Publications by EENPS members
Information about recent publications by the members of the EENPS
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We are starting a new activity in scope of the EENPS with the goal of promoting and amplifying the research by our members.
The idea is that we circulate our new and recent research output through website and our social media accounts (Facebook, Twitter). We plan to also circulate your research through our mailing list, but to not clutter your inboxes too much, we will just make an occasional digest containing the info about multiple new papers.
If you would like us to showcase your recent research, please send the following to [email protected]:
1. Name(s) and affiliation(s) of the author(s)
2. Title of your paper
3. Short abstract (feel free to use the abstract of the paper)
4. Link to the paper (DOI link is the most reliable, but other links are OK too)
5. If you are on Twitter, your username, so we can tag you.
All EENPS members are welcome to participate.
The idea is that we circulate our new and recent research output through website and our social media accounts (Facebook, Twitter). We plan to also circulate your research through our mailing list, but to not clutter your inboxes too much, we will just make an occasional digest containing the info about multiple new papers.
If you would like us to showcase your recent research, please send the following to [email protected]:
1. Name(s) and affiliation(s) of the author(s)
2. Title of your paper
3. Short abstract (feel free to use the abstract of the paper)
4. Link to the paper (DOI link is the most reliable, but other links are OK too)
5. If you are on Twitter, your username, so we can tag you.
All EENPS members are welcome to participate.
Publications are listed by rounds of notification
34th round
Sebastian Fortin, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, Argentina
Matias Pasqualini, Instituto de Investigaciones “Dr. Adolfo Prieto”, Universidad Nacional de Rosario, Rosario, Argentina
Emergence-free duality: Phonons and vibrating atoms in crystalline solids, Foundations of Physics, 55, article number 24, 2025. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-025-00834-5
ABSTRACT
The crystalline solids admit two models: the one of vibrating atoms and the one of phonons. The model of phonons allows explaining certain properties of crystalline solids that the model of vibrating atoms does not allow. Usually, the model of phonons is assigned a diminished ontological status as quasi-particles. Recently, there has been a proposal to homologate the ontological status of phonons with that of emergent particles, such as photons. In this article, this proposal will be critically examined, and it will be proposed that the model of phonons and the model of vibrating atoms could be considered in ontological parity.
Anna Alexandrova, Cambridge University
The inexact and separate science of economics: by D. M. Hausman, Cambridge University Press, 2023, 2nd edition Cambridge, UK, $44.99 (paperback), ISBN: 9781009320276, Length: 450 pages, Journal of Economic Methodology, 1–4. https://doi.org/10.1080/1350178X.2025.2499379
Anna Alexandrova
Social science: A constructivist account, forthcoming in Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 2025. https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.115918
ABSTRACT
What sort of inquiry is social science? This question used to preoccupy philosophers but fell off their agenda due to a stalemate between so-called naturalists, who took the ideal to be natural science, and exceptionalists, who allied social sciences with humanities. I show that both positions commit the error of contrastivism, namely defining social science in contrast to these two traditions, which inevitably ends up caricaturing and essentialising them. Using recent advances in social epistemology and political theory, I formulate constructivism about social sciences, a view that denies an essence to this inquiry and grounds it in the needs of communities to understand and improve themselves.
Dimitrios Panayotopoulos-Tsiros, Owen Garling, Rosa Marks, Anna Alexandrova, Diane Coyle, & Michael Kenny
Measuring social and cultural infrastructure. The British Academy: London, 2025 (report). doi.org/10.5871/infrastructure/measuring
Anguel Stefanov, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences
Changing views of space, time, and the universe, Lambert Academic Publishing, 2025.
ABSTRACT
The book explores how and why contemporary scientific knowledge undergoes conceptual shifts in its understanding of space, time, and the Universe. It argues for the substantive nature of spacetime and presents gravitational interaction not as a force field - unlike electromagnetic, weak, and strong interactions. The narrative revisits Einstein's so-called "biggest blunder" in light of his philosophical realism. It also examines how philosophical and aesthetical preferences influence modern cosmological theories. Finally, the book offers a critical analysis of the three main versions of the Anthropic Principle.
33rd round
Richard David-Rus, Institute of Anthropology Romanian Academy
Defending understanding without explanation. In: Mărăşoiu, A.I., & Dumitru, M. (Eds.). (2024). Understanding and Conscious Experience: Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives (1st ed.). Routledge, pp. 258. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003437239
ABSTRACT
The present chapter aims to reject a bold critique raised against understanding without explanation (UwE). It begins by reviewing the way UwE was reflected during the last two decades of the debate on understanding. It continues by introducing Lipton’s account of UwE and the general lines along which Khalifa articulates his critique of UwE. The critique is rejected in two ways. First, it discloses Khalifa’s incorrect reconstruction of Lipton’s basic assumptions and argument. The second challenge rejects the more general argumentative strategy deployed by Khalifa in dealing with UwE cases in showing that the explanatory sort of understanding always surpasses the non-explanatory form. The case of UwE through merely potential explanation will be used to exemplify the argument.
Chapter link: https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003437239-6/defending-understanding-without-explanation-richard-david-rus
Andrei Ionuț Mărăşoiu Mircea Dumitru, University of Bucharest
Understanding and Conscious Experience: Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives (1st ed.). (2024). Routledge, pp. 258. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003437239
ABSTRACT
This volume explores how understanding relates to conscious experience. In doing so, it builds bridges between different philosophical disciplines and provides a metaphysically robust characterization of understanding, both in and beyond science. The past two decades have witnessed growing interest from epistemologists, philosophers of science, philosophers of mind and ethicists in the nature and value of intellectual understanding. This volume features original essays on understanding and the phenomenal experiences that underlie it. The chapters are divided into three thematic sections. Part 1 provides theoretical characterizations of understanding, including Henk de Regt’s defense of a contextual theory of scientific understanding and a debate on whether scientific inference and explanatory power are necessary or central features of understanding. Part 2 explores how conscious experience and understanding are related. The chapters articulate a phenomenal theory of understanding and address themes that are connected to understanding, including awareness, transformative experiences and exemplification. Finally, Part 3 is devoted to domain-specific inquiries about understanding, such as logical proofs, particle physics and moral understanding. Understanding and Conscious Experience will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in the philosophy of science, epistemology, philosophy of mind, ethics and phenomenology.
Link: https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/edit/10.4324/9781003437239/understanding-conscious-experience-andrei-ionu%C8%9B-m%C4%83r%C4%83%C5%9Foiu-mircea-dumitru?refId=69378ecd-b362-43a3-8c4b-26c330cdfcb7&context=ubx
Lilia Gurova, New Bulgarian University
Understanding and inference in recent works on scientific understanding. In: Mărăşoiu, A.I., & Dumitru, M. (Eds.). (2024). Understanding and Conscious Experience: Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives (1st ed.). Routledge, pp. 258. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003437239
ABSTRACT
Over the past two decades, the literature on scientific understanding has been dominated by discussions on topics such as ‘understanding and knowledge’, ‘understanding and truth’, ‘explanation and understanding’, and similar. These topics inspired heated debates among the scholars of understanding, but they also blurred certain important similarities in their views. It is possible, however, to look at the seemingly diverse accounts of understanding from a different perspective. This chapter shows how the explications of the relationship between understanding and inference found in three recent books point to a minimal inferential account of understanding, built on the assumption that the recognized manifestations of understanding are always associated with certain demonstrations of inferential abilities. The most interesting corollaries of this assumption are discussed to illuminate the connections between prediction and understanding, and between categorization and understanding.
