophy of science offer a slightly new approach to the topic of value judgments in economics that has been discussed in philosophy of economics for decades. It suggests that the perspective of philosophy of science reviewed in the article invites to rethinking analyses of feminist economists as important contributions to economic methodology.
Link: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1350178X.2020.1868776?needAccess=true
Mariusz Maziarz (Interdisciplinary Centre for Ethics and Institute of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland),
Martin Zach (Department of Analytic Philosophy, Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences)
Assessing the quality of evidence from epidemiological agent-based models for the COVID-19 pandemic. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, 43(1).
Abstract:
Agent-based models (ABMs) are one of the main sources of evidence for decisions regarding mitigation and suppression measures against the spread of SARS-CoV-2. These models have not been previously included in the hierarchy of evidence put forth by the evidence-based medicine movement, which prioritizes those research methods that deliver results less susceptible to the risk of confounding. We point out the need to assess the quality of evidence delivered by ABMs and ask the question of what is the risk that assumptions entertained in ABMs do not include all the key factors and make model predictions susceptible to the problem of confounding.
Link: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40656-020-00357-4
Milena Ivanova (University of Cambridge)
Duhem and Holism. Cambridge Elements: Cambridge University Press.
Abstract:
The holistic thesis developed by Pierre Duhem challenges the idea that our evidence can conclusively falsify a theory. Given that no scientific theory is tested in isolation, a negative experiment can always be attributed to components other than the theory we test – to the auxiliary hypotheses and background assumptions. How do scientists decide whether the experimental result undermines the theory or points at an error in the underlying assumptions? Duhem argues that we cannot offer a rule that directs when the scientist should employ a radical or conservative strategy in light of a negative result, and ultimately they will appeal to their intuition. More recently philosophers have offered a number of strategies of how to locate error and justify the abandonment of a theory or an auxiliary hypothesis. This Element analyses Duhem's response to holism and subsequent accounts of how the problem can be resolved.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009004657
Milena Ivanova (University of Cambridge).
The Aesthetics of Scientific Experiments. Philosophy Compass.
Abstract
This article explores the aesthetic dimensions of scientific experimentation, addressing specifically how aesthetic features enter the construction, evaluation and reception of an experiment. I highlight the relationship between experiments and artistic acts in the early years of the Royal Society where experiments do not serve only epistemic aims but also aim to generate feelings of awe and pleasure. I turn to analysing which aspects of experiments are appreciated aesthetically, identifying several contenders, from the ability of an experiment to uncover nature's beauty, to encapsulating original designs and human creativity. Following this analysis, I focus on the notion of beauty: what makes an experiment beautiful? Several common qualities are explored, from the simplicity and economy of the experiment, to the significance of the experimental results.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12730
Natalia Carrillo and Tarja Knuuttila (University of Vienna)
“An artefactual perspective on idealization: Galvanic cells and electric circuits in nerve signal research.” In: Alejandro Cassini y Juan Redmond (ed.) Models and Idealizations in Science: Fictional and Artefactual Approaches (Cham: Springer).
Abstract:
There are two traditions of thinking about idealization offering almost opposite views on their functioning and epistemic status. While one tradition views idealizations as epistemic deficiencies, the other one highlights the epistemic benefits of idealization. Both of these accounts agree in that idealizations are deliberate misrepresentations. In this article, we approach idealization from the artifactual account of models, comparing it to the traditional accounts of idealization as misrepresentation, and exemplifying it through the case of the Hodgkin and Huxley model of nerve impulse. From the artifactual perspective, the epistemic benefits and deficiencies introduced by idealization frequently come in a package due to the way idealization draws together different resources in model construction. Accordingly, idealization tends to be holistic in that it is not often easily attributable to just some specific parts of the model. We argue that the artifactual approach lends a unifying view into idealization in that it is able to recover several basic philosophical insights motivating both the deficiency and epistemic benefit accounts, being simultaneously detached from the idea of distortion by misrepresentation.
Keywords: scientific modeling, representation, artifactual account, Hodgkin and Huxley Model
Links: https://philpapers.org/rec/KNUAAP, https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783030658014
Poliseli, L (Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution and Cognition Research); Russo, F. (University of Amsterdam).
Philosophy of science in practice and weak scientism together apart. In. Mizrahi M (ed) For and Against Scientism: science, methodology and the future of philosophy (Roman & Littlefield). forthcoming
Abstract:
The term ‘scientism’ has not attracted consensus about its meaning or about its scope of application. In this paper, we consider Mizrahi’s suggestion to distinguish ‘Strong’ and ‘Weak’ scientism, and the consequences this distinction may have for philosophical methodology. While we side with Mizrahi that his definitions help advance the debate, by avoiding verbal dispute and focussing on questions of method, we also have concerns about his proposal as it defends a hierarchy of knowledge production. Mizrahi’s position is that Weak Scientism should be adopted, stating that “of all the knowledge we have, scientific knowledge is the best knowledge”. This version of scientism, however, has consequences for philosophical methodology. In particular, if one conceives of philosophy as an a priori discipline and holds Weak Scientism, the introduction of empirical methods in philosophy may threaten its very essence or soul. In this chapter, we will defend the move to adopt empirical methods in philosophy and argue that, rather than threatening its essence or soul, these methods put philosophy in a better position to contribute to knowledge production, an endeavour shared with the sciences, and in a very interdisciplinary spirit. Our point of disagreement with Mizrahi is that we should avoid any hierarchy of knowledge, and instead focus on what each perspective -- scientific, philosophical, historical, or other -- can contribute to understanding phenomena.
Ludwig, D. (Wageningen University & Research); Inkeri, K (Tampere University); Mncube, Z (University of Johannesburg); Poliseli, L. (Konrad Lorenz Insitute for Evolution and Cognition Research); Reyes-Galindo, L. (Wageningen University).
Global Epistemologies and Philosophies of Science. Routledge, 2021.
Abstract:
In bringing together a global community of philosophers, Global Epistemologies and Philosophies of Science develops novel perspectives on epistemology and philosophy of science by demonstrating how frameworks from academic philosophy (e.g. standpoint theory, social epistemology, feminist philosophy of science) and related fields (e.g. decolonial studies, transdisciplinarity, global history of science) can contribute to critical engagement with global dimensions of knowledge and science
Global challenges such as climate change, food production, and infectious diseases raise complex questions about scientific knowledge production and its interactions with local knowledge systems and social realities. As academic philosophy provides relatively little reflection on global negotiations of knowledge, many pressing scientific and societal issues remain disconnected from core debates in epistemology and philosophy of science.
This book is an invitation to broaden agendas of academic philosophy by presenting epistemology and philosophy of science as globally engaged fields that address heterogeneous forms of knowledge production and their interactions with local livelihoods, practices, and worldviews. This integrative ambition makes the book equally relevant for philosophers and interdisciplinary scholars who are concerned with methodological and political challenges at the intersection of science and society.
Link: https://www.routledge.com/Global-Epistemologies-and-Philosophies-of-Science/Ludwig-Koskinen-Mncube-Poliseli-Reyes-Galindo/p/book/9780367461379
Poliseli, L (Konrad Lorenz Insitute for Evolution and Cognition Research); Leite, CMP (Federal University of Bahia).
Developing transdisciplinary practices: an interplay between disagreement and trust. In.: Ludwig, D; Inkeri, K; Mncube, Z; Poliseli, L; Reyes-Galindo, L. . Global Epistemologies and Philosophies of Science. Routledge, 2021.