Chapter link: Understanding and inference in recent works on scientific understandin
Anna Martin, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Science
Shared agency in complex settings. Philosophy and Science Philosophical and Interdisciplinary Studies (pol. Filozofia i Nauka. Studia Filozoficzne i Interdyscyplinarne, vol. 13, 2025, pp. 133–152. https://filozofiainauka.studiafilozoficzne.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Martin_133.pdf
ABSTRACT
The paper begins by identifying two opposing approaches to (shared) agency— the standard model and the dynamical model. Despite differences between them, both models essentially converge upon the belief that shared agency entails direct mutual influence between agents, in the form of either mutual control or mutual responsiveness, respectively. This assumption becomes problematic when applied to interdisciplinary practices, like interdisciplinary research, which involve role specialization and thus do not lend themselves to an explanation in terms of direct mutual influence. In response to this difficulty, the paper advances a third approach— referred to here as the regulatory model (e.g., Schore, 2000)—which explains shared agency in terms of loose coupling (Gruber, Bödeker, 2005) understood as a pattern of cyclical organization of action in the course of which different positions (perspectives, agendas) are first differentiated during the exploratory phase and then integrated, giving rise to a dialogical from of self-organization.
Kadri Simm, Jaana Eigi-Watkin, University of Tartu
Diverse Sources of Normativity in Open Science and Their Implications for Ethical Governance. Royal Society Open Science (2024). https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rsos.240480
ABSTRACT
Over the past decade, open science (OS) has emerged as a global science policy and research initiative with implications for most aspects of research, including planning, funding, publishing, evaluation, data sharing and access. As OS has gained increasing prominence, it has also faced substantial criticism. Whether it is the worries about the equality of access associated with open-access publishing or the more recent allegations of OS benefitting those who act in the private interest without giving back to OS, there are, indeed, many potential as well as actual harms that can be linked to the practice of OS. These criticisms often revolve around ethical challenges and fairness concerns, prompting the question of whether a comprehensive ethical governance framework is needed for OS. This commentary contends that owing to the heterogeneous nature of the normative foundations of OS and the inherent diversity within scientific practices, a pluralistic and deliberative approach to governance is needed.
32rd round (3/25)
Kubiak, A.P., (Warsaw University of Technology), (2025). "Perspectival Realism and Frequentist Statistics: The Case of Jerzy Neyman’s Methodology and Philosophy." Synthese 205, 13
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-024-04842-2
Abstract In this article I investigate the extent to which perspectival realism (PR) agrees with frequentist statistical methodology and philosophy, with an emphasis on J. Neyman’s frequentist statistical methods and philosophy. PR is clarified in the context of frequentist statistics. Based on the example of the stopping rule problem, PR is shown to be able to naturally be associated with frequentist statistics in general. I show that there are explicit and implicit aspects of Neyman’s methods and philosophy that are incompatible and both partially agree and disagree with PR. Additionally, I provide clarifications and interpretations to make Neyman’s methods and philosophy more coherent with the realist aspect of PR. Furthermore, I deliver an argument that, based on Neyman’s methods and philosophy, one is dealing with genuine and non-trivial perspectives. I argue that, despite Neyman being a normative anti-pluralist, there are some elements of perspectival pluralism present in his methods and philosophy. In conclusion, firstly, due to their ambivalence, Neyman’s conceptions align more closely with PR than with alternative, less moderate stances. Secondly, from the perspective of the statistical approach analysed, PR should be treated as a descriptive rather than a normative position, and as case (or aspect)-dependent, rather than a universal, absolute, or binding stance.
Greif, H., Kubiak, A.P., Stacewicz, P., (Warsaw University of Technology), (2024). “Selection, growth and form. Turing’s two biological paths towards intelligent machinery.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 106, pp. 126-135.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.05.017
Abstract We inquire into the role of Turing’s biological thought in the development of his concept of intelligent machinery. We trace the possible relations between his proto-connectionist notion of ‘organising’ machines in Turing (1948) on the one hand and his mathematical theory of morphogenesis in developmental biology (1952) on the other. These works were concerned with distinct fields of inquiry and followed distinct paradigms of biological theory, respectively postulating analogues of Darwinian selection in learning and mathematical laws of form in organic pattern formation. Still, these strands of Turing’s work are related, first, in terms of being amenable in principle to his (1936) computational method of modelling. Second, they are connected by Turing’s scattered speculations about the possible bearing of learning processes on the anatomy of the brain. We argue that these two theories form an unequal couple that, from different angles and in partial fashion, point towards cognition as a biological and embodied phenomenon while, for reasons inherent to Turing’s computational approach to modelling, not being capable of directly addressing it as such. We explore ways in which these two distinct-but-related theories could be more explicitly and systematically connected, using von Neumann’s contemporaneous and related work on Cellular Automata and more recent biomimetic approaches as a foil. We conclude that the nature of ‘initiative’ and the mode of material realisation are the key issues that decide on the possibility of intelligent machinery in Turing.
31st round (12/24)
Fabian, Mark, Anna Alexandrova, Diane Coyle, Matthew Agarwala, and Marco Felici. (2024). "Wellbeing public policy needs more theory." International Journal of Wellbeing, 14(3).
Abstract Advocacy for ‘wellbeing public policy’ (WPP) requires suitable evidence. Endorsing the ambition to focus policy on wellbeing outcomes, we nevertheless argue that the current evidence base is deficient due to a lack of theory. For the purposes of our analysis, we identify theory narrowly with conceptual clarity and the modelling of causal mechanisms underlying statistical regularities. The prevailing focus on identifying ‘drivers’ of wellbeing and their effect sizes is not well suited for such theorising. We show that this status quo creates potential for conceptual confusion, incorrect aggregation, poor robustness and external validity of policy evaluations, inept interventions, and raises the prospect of a ‘Lucas critique’ in wellbeing economics. We discuss what sort of theory addresses these pitfalls, and where WPP could proceed fruitfully even in the absence of such theory. Ultimately, we call upon wellbeing experts to invest in developing theory as this would improve the basis for WPP and outcomes for those affected by it. Moreover, such theoretical contributions from the field of WPP could spillover to other disciplines, extending the reach and influence of wellbeing research.
Elena Popa (2024). Just pluralism: thinking about concepts of mental disorder in global context. Synthese, 204(3), 83. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-024-04724-7
Abstract This paper will investigate justice requirements that a pluralist stance on concepts of mental disorder should meet for use on a global scale. This is important given that different concepts of mental disorder are connected to particular interventions which may be more or less successful in specific contexts. While taking a broadly normative view on mental disorders, I will describe relevant concepts in a more fine grained manner, referring to their connections to particular approaches to biology, the self, or community. Drawing on research on epistemic injustice, I highlight the requirement that the set of multiple concepts be sufficiently flexible to enable the participation of those possessing relevant local knowledge. Using insights from health justice, I point out that the set of concepts should be conducive to distributive and procedural justice with regard to mental health and should support interventions on social determinants of health. These requirements apply to two dimensions of pluralism: regarding what concepts to include and how to relate them to one another. I conclude by explaining how an ontology of partial overlaps connected to a concept of health as metaphysically social can help address the challenges arising particularly regarding the latter dimension.