Abstract:
Inter- and transdisciplinary research arise as necessary conditions to address societal problems. These collaborations, by definition, encompass experts from distinct domains, demanding an epistemic dependence between researchers. In such cases where, additionally, epistemic asymmetry exists, this might then lead to tensions and enhance epistemic disagreements. How should scholars behave when in peer disagreement? On the one hand, in philosophical literature on epistemology of disagreement, normative accounts about how one should respond when facing an epistemic disagreement are usually built upon hypothetical scenarios that do not portray real-life disagreements in scientific settings. On the other hand, Science and Technology Studies (STS) research that deals with academic and scientific disagreement typically uses a descriptive, empirical approach. We argue that before a normative account of responses to disagreement is developed, we need to understand how academic disagreement actually takes place in real interdisciplinary scientific practice. In this chapter, we address a case of academic disagreement within an interdisciplinary research team in Brazil during their development of a framework for transdisciplinary collaboration. Data was collected with ethnographic tools, while the analytic perspective of the investigation is grounded on recent debates about research groups in social epistemology and in the epistemology of disagreement. We will show that an interplay between trust and disagreement is required for dealing with inter- and transdisciplinary research practices. We hold that shedding light into disagreements and communications between collaborators may improve the epistemic performance of collaborative research teams by refining the dynamics of inter- and transdisciplinary investigations.
Link: https://www.routledge.com/Global-Epistemologies-and-Philosophies-of-Science/Ludwig-Koskinen-Mncube-Poliseli-Reyes-Galindo/p/book/9780367461379
Duško Prelević (Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade)
The Chalmers Trilemma Re-examined
Journal of Philosophical Research 46: 345‒361, 2021.
Abstract:
The Continuum Hypothesis seems to be a counterexample to David Chalmers's A Priori Scrutability thesis, according to which there is a compact class of truths (the scrutability base) from which all truths are a priori scrutable. Chalmers's three-part answer to this problem (which I call the “Chalmers trilemma”) runs as follows: either the Continuum Hypothesis is indeterminate; or adding a new axiom will settle the issue; or, if these two options do not work, we should add the Continuum Hypothesis (or its negation) to the scrutability base. I argue that Chalmers's answer is unsatisfactory: the first horn of the trilemma can be interpreted in several ways, and either it departs from common mathematical practice and rests on weak analogies, or it shares the same problems with two other horns; the second horn does not provide good reasons to believe that from a fixed system of axioms all truths about our world are scrutable; the third horn of the trilemma renders Chalmers's project empty.
Link: https://doi.org/10.5840/jpr2021825172
Tomáš Marvan (Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences)
Was Wegner Rejecting Mental Causality? Theory and Psychology.
Abstract:
Daniel Wegner’s theory of apparent mental causation is often misread. His aim was not to question the causal effectiveness of conscious mental states, such as intentions. Rather, he attempted to show that our subjective sense of agency is not a completely reliable indicator of the causality of action, and needs to be replaced by more objective means of inquiry.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1177/09593543211000820
Tomáš Marvan (Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences)
Marek Havlík (National Institute of Mental Health, Klecany)
Is Predictive Processing a Theory of Perceptual Consciousness? New Ideas in Psychology 61.
Abstract:
Predictive Processing theory, hotly debated in neuroscience, psychology and philosophy, promises to explain a number of perceptual and cognitive phenomena in a simple and elegant manner. In some of its versions, the theory is ambitiously advertised as a new theory of conscious perception. The task of this paper is to assess whether this claim is realistic. We will be arguing that the Predictive Processing theory cannot explain the transition from unconscious to conscious perception in its proprietary terms. The explanations offer by PP theorists mostly concern the preconditions of conscious perception, leaving the genuine material substrate of consciousness untouched.
Link: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0732118X20302129?via%3Dihub
Published in 2020
Agustina Borella (ESEADE University Institute, Argentina)
TRAZOS Ensayos de Filosofía para el Mundo Social. Grupo Unión, Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires.
Abstract:
Entender algo sobre un mundo que se nos presenta de modo desordenado e incompleto constituye buena parte de la tarea de la filosofía y de la ciencia.
La racionalidad, los modelos, y el mundo social introducen preocupaciones propias de la filosofía de la ciencia en general y de la epistemología de la economía en particular.
Los aportes de Popper, Lawson, Mäki, Hayek y Cartwright se expresan en estos trazos como intentos abiertos para alcanzar a comprender nuestro mundo.
English:
To understand something about a world, that is presented to us in a disorderly and incomplete way, is a large part of the task of philosophy and science.
Rationality, models and the social world introduce specific issues of philosophy of science in general and of epistemology of economics in particular.
The contributions of Popper, Lawson, Maki, Hayek and Cartwright are expressed in these strokes as open attempts to understand our world.
Link to the book: https://www.amazon.com/dp/B08FMSXNQV/ref=cm_sw_r_fa_dp_DcSnFb3XRPQQH?fbclid=IwAR1XsryCgzcCZjlbztz_hI17g1XMm0FFSpPDKNff11um1p03I3_qHmiqDi8
Anguel S. Stefanov (Institute of Philosophy and Sociology at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences)
Space and Time: Philosophical Problems. Minkowski Institute Press, Montreal.
Abstract:
The monograph comprises interconnected philosophical analyses of issues related to the nature of space, time and spacetime – that of the very existence of space and time, transcendental philosophy of space and time, whether there exists a middle way between the A- and B-theories of time, the growing block theory, the phenomenology of temporal passage, whether time flows at any rate, the relationalist-substantivalist debate and time travel. Two essays on Zeno’s paradoxes and on the arrow of time and irreversible processes are included as appendices. The book can also serve as a textbook of a course on the philosophy of space, time and spacetime.
Link: http://www.minkowskiinstitute.org/mip/books/stefanov2.html
Benjamin Wilck (Humboldt-Universitaet zu Berlin, Department of Philosophy)
Euclid’s Kinds and (Their) Attributes. History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis, 23(2), 362-397.
Abstract:
Relying upon a very close reading of all of the definitions given in Euclid’s Elements, I argue that this mathematical treatise contains a philosophical treatment of mathematical objects. Specifically, I show that Euclid draws elaborate metaphysical distinctions between (i) substances and non-substantial attributes of substances, (ii) different kinds of substance, and (iii) different kinds of non-substance. While the general meta-physical theory adopted in the Elements resembles that of Aristotle in many respects, Euclid does not employ Aristotle’s terminology, or indeed, any philosophical terminology at all. Instead, Euclid systematically uses different types of definition to distinguish between metaphysically different kinds of mathematical object.
Link: https://philpapers.org/rec/WILEKA
Benjamin Wilck (Humboldt-Universitaet zu Berlin, Department of Philosophy)
Can the Pyrrhonian Sceptic Suspend Belief Regarding Scientific Definitions?: Geometry and Scepticism Reconsidered. History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis, 23(1), 253-288.
Abstract:
In this article, I tackle a heretofore unnoticed difficulty with the application of Pyrrhonian scepticism to science. Sceptics can suspend belief regarding a dogmatic proposition only by setting up opposing arguments or considerations for and against that proposition. Since Sextus provides arguments exclusively against particular geometrical definitions in Adversus Mathematicos III, commentators have argued that Sextus’ method is not scepticism, but negative dogmatism. However, commentators have overlooked the fact that arguments or considerations in favour of particular geometrical definitions were absent in ancient geometry, and hence unavailable to Sextus. While this might explain why they are also absent from Sextus’ text, I survey and evaluate various strategies to supply arguments in support of particular geometrical definitions.
Link: https://philpapers.org/rec/WILCTP-9
Borut Trpin (MCMP/LMU Munich)
Jeffrey conditionalization: proceed with caution. Philosophical Studies, 177(10), 2985-3012.
Abstract:
It has been argued that if the rigidity condition is satisfied, a rational agent operating with uncertain evidence should update her subjective probabilities by Jeffrey conditionalization (JC) or else a series of bets resulting in a sure loss could be made against her (the Dynamic Dutch Book Argument). We show, however, that even if the rigidity condition is satisfied, it is not always safe to update probability distributions by JC because there exist such sequences of non-misleading uncertain observations where it may be foreseen that an agent who updates her subjective probabilities by JC will end up nearly certain that a false hypothesis is true. We analyze the features of JC that lead to this problem, specify the conditions in which it arises and respond to potential objections.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01356-3
Daniel Kostić (Institute for Science in Society (ISiS), Radboud University, The Netherlands)
General Theory of Topological Explanations and Explanatory Asymmetry. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 375: 20190321.