Elena Popa (Jagiellonian University). (2024). Values in public health: an argument from trust. Synthese, 203(6), 200. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-024-04650-8
Abstract Research on the role of values in science and objectivity has typically approached trust through its epistemic aspects. Yet, recent work on public trust in science has emphasized the role of non-epistemic values in building and maintaining trust. This paper will use a concept of trust that adds concerns about justice to epistemic conditions to investigate this problem in relation to public health. I will argue that trust-conducive values, particularly justice, are relevant in deciding which value influences are legitimate in scientific decision-making. Drawing on public health ethics, I will provide a consequentialist justification for employing trust-conducive values. While several concepts of justice have been explored in the context of public health, I will further draw on public health ethics, focusing on a view that brings together both distributive and procedural aspects. For illustration, I will use the case of cardiovascular disease prevention, particularly how concerns about justice apply when choosing between population-based and individual-based approaches.
30th round (07/2024)
Yilmaz, Ö. (2024). Return of the organism? The concept in plant biology, now and then. Theoretical and Experimental Plant Physiology, 1-14. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40626-024-00334-3
Abstract This essay argues for the importance of an organismic perspective in plant biology and considers some of its implications. These include an increased attention to plant-environment interaction and an emphasis on integrated approaches. Furthermore, this essay contextualizes the increased emphasis on the concept of organism in recent years and places the concept in a longer history. Recent developments in biology and worsening environmental crises have led researchers to study plant responses to chang- ing environments with whole plant approaches that situate plants in their environments, emphasizing the intricate and dynamic interaction between them. This renewed attention to the organism recalls the debates of the early twentieth century, when organicism was one of the three main frameworks in biology (along with vitalism and mechanism). Some scholars see this renewed importance today as a “return” of this earlier period. This essay argues that including insights from plant biology will benefit philosophy of biology research that examines the concept of organism and organicism now and in earlier periods. A comprehensive account of the concept of organism should involve a botanical conception of the organism as well as a zoological one (which is more frequently considered). Although this essay does not aim to present a conceptual analysis, it presents examples of how an organismic perspective can be useful for understanding concepts (such as phenotype, stress, etc.) and research processes (such as experiment set-ups, data processes, etc.) in plant biology. Philosophy of biology investigations that aim at a comprehensive understanding of the concept of organism can benefit greatly from examinations of cases in plant biology, both now and in the past.
Eigi-Watkin, J., Velbaum, K., Talpsepp, E., Lõhkivi, E. (all University of Tartu) (2024). How interdisciplinary researchers see themselves: plurality of understandings of interdisciplinarity within a field and why it matters. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 14, 13. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00572-x
Abstract: It is widely acknowledged that interdisciplinarity (ID) is very diverse. Our contribution is a demonstration that considerable diversity exists also on the level of understandings of ID that researchers working in the same ID field express. Specifically, we analyse qualitatively, building on the method of culture contrast, six interviews with researchers working in computational linguistics and language technology in Estonia. We identify six understandings of ID expressed by the interviewees: centred on an ID method; a disciplinary method in an ID field; an ID way of seeing and thinking; ID education; ID interests; one’s field as naturally ID. We show how understandings of ID are significant for analysing research practice, since they are involved in how researchers form a positive picture of themselves and their colleagues. We also show how an awareness of different understandings of ID is useful for discussing the significance of integration in ID.
Mets, A. (University of Tartu), Lõhkivi E., (University of Tartu), Müürsepp P. (Tallinn University of Technology), Eigi-Watkin, J. (University of Tartu) (eds.) (2024). Practical Realist Philosophy of Science Reflecting on Rein Vihalemm’s Ideas. Lexington Books.
https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781666937220/Practical-Realist-Philosophy-of-Science-Reflecting-on-Rein-Vihalemm%E2%80%99s-Ideas
Abstract: The Estonian philosopher of science Rein Vihalemm (1938–2015) left two prominent and fruitful philosophical-methodological legacies that continue to captivate philosophers of science: a methodological distinction of scientific disciplines and the practical realist philosophy of science. Edited by Ave Mets, Endla Lõhkivi, Peeter Müürsepp, and Jaana Eigi-Watkin, Practical Realist Philosophy of Science: Reflecting on Rein Vihalemm's Ideas explores some of these fruits that have sprung from philosophy of science, and the applications of those approaches through three main ideas: (back)grounds of the practical approach, metaphysics of practices, and special sciences. The first part features authors who juxtapose Vihalemm’s approach with those of prominent philosophers on the practical and material basis of cognition, providing support and refinement to his framework. The second part delves into the metaphysical aspects of science and practices, and comprehending them. The third part centers around examples of Vihalemm’s approach to specific scientific disciplines within chemistry, biology and humanities. These diverse implications outlined in this book, supported by solid ground and compelling argumentation, offer an original contribution to this field.
Special issue “The Philosophical Legacy of Rein Vihalemm. Reflections and Expansions” of Acta Baltica Historiae et Philosophiae Scientiarum (vol. 12, no. 1, Spring 2024). Edited by Ave Mets, Endla Lõhkivi and Peeter Müürsepp. With contributions from Jean-Pierre Llored, Juho Lindholm and Ave Mets, and a translation of Rein Vihalemm’s 1969 paper “On the Transition to Theoretical Stage of Cognition (on the Example of the History of the Study of Chemical Affinity)” (originally in Russian).
The special issue is available open access here: https://www.bahps.org/acta-baltica/abhps-12-1/
29th round (05/2024)
Seppälä, P., & Małecka, M. (2024). AI and discriminative decisions in recruitment: Challenging the core assumptions. Big Data & Society, 11(1). https://doi.org/10.1177/20539517241235872
Abstract: In this article, we engage critically with the idea of promoting artificial intelligence (AI) technologies in recruitment as tools to eliminate discrimination in decision-making. We show that the arguments for using AI technologies to eliminate discrimination in personnel selection depend on presuming specific meanings of the concepts of rationality, bias, fairness, objectivity and AI, which the AI industry and other proponents of AI-based recruitment accept as self-evident. Our critical analysis of the arguments for relying on AI to decrease discrimination in recruitment is informed by insights gleaned from philosophy and methodology of science, legal and political philosophy, and critical discussions on AI, discrimination and recruitment. We scrutinize the role of the research on cognitive biases and implicit bias in justifying these arguments – a topic overlooked thus far in the debates about practical applications of AI. Furthermore, we argue that the recent use of AI in personnel selection can be understood as the latest trend in the long history of psychometric-based recruitment. This historical continuum has not been fully recognized in current debates either, as they focus mainly on the seemingly novel and disruptive character of AI technologies.
Małecka, M. (2023). Imaginary of Behavioral Governing: From Nudges to Algorithms. Public Culture. 35 (3), 343–354. https://doi.org/10.1215/08992363-10742509
Abstract: The article introduces the concept of the imaginary of behavioral governing to capture the view on the role of behavioral research in governing behavior that is widely shared in the academic and public discussions about behavioral policy (nudging), including the recent debates about reliance on big data and algorithms to influence people's behavior. It is believed that behavioral science provides knowledge of stable regularities of behavior and of the cognitive processes that lead to them, and that policymakers/governments act upon this knowledge to change behavior of individuals. I argue that this set of claims about the knowledge provided by the behavioral sciences is not substantiated in behavioral research. The formal theoretical frameworks of behavioral science come to be interpreted — via the imaginary of behavioral governing — as relating to human agents that power can act upon. I reflect on the possible point of entry for critique of this imaginary and its effects.
Gabovich, A.M., Kuznetsov, V., Scientific realism from a polysystemic view of physical theories and their functioning. Global Philosophy 33, 53 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-023-09703-0
Abstract: One of the vividly discussed topics in the contemporary philosophy of science (especially physics) is the opposition between Realism and Anti-Realism. The supporters of the first way of thinking trust in the objective existence of realities studied by science. They consider theories as approximate descriptions of these realities (Psillos 1999, xvii), whereas their opponents do not. However, both sides base their argumentation on simplified notions of scientific theories. In this paper, we present a more general approach, which can be coined as “Theoretical Physics Realism” (TPR). It is based on the detailed reconstruction of the polysystemic nature of physical theories. The consequences of this reconstruction for understanding the genuine relationship between theories and experiments in studying the realities are indicated. The paper distinguishes between abstract (general) and domain-dependent theories and appeals to specific physical theories together with their application domains rather than general speculations.
Gabovich, A.M., Kuznetsov, V.I., Anatoly Vlasov heritage: 60-year-old controversy. EPJ H 48, 5 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1140/epjh/s13129-023-00051-6
Abstract: We analyzed remarkable stories linked to the famous Anatoly Vlasov equations in plasma physics. Their creation, modification, and application are interesting from a scientific viewpoint. We also show the relations between those equations dealing with electromagnetism and analogous Jeans equations describing, in particular, gravitational instability in astrophysics. The second half of the essay is devoted to the controversies and political struggle in Soviet (before 1991) and Russian (after 1991) physical communities related to Vlasov’s personality, career, and posthumous recognition. The never-ending destructive influence of Russian totalitarianism on science is demonstrated.
Alexander M. Gabovich and Volodymyr I. Kuznetsov. Eponyms in physics: useful tools and cultural heritage. European Physical Society, Eur. J. Phys. 45 035802. https://doi.org/10.1088/1361-6404/ad2fd7
Abstract: The recent proposition to eliminate eponyms from physical publications is discussed. The role of eponyms in research and education is analyzed. We show that eponyms constitute an integral part of physical texts and ensure the continuity of scientific research. Their proposed elimination is dangerous for science and the entire human culture and must be rejected.
Gabovich A., Kuznetsov V., Philosophy of Scientific Theories. The First Essay: Names and Realities Naukova Dumka. ISBN 978-966-00-1896-0 2023. (In Ukrainian)
Abstract: The book presents an original and generalizing substantive vision of the philosophy of science through the prism of a detailed analysis of the polysystem structure of scientific theories. Theories are considered, firstly, as complex, specialized forms of developed scientific thinking about the realities studied by natural science; secondly, as constantly improving tools for producing new knowledge in interaction with experimental research; and thirdly, as carriers of ordered and verified knowledge. Emphasis is placed on their nominal and ontic subsystems. The book develops personal and joint research of the authors (theoretical physicist and philosopher), the experience of teaching philosophy of physics at NaUKMA, philosophy of science at the Higher School of Philosophy at the H. Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and theoretical physics at the National Technical University "Ihor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute". The research is based on a significant source base covering works of modern Western researchers in natural science and philosophy of science. It is for students, teachers, and scientists who are interested in the problems of modern philosophy of science and have a certain amount of scientific knowledge. It will also be useful for high school students who are eager to become scientists.
Vladimir I. Kuznetsov, H. Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine; National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Kyiv, Ukraine. TO THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF SCIENTIFIC THEORIES. https://doi.org/10.15407/visn2023.11.03
Abstract: The article examines the relationship between science and the philosophy of science through the prism of modeling scientific theories, which are much more complex systems than are usually described in professional literature. Many specialists related to science, its teaching, and administration have simplified ideas about the component composition of theories, which are the main tools of scientific thinking. It is, therefore, necessary to develop a unifying yet detailed view of the theories. It is appropriate to base it on analyzing theories used in scientific practice. The author proposes to place a polysystemic vision of theories at the centre of the philosophy of science and other metasciences about science (the science of science, history of science, sociology of science, psychology of science, science management, etc.). Such a vision is useful for philosophers and scientists, teachers of scientific disciplines and students, those who manage science as a social institution for producing new knowledge, and those who evaluate its results. Keywords: philosophy of science, philosophy of physics, scientific theory, subsystems of scientific theories, polysystem approach.
Vladimir Kuznetsov. Chief researcher of the Department of Logic and Methodology of Science of the H. S. Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Doctor of Philosophy, Professor of Chair of Physical and Mathematical Disciplines of the National University "KyivMohyla Academy" (part-time). Philosophy of Science in Ukraine. A Personal Story. The HPS&ST Newsletter, 2023, April, Vol. 36 (3). P. 4-12. ISSN: 2652-2837. hps^l0st_news__2023_april_.pdf (hpsst.com)
Abstract: The author’s view on the Ukrainian philosophy of science in the context of his participation in its development.
28th round (03/2024)
Popa, Elena (Jagiellonian University) & Zawiła-Niedźwiecki, Jakub (University of Warsaw) & Zabdyr-Jamróz, Michał (Jagiellonian University Medical College). Policy change without ethical analysis? Commentary on the publication of Smajdor. Theor Med Bioeth 44, 379–385 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-023-09631-5
Abstract: This commentary addresses the proposal and argumentative line presented in the paper ‘Whole Body Gestational Donation’ (WBGD) by Anna Smajdor (2023), published as an intended ‘outrageous argument’ in a dedicated special issue of Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics. We believe that the paper is fatally flawed due to its lack of engagement with relevant approaches in ethics and essential sources in health sciences as well as its insufficient, superficial, and rash argumentation. Its critical weaknesses include, among others, that it does not take any explicit ethical stance, it does not consider the societal impacts of its premise, and it hastily assumes a large degree of equivalency between WBGD and the usual organ donations. These scholarly flaws are made worse by the fact that the paper is not merely an academic thought experiment but contains important policy change proposals. As a consequence, the paper feeds into more general and systemic worries about the suitability of philosophy for public policy.
Popa, Elena (Jagiellonian University). Loneliness as Cause. Topoi 42, 1175–1184 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-023-09933-2.
Abstract: While loneliness has been linked to various mental and physical health problems, the sense in which loneliness is a cause of these conditions has so far attracted little philosophical attention. This paper aims to fill this gap by analyzing research on health effects of loneliness and therapeutic interventions through current approaches to causality. To deal with the problem of causality between psychological, social, and biological variables, the paper endorses a biopsychosocial model of health and disease. I will investigate how three main approaches to causality used in psychiatry and public health apply to loneliness: interventionism, mechanisms, and dispositional theories. Interventionism can specify whether loneliness causes specific effects, or whether a treatment works, incorporating results from randomized controlled trials. Mechanisms help explain how loneliness brings about negative health effects, spelling out psychological processes involved in lonely social cognition. Dispositional approaches help stress particular features of loneliness connected to negative social interactions, such as defensiveness. I will conclude by showing that previous research alongside emerging approaches to health effects of loneliness lend themselves to analysis in terms of the causal models under discussion.