Abstract:
In this paper, I present a general theory of topological explanations, and illustrate its fruitfulness by showing how it accounts for explanatory asymmetry. My argument is developed in three steps. In the first step, I show what it is for some topological property A to explain some physical or dynamical property B. Based on that, I derive three key criteria of successful topological explanations: a criterion concerning the facticity of topological explanations, i.e. what makes it true of a particular system; a criterion for describing counterfactual dependencies in two explanatory modes, i.e. the vertical and the horizontal and, finally, a third perspectival one that tells us when to use the vertical and when to use the horizontal mode. In the second step, I show how this general theory of topological explanations accounts for explanatory asymmetry in both the vertical and horizontal explanatory modes. Finally, in the third step, I argue that this theory is universally applicable across biological sciences, which helps in unifying essential concepts of biological networks.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2019.0321
Daniel Kostić (Institute for Science in Society (ISiS), Radboud University, The Netherlands)
Claus C. Hilgetag (Institute of Computational Neuroscience, University Medical Center Hamburg-Eppendorf, Hamburg, Germany)
Marc Tittgemeyer (Max-Planck-Institut for Metabolism Research, Translational Neurocircuitry, and Cluster of Excellence in Cellular Stress and Aging-Associated Disease (CECAD), Cologne, Germany)
Unifying the Essential Concepts of Biological Networks. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 375: 20190314.
Abstract:
Over the last decades, network-based approaches have become highly popular in diverse fields of biology, including neuroscience, ecology, molecular biology and genetics. While these approaches continue to grow very rapidly, some of their conceptual and methodological aspects still require a programmatic foundation. This challenge particularly concerns the question of whether a generalized account of explanatory, organizational and descriptive levels of networks can be applied universally across biological sciences. To this end, this highly interdisciplinary theme issue focuses on the definition, motivation and application of key concepts in biological network science, such as explanatory power of distinctively network explanations, network levels and network hierarchies.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2019.0314
Jaana Eigi (University of Tartu)
Are Experts Representative of Non-Experts? Elective Modernism, Aspects of Representation, and the Argument from Inductive Risk
Perspectives on Science 28(4), 459-481
Abstract:
The approach to expert communities and political representation of non-experts in Harry Collins and Robert Evans’ elective modernism reflects the conviction that experts are not representative of ordinary citizens. I use an analysis of aspects of representation and the argument from inductive risk to argue that experts can be seen as representative of (some) non-experts, when we understand representation as resemblance based on shared social perspectives and acknowledge the inevitable involvement of such perspectives in decisions under inductive risk. This, in turn, has implications for some of the proposals about practices and institutions made in elective modernism.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1162/posc_a_00347
Luana Poliseli (Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution and Cognition Research (KLI), Klosterneuburg, Austria)
Emergence of scientific understanding in real-time ecological research practice. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences
Abstract:
Scientific understanding as a subject of inquiry has become widely discussed in philosophy of science and is often addressed through case studies from history of science. Even though these historical reconstructions engage with details of scientific practice, they usually provide only limited information about the gradual formation of understanding in ongoing processes of model and theory construction. Based on a qualitative ethnographic study of an ecological research project, this article shifts attention from understanding in the context of historical case studies to evidence of current case studies. By taking de Regt’s (Understanding scientific understanding. Oxford University Press, New York, 2017) contextual theory of scientific understanding into the field, it confirms core tenets of the contextual theory (e.g. the crucial role of visualization and visualizability) suggesting a normative character with respect to scientific activities. However, the case study also shows the limitations of de Regt’s latest version of this theory as an attempt to explain the development of understanding in current practice. This article provides a model representing the emergence of scientific understanding that exposes main features of scientific understanding such as its gradual formation, its relation to skills and imagination, and its capacity for knowledge selectivity. The ethnographic evidence presented here supports the claim that something unique can be learned by looking into ongoing research practices that can’t be gained by studying historical case studies.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40656-020-00338-7
Tomáš Marvan (Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences)
Michal Polák (University of West Bohemia, Pilsen)
Generality and content-specificity in the study of the neural correlates of perceptual consciousness. Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, 1(II).