Pokropski, M. (Faculty of Philosophy, University of Warsaw), Suffczynski, P. (Faculty of Physics, University of Warsaw). First-person constraints on dynamic-mechanistic explanations in neuroscience: The case of migraine and epilepsy models. Synthese 202, 153 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04396-9
Abstract: According to recent discussion, cross-explanatory integration in cognitive science might proceed by constraints on mechanistic and dynamic-mechanistic models provided by different research fields. However, not much attention has been given to constraints that could be provided by the study of first-person experience, which in the case of multifaceted mental phenomena are of key importance. In this paper, we fill this gap and consider the question whether information about first-person experience can constrain dynamic-mechanistic models and what the character of this relation is. We discuss two cases of such explanatory models in neuroscience, namely that of migraine and of epilepsy. We argue that, in these cases, first-person insights about the target phenomena significantly contributed to explanatory models by shaping explanatory hypotheses and by indicating the dynamical properties that the explanatory models of these phenomena should account for, and thus directly constraining the space of possible explanations.
Csaba Pléh, Laying the Foundations of Independent Psychology: The Formation of Modern Psychology, Volume 1. By Routledge: https://www.routledge.com/Laying-the-Foundations-of-Independent-Psychology-The-Formation-of-Modern-Psychology-Volume-1/Pleh/p/book/9781032502762
Abstract: Part of a two-volume series, this book offers a multicentric perspective on the history of psychology, situating its development in relation to developments made in other social sciences and philosophical disciplines.
This first volume, Laying the Foundations of Independent Psychology, provides a detailed exploration of the origins and development of European psychology. The book examines psychology’s beginnings as an independent discipline in the late 19th century through to the emergence of the dominant new schools of behaviorism, Gestalt psychology and psychoanalysis in the early 1900s. This volume also offers a broad overview of the early impact of Darwinism, not only on the psychological study of individual differences and on American functionalism, but also on the early evolutionary treatments of cognition in William James, James Baldwin, Ernst Mach and even Sigmund Freud. Taking this wider perspective, the book shows that European psychology was continuously present and active, placing these European developments in their own context in their own time.
An invaluable introductory text for undergraduate students of the history of psychology, the book will also appeal to postgraduates, academics and those interested in psychology or the history of science, as well as graduate students of psychology, biology, sociology and anthropology with a theoretical interest.
Csaba Pléh, Diversification and Professionalization in Psychology: The Formation of Modern Psychology, Volume 2. By Routledge: https://www.routledge.com/Diversification-and-Professionalization-in-Psychology-The-Formation-of-Modern-Psychology-Volume-2/Pleh/p/book/9781032625775
Abstract: Diversification and Professionalization in Psychology offers readers a multicentric perspective on the history of social science and compares the developments in psychology in relation to the developments made in the other social and natural sciences.
This is the second volume about the formation of modern psychology and provides a comprehensive look into the origins and developments of modern psychology. With a large geographical coverage, European developments are put into their own context in their own time. In doing this, the book explores different early schools, from social reductionists like Durkheim, Charles Blondel, and Maurice Halbwachs, to the social debates about relativism in Lévy-Bruhl, early Piaget, the beginnings of ethology, and the semiotic approach of Karl Bühler. These thinkers are placed in relation to the recent upsurge of different social and biological theories of the mind. Throughout, the author develops a detailed presentation of the thematic development of psychology and links the history of psychology to an outline of contemporary psychology.
This is an invaluable introductory text for undergraduate students of the history of psychology and will also appeal to postgraduates, academics, and anyone interested in psychology or the history of science. It will also be of interest to graduate students of psychology, biology, sociology, and anthropology with a theoretical interest in the history of the field.
Garber, I. (2024). Meta-Anthropology: An Attractive Catchword or a Scientific Discipline?
Three Stages in the Formation of Meta-Anthropology. Human Arenas, 1-18.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s42087-024-00404-7
https://rdcu.be/dzHOi
Abstract: The purpose of the article is to present meta-anthropology as an independent scientific discipline that can be developed in the image and likeness of other meta-sciences—metamathematics and metalogic, metaethics, and meta-sociology. This means identifying and formulating key meta-problems, creating a special meta-language, developing meta-theories, and obtaining non-trivial results, at least at the level of meta-classifications. The history of meta-anthropology, summarized in the article, shows that only the first three steps have been taken along this long path. These include the creation and justification of the term, the choice of a higher-level theory for constructing the theory of the discipline (world hypotheses and root metaphors), and the proposal of a normative model. The whole process entails a transformation of the whole anthropology due to the anthropologists’ transition from thinking/thought to meta-thinking/meta-thought. We will try to show that the meta-level of analysis is useful for anthropology, generates new knowledge and ideas, and unites different areas of anthropology. Some prospects for the further development of meta-anthropology and the limitations of this study are discussed.
Subotić, V., Exploring, expounding & ersatzing: a three-level account of deep learning models in cognitive neuroscience. Synthese 203, 94 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04514-1
Abstract: Deep learning (DL) is a statistical technique for pattern classification through which AI researchers train artificial neural networks containing multiple layers that process massive amounts of data. I present a three-level account of explanation that can be reasonably expected from DL models in cognitive neuroscience and that illustrates the explanatory dynamics within a future-biased research program (Feest Philosophy of Science 84:1165–1176, 2017; Doerig et al. Nature Reviews: Neuroscience 24:431–450, 2023). By relying on the mechanistic framework (Craver Explaining the brain: Mechanisms and the mosaic unity of neuroscience. Clarendon, 2007; Stinson Eppuor si muove: Doing history and philosophy of Science with Peter Machamer. Springer, 2017, The Routledge Handbook of the computational mind. Routledge, 2018), I develop an account that corresponds to the stages of mechanism discovery, i.e., our shifting epistemic position and epistemic goals, and propose a representative model for each level. Generic, theoretical DL models at Level 1 address the general features of a cognitive phenomenon through exploration and provide us with how-possibly explanations. On the other hand, DL models at Level 2 either identify the interaction between the features or represent the epistemic stage when the researcher is still unsure if the modeled features are crucial or arbitrary. These models should provide us with how-plausibly explanations. Finally, specific DL models of specific brain areas, i.e., ersatz models filled with relevant cognitive and neuroscientific details, are at Level 3. At this level, a researcher can advance how-actually explanations of cognitive phenomena. The main strength of this account is that it elucidates both global explanatory dynamics and local explanatory dynamics (cf. Dresow Synthese 199:10441–10474, 2021). The former occurs when the transition between levels happens in accordance with the process of obtaining more details about a particular cognitive phenomenon through multiple DL models. The latter, meanwhile, involves cases in which the transition between levels takes place within a single DL model by elucidating internal mechanisms (e.g., using Explainable AI techniques for rendering models more transparent).
Published in 2023 (roughly)
27th round
Kostić, Daniel (Leiden University), Halffman, Willem (Radboud University). (2023). “Mapping Explanatory Language in Neuroscience”. Synthese 202, 112. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04329-6.
Abstract:
The philosophical literature on scientific explanation in neuroscience has been dom- inated by the idea of mechanisms. The mechanist philosophers often claim that neuroscience is in the business of finding mechanisms. This view has been chal- lenged in numerous ways by showing that there are other successful and widespread explanatory strategies in neuroscience. However, the empirical evidence for all these claims was hitherto lacking. Empirical evidence about the pervasiveness and uses of various explanatory strategies in neuroscience is particularly needed because exam- ples and case studies that are used to illustrate philosophical claims so far tend to be hand-picked. The risk of confirmation bias is therefore considerable: when looking for white swans, all one finds is that swans are white. The more systematic quantitative and qualitative bibliometric study of a large body of relevant literature that we present in this paper can put such claims into perspective. Using text mining tools, we identify the typical linguistic patterns used in the alleged mechanistic, dynamical, and topo- logical explanations in the literature, their preponderance and how they change over time. Our findings show abundant use of mechanistic language, but also the presence of a significant neuroscience literature using topological and dynamical explanatory language, which grows over time and increasingly differentiates from each other and from mechanistic explanations.
Keywords Scientific explanation · Neuroscience · Text mining · Explanatory pluralism
Kostić, Daniel (Leiden University, (2023). “On the Role of Erotetic Constraints in Non-causal Explanations”. Philosophy of Science, 1-15. doi:10.1017/psa.2023.114.
Abstract:
In noncausal explanations, some noncausal facts (such as mathematical, modal, or metaphysical) are used to explain some physical facts. However, precisely because these explanations abstract away from causal facts, they face two challenges: (1) it is not clear why one rather than the other noncausal explanantia would be relevant for the explanandum; and (2) why would standing in a particular explanatory relation (e.g., “counterfactual dependence,” “constraint,” “entailment,” “constitution,” and “grounding”), and not in some other, be explanatory. I develop an explanatory relevance account that is based on erotetic constraints and show how it addresses these two challenges.
Commentary (no abstract)
Miłkowski, Marcin (Polish Academy of Sciences), and Kostić, Daniel (Leiden University) (2023). “Forging Connections: Uniting Neuroscience and Philosophy of Science.” eLetter, Levenstein, Daniel, et al. "On the role of theory and modeling in neuroscience." Journal of Neuroscience, 43.7 (2023): 1074-1088. https://www.jneurosci.org/content/43/7/1074/tab-e-letters#forging-connections-uniting-neuroscience-and-philosophy-of-science.
26th round
Anand Vaidya and Duško Prelević (eds.) (2023)
Epistemology of Modality and Philosophical Methodology.
New York and London: Routledge.
Abstract:
This book collects original essays on the epistemology of modality and related issues in modal metaphysics and philosophical methodology.
The contributors utilize both the newer "metaphysics-first" and the more traditional "epistemology-first" approaches to these issues. The chapters on modal epistemology mostly focus on the problem of how we can gain knowledge of possibilities, which have never been actualized, or necessities which are not provable either by logico-mathematical reasoning or by linguistic competence alone. These issues are closely related to some of the central issues in philosophical methodology, notably: to what extent is the armchair methodology of philosophy a reliable guide for the formation of beliefs about what is possible and necessary. This question also relates to the nature of thought experiments that are extensively used in science and philosophy.
Epistemology of Modality and Philosophical Methodology will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working on the epistemology and metaphysics of modality, as well as those whose work is concerned with philosophical methodology more generally.
Link: https://www.routledge.com/Epistemology-of-Modality-and-Philosophical-Methodology/Vaidya-Prelevic/p/book/9780367431679
To order, use the promotional flyer: epistemology_of_modality_flyer.pdf
Duško Prelević (University of Belgrade) (2023)
"The Explanatory Power of Modal Rationalism".
In: A. Vaidya and D. Prelević (eds.), Epistemology of Modality and Philosophical Methodology. New York and London: Routledge.
Abstract:
Probably, the main objection to Chalmersian conceivability-based modal rationalism is that it cannot explain non-trivial essentialist de re modal knowledge. In particular, Sonia Roca-Royes has argued that the proponents of that view are not capable of elucidating our knowledge of interesting essentialist principles, such as the Essentiality of Origin and the Essentiality of Kind (let us say, by arguing that scenarios in which these principles are false are inconceivable) without presupposing essentialism in advance. I argue that this criticism is not metaphysically innocent, and that it can be handled once it is unfolded which theory of objecthood it presupposes. By using Gilbert Ryles’s distinction between strong and weak reductio ad absurdum and pluralism in geometry as illustrations (elsewhere, I have argued that such pluralism is in accordance with modal rationalism independently of whether modal monism is true or not), I draw the distinction between absolute and relative conceivability, arguing that the conceivability (or inconceivability) of scenarios that falsify the Essentiality of Kind and the Essentiality of Origin depends on which system of metaphysical axioms (or a set of beliefs) is presupposed. In the former case, conceivability is premised on a conception of objecthood one endorses, whereas in the latter case, some other metaphysical axioms are relevant as well. An advantage of the proposed reply to Roca-Royes’s criticism over David Chalmers’s own reply is that it does not depend on the validity of an anti-realist view of modality.
Link: https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003002192-11/explanatory-power-modal-rationalism-duško-prelević
Borut Trpin (Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy)
Trpin, B.
Against Methodological Gambling.
Erkenntnis 88, 907–927 (2023).
Abstract:
Should a scientist rely on methodological triangulation? Heesen et al. (Synthese 196(8):3067–3081, 2019) recently provided a convincing affirmative answer. However, their approach requires belief gambles if the evidence is discordant. We instead propose epistemically modest triangulation (EMT), according to which one should withhold judgement in such cases. We show that for a scientist in a methodologically diffident situation the expected utility of EMT is greater than that of Heesen et al.’s (2019) triangulation or that of using a single method. We also show that EMT is more appropriate for increasing epistemic trust in science. In short: triangulate, but do not gamble with evidence.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-021-00386-w
Tomáš Marvan (Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences)
Tomáš Marvan, Hanne Andersen, Hasok Chang, Benedikt Lōwe and Ivo Pezlar, eds,
Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science and Technology.
Bridging Across Academic Cultures. Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Congress in Prague. College Publications 2022.
Description:
This volume contains papers based on invited lectures from the 16th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science and Technology, descriptions of congress symposia, and other materials relating to the congress and DLMPST.
Link: https://www.collegepublications.co.uk/lmps/?00017
Direct OA download: http://www.collegepublications.co.uk/downloads/lmps00017.pdf
T. Marvan, M. Polák, Neurocentrist identity theory and neuro-phenomenal typing. A commentary on Manzotti, 'The boundaries and location of consciousness as identity theories deem fit'. Frontiers in Psychology 13:1058325, section Consciousness Research, 2022.
Abstract:
Manzotti (2021) surveys recent variants of identity theories, defending his own preferred version, mind-object identity theory (MOI). According to this view, experiences are identical with the external objects, and the mind is thus literally “spread” in the world. Manzotti supports this view with considerations about indiscernibility of properties and other theoretical considerations. He claims that brain-mind accounts of identity commit the “fallacy of the center,” locating conscious mind inside the skull. Amongst other recent works, he comments on our (Polák and Marvan, 2018) article, in which we defended a standard, neurocentrist version of type identity theory, and supplemented it with a sketch of neuro-phenomenal typing. Manzotti holds that although we appeal to neuro-phenomenal types in our account of mind-brain identity, we nevertheless “lack a convincing explanation as to why the type of neural processes should be identical to the type of one's experience.” This is a fair point. We didn't do much in our 2018 article to support our views on the principles of neuro-phenomenal typing, either by detailed theoretical considerations or by empirical evidence. In this short rejoinder, we offer the missing argument. By doing so, we also respond both to Manzotti's cited objection and to the charge of the “fallacy of the center.”