Abstract:
The claim of this paper is that the NCC notion, as applied to conscious perceptual episodes, needs to be reconceptualized. It mixes together the processing related to the perceived contents and the neural substrate of consciousness proper, i.e. mechanisms making the perceptual contents conscious. We thus propose that the perceptual NCC be divided into two constitutive subnotions. The main theoretical idea that emerges as a consequence of this reconceptualization is that the neural correlate of a perceptual episode is formed in the neural interaction between content-processing and consciousness-conferring mechanisms. The paper elaborates this distinction, marshals some initial arguments in its favour, and tests it against some of the most debated theories of consciousness.
Link: https://philosophymindscience.org/index.php/phimisci/article/view/61
Vassil Vidinsky (Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski”)
(Post) phenomenological Approach to Homo Sapiens Technicus. Balkan Journal of Philosophy, 12(1), 31-36.
Abstract:
In this paper I use a (post)phenomenological approach to clarify the objective cultural expansion of our technology. Thus, I establish a conceptual analogy between two different philosophical analyses of human–machine relations – one historical and one phenomenological. I develop the analogy between them and their corresponding concepts in several steps. (1) First, I present the Homo sapiens technicus tendency and then the phenomenological differentiation between body schema and body image. All of these elucidate our involvement with machines. (2) Then, I conceptualize the term ‘context’, coupling its structural stability with the idea of distextaulity in order to achieve a better empirical understanding of our technological contradictions. (3) I continue to develop and enrich the analogy by illuminating the functional similarities – fluid boundary, automation, complexity – between contextual structures on the one hand and body schemata on the other. (4) Finally, I explore a deeper causal and narrative connection between those strands, shedding light on an interesting twofold circularity: a circular causation and a double narrative within Homo sapiens technicus.
Link: https://doi.org/10.5840/bjp20201215
Vlasta Sikimić (University of Tübingen)
Tijana Nikitović (University of Belgrade)
Miljan Vasić (University of Belgrade)
Vanja Subotić (University of Belgrade)
Do Political Attitudes Matter for Epistemic Decisions of Scientists? Review of Philosophy and Psychology.
Abstract:
The epistemic attitudes of scientists, such as epistemic tolerance and authoritarianism, play important roles in the discourse about rivaling theories. Epistemic tolerance stands for the mental attitude of an epistemic agent, e.g., a scientist, who is open to opposing views, while epistemic authoritarianism represents the tendency to uncritically accept views of authorities. Another relevant epistemic factor when it comes to the epistemic decisions of scientists is the skepticism towards the scientific method. However, the question is whether these epistemic attitudes are influenced by their sociopolitical counterparts, such as the researcher’s degree of conservatism. To empirically investigate the interplay between epistemic and sociopolitical attitudes of scientists, we conducted a survey with researchers (N = 655) across different disciplines. We propose scales for measuring epistemic tolerance and epistemic authoritarianism, as well as a scale for detecting the participants' readiness to question the scientific method. Furthermore, we investigate the relationship between epistemic tolerance and epistemic authoritarianism on the one hand, and career stage and sociopolitical views on the other hand. Interestingly, our study found only small correlations between the participants' degree of conservatism and their epistemic attitudes. This suggests that sociopolitical views, against common argumentation, actually do not play an important role in one’s scientific decisions. Moreover, social scientists scored higher on the epistemic tolerance and lower on the epistemic authoritarianism scale than natural scientists. Finally, the results indicate that natural scientists question the scientific method less than social scientists.
Link: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13164-020-00504-7