Link: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.1058325/full
Anguel S. Stefanov (Bulgarian Academy of Sciences) & Gregorie Dupuis-Mc Donald (Department of Philosophy, University of Salzburg) (Editors):
Spacetime Conference 2022.
Minkowski Institute Press.
Abstract:
This volume contains original contributions made at the sixth session of the Minkowski Institute international conference “Nature and Ontology of Spacetime”. It continues the ambition of debating open ontological and epistemological problems in the philosophy and physics of spacetime. In this volume, topics covered include the reality of Minkowski spacetime ontology, the nature of time, quantum gravitation, inertia and relativistic phenomena, as well as aspects of the mathematical structure of the special and general theory of relativity. The volume will be of interest to students in philosophy of science, researchers in spacetime physics, and to any reader who wants to study contemporary issues and debates in modern philosophy and physics.
Link: http://minkowskiinstitute.org/mip/
Magdalena Małecka (Aarhus University, Aarhus Institute of Advanced Studies / Practical Philosophy, University of Helsinki)
Małecka M., 2022,
Economics as value-laden science: Lessons from the philosophy of science on the normative/positive distinctions and the rational choice theory, [in:] The Positive and the Normative in Economic Thought, Badiei S., Grivaux A., Routledge: 214-230
Abstract:
The topic of values in economics has a long history. According to already established narratives, the view of economics as a value-free science was solidified by the neoclassical school that defined economics as a positive science free from any value judgements. However, some philosophers of economics and historians of economic thought teach us that debates about the role of value judgements in economics, as well as the division of economics into positive and normative branches, were much richer and more ambiguous than what the standard narrative might suggest. This chapter does not intend to contribute further to these debates. Instead, its aim is to draw readers’ attention to yet another take on values in economics that has become present in philosophy of economics. The chapter reviews current attempts to bring insights from philosophy of science on how to analyse values in science to economic methodology. First, it reflects on whether these insights shed new light on discussions about the positive and the normative in economics. Second, it shows that they allow us to approach theoretical discussions on so-called rational choice theory from a novel and illuminating angle. The chapter concludes by listing the main lessons that can be learnt from the vibrant debates on values in science in philosophy of science.
Link: https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003247289-15/economics-value-laden-science-magdalena-ma%C5%82ecka
Małecka M., 2022,
Chasing the human in modern economics, Review of Deirdre McCloskey’s Bettering humanomics: A new, and old, approach to economic science, MetaScience.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11016-022-00810-z
Other publications
Anna Alexandrova (University of Cambridge)
Anna Alexandrova’s work on wellbeing was publicized in No Man Is an Island: Well-Being as a Collective Endeavor By Alene Dawson.
LInk: https://www.templeton.org/news/no-man-is-an-island-well-being-as-a-collective-endeavor
25th round
Ivan Loginov
(Department of Philosophy & History of Science, Faculty of Science, Charles University)
The Subjective Perception of Music: Stanislav Vomela and Subjective Research in Psychophysiology in 1930s Czechoslovakia
Abstract:
This paper explores the subjective psychophysiological research of the so-called subjective audition conducted by the Czech physician and endocrinologist Stanislav Vomela in the 1930s. It examines Vomela’s attempts to analyze his own peculiar experience of hearing what he called subjective music (music heard only by the subject) and introduces the concept of acousmatics Vomela developed to study this kind of auditory perception. Vomela’s methodology is studied against the background of J. E. Purkyně’s understanding of the subjective empiricist methodology of self-knowing in the physiology of the senses and in the context of research into eidetic imagery by E. R. Jaensch and Victor Urbantschitsch.
Link: https://doi.org/10.46938/tv.2022.542
Twitter: https://twitter.com/l0ginov
24th round
Oleksandr Gabovich, Institute of Physics of the NAS of Ukraine
Volodymyr Kuznetsov, H.S. Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy of the NAS of Ukraine / National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy”
Overview of modern philosophy of science (art. 2) (in Ukrainian). Philosophical Thought
Abstract:
Varieties of modern philosophies of mathematical and natural sciences are represented. Specific features of those sciences are analyzed based on graph classifications of the respective philosophies. The importance of reconstructions of practical theories is emphasized for all kinds of philosophies of science used by them.
The first part outlines the purpose of the article and considers subject and theoretical, the second — evaluative, nominal, theoretical-reconstructive and linguistic-reconstructive classifications of philosophies of science. The conclusions are made about the problematic application of these classifications to the philosophies of social sciences and humanities.
Keywords: global/general and local/science-centered philosophies of sciences; features and classifications of philosophies of mathematical and natural sciences; a network of specific theories as the core of the relevant science; practical theories and their reconstructions.
Link: https://doi.org/10.15407/fd2022.02.137
Anguel S. Stefanov (Professor of Philosophy, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences)
Suggested Answers to Philosophical Puzzles (Book)
Publishing House: Cambridge Scholars Publishing
Abstract:
Link:
Published in 2022/forthcoming
Publications are listed by year, then in alphabetical order or by order of notification
Adam P. Kubiak (Faculty of Administration and Social Sciences, Warsaw University of Technology)
& Paweł Kawalec (Faculty of Philosophy, John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin)
“Prior Information in Frequentist Research Designs: The Case of Neyman’s Sampling Theory”.
Journal for General Philosophy of Science.
Abstract:
We analyse the issue of using prior information in frequentist statistical inference. For that purpose, we scrutinise different kinds of sampling designs in Jerzy Neyman’s theory to reveal a variety of ways to explicitly and objectively engage with prior information. Further, we turn to the debate on sampling paradigms (design-based vs. model-based approaches) to argue that Neyman’s theory supports an argument for the intermediate approach in the frequentism vs. Bayesianism debate. We also demonstrate that Neyman’s theory, by allowing non-epistemic values to influence evidence collection and formulation of statistical conclusions, does not compromise the epistemic reliability of the procedures and may improve it. This undermines the value-free ideal of scientific inference.
Link: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10838-022-09600-x
Jaana Eigi-Watkin (University of Tartu)
“Applying the notion of epistemic risk to argumentation in philosophy of science”. European Journal for Philosophy of Science.
Abstract:
I analyse an empirically informed argument in philosophy of science to show that it faces several varieties of risk commonly discussed as inductive risk. I argue that this is so even though the type of reasoning used in this argument differs from the reasoning in some of the arguments usually discussed in connection with inductive risk. To capture the variety of risks involved, I use the more general notion of epistemic risk proposed by Justin Biddle and Quill Kukla. I show how the argument in question faces several of the epistemic risks already described in connection with empirical reasoning. Importantly, I also argue that the subtype of inductive reasoning used in the argument merits a separate discussion. To analyse it, I recommend using the model of colligation, or reasoning through offering synthesising expressions. I then argue that it is desirable to recognise the risk in colligating inductive reasoning as a distinct type of epistemic risk that is relevant for understanding risk in other fields as well. Thus, I suggest that philosophy of science is one of the fields subject to non-trivial epistemic risk; I characterise several of these risks on the example of a specific argument; and I describe epistemic risk that accompanies colligation – colligating inductive risk.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-022-00455-z
Yılmaz, Özlem . "Biyoloji Felsefesinde Organizma Kavramı". Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi 1 / 1 (April 2022): 78-86,
Kilikya Journal of Philosophy.
Özet: Çevre sorunlarının katlanarak arttığı ve biyoloji biliminin büyük sıçramalarla geliştiği günümüzde organizma kavramının incelenmesi, hem kendi doğamızı (dolayısıyla da diğer canlılarla etkileşimlerimizi) hem de günümüz biyolojisindeki değişimleri daha iyi anlayabilmemiz için faydalı olacaktır. Bu çalışma, organizma kavramını özellikle organizma-çevre etkileşimi üzerinden inceleyerek günümüz biyolojisindeki önemini vurgulayacaktır. Organizma kavramı özellikle Modern Sentezden, Genişletilmiş Evrimsel Senteze geçişle birlikte ayrı bir önem kazanmıştır. Köklerini yirminci yüzyılın başlarındaki organizma-merkezci biyolojiden alan bu kavramın gelişimi, son birkaç on yıldır biyoloji biliminde gerçekleşmiş olan gelişmelerle (özellikle gelişim biyolojisi, sistem biyolojisi ve ekoloji dallarında) iyice dinamikleşmiştir. Organizma kavramının gelişimini incelemek sadece biyoloji biliminin felsefesi açısından değil, bunun yanında, insan olarak kendi biyolojik varlığımızı -organizma- ve çevremizle (hem abiyotik hem de biyotik) olan etkileşimlerimizi, tekrar düşünmek açısından değerlidir.
Link: https://dergipark.org.tr/en/pub/kilikya/issue/69763/1111764
Kostić, Daniel, and Khalifa, Kareem, (2022).
"Decoupling Topological Explanations from Mechanisms.” Philosophy of Science.
Abstract:
We provide three innovations to recent debates about whether topological or “network” explanations are a species of mechanistic explanation. First, we more precisely characterize the requirement that all topological explanations are mechanistic explanations and show scientific practice to belie such a requirement. Second, we provide an account that unifies mechanistic and non-mechanistic topological explanations, thereby enriching both the mechanist and autonomist programs by highlighting when and where topological explanations are mechanistic. Third, we defend this view against some powerful mechanist objections. We conclude from this that topological explanations are autonomous from their mechanistic counterparts.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2022.29
Khalifa, Kareem. Islam, Farhan. Gamboa, J.P. Wilkenfeld, Daniel. Kostić, Daniel. (2022).
“Integrating Philosophy of Understanding with the Cognitive Sciences”, Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience.
Abstract:
We provide two programmatic frameworks for integrating philosophical research on understanding with complementary work in computer science, psychology, and neuroscience. First, philosophical theories of understanding have consequences about how agents should reason if they are to understand that can then be evaluated empirically by their concordance with findings in scientific studies of reasoning. Second, these studies use a multitude of explanations, and a philosophical theory of understanding is well suited to integrating these explanations in illuminating ways.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3389/fnsys.2022.764708.
Marek Pokropski (Faculty of Philosophy, University of Warsaw, Poland).
Mechanisms and Consciousness. Integrating Phenomenology with Cognitive Science, Routledge.
Abstract:
This book develops a new approach to naturalizing phenomenology. The author proposes to integrate phenomenology with the mechanistic framework for explanation in cognitive sciences, and offers new methodological perspectives for studying complex mental phenomena such as consciousness.
Link:
https://www.routledge.com/Mechanisms-and-Consciousness-Integrating-Phenomenology-with-Cognitive-Science/Pokropski/p/book/9780367465254#
Milena Ivanova (University of Cambridge).
“What is a Beautiful Experiment?” Erkenntnis.
Abstract:
This article starts an engagement on the aesthetics of experiments and offers an account for analysing how aesthetics features in the design, evaluation and reception of experiments. I identify two dimensions of aesthetic evaluation of experiments: design and significance. When it comes to design, a number of qualities, such as simplicity, economy and aptness, are analysed and illustrated with the famous Meselson-Stahl experiment. Beautiful experiments are also regarded to make significant discoveries, but I argue against a narrow construal of experimental aims. By drawing on the plurality of goals experimenters have and diversity of aesthetic responses, I argue that experiments are aesthetically appreciated both when they discover and when they produce disruptive results.
URL: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10670-021-00509-3
M. Efe Ates (Department of Philosophy, MSKÜ, Turkey).
“Pioneers of the ice age models: a brief history from Agassiz to Milankovitch”. History of Geo- and Space Sciences.
Abstract:
It is now widely accepted that astronomical factors trigger the emergence of glacial and interglacial periods. However, nearly two centuries ago, the overall situation was not as apparent as it is today. In this article, I briefly discuss the astronomical model of ice ages put forward in the 19th and early 20th centuries. This period was indeed anni mirabiles for scientists to understand the ice age phenomenon. Agassiz, Adhémar and Croll laid the foundation stones for understanding the dynamics of ice ages. But it was Milankovitch who combined empirical geology with mathematical astronomy. Specifically, he identified the shortcomings of the preceding ice age models and modified his model accordingly. In what follows, I review earlier approaches to the ice age problem and show how they failed to meet their objectives. Next, I show how Milankovitch's model managed to capture all sufficient astronomical elements. The final sections focus on Milutin Milankovitch's successful approach, including his accomplishment of tackling the problem mathematically.
Link: https://doi.org/10.5194/hgss-13-23-2022
Martin Zach (Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Faculty of Arts, Charles University in Prague)
“Revisiting abstraction and idealization: how not to criticize mechanistic explanation in molecular biology”. European Journal for Philosophy of Science.
Abstract:
Abstraction and idealization are the two notions that are most often discussed in the context of assumptions employed in the process of model building. These notions are also routinely used in philosophical debates such as that on the mechanistic account of explanation. Indeed, an objection to the mechanistic account has recently been formulated precisely on these grounds: mechanists cannot account for the common practice of idealizing difference-making factors in models in molecular biology. In this paper I revisit the debate and I argue that the objection does not stand up to scrutiny. This is because it is riddled with a number of conceptual inconsistencies. By attempting to resolve the tensions, I also draw several general lessons regarding the difficulties of applying abstraction and idealization in scientific practice. Finally, I argue that more care is needed only when speaking of abstraction and idealization in a context in which these concepts play an important role in an argument, such as that on mechanistic explanation.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-022-00453-1
Richard David-Rus (Francisc I. Rainer Institute of Anthropology, Romanian Academy, Bucharest, Romania)
“Understanding without Explanation: A Still Open Issue”. Filozofia Nauki.
Abstract:
This paper takes a stance in the debate concerning scientific understanding. It claims that the case for a specific type of understanding, understanding without explanation (UwE), is still open, despite the tendency in the current literature that might suggest otherwise. The paper begins by situating the distinction between an explanatory and non-explanatory understanding in the debate on understanding by introducing Lipton’s account of UwE. The paper then discusses the significance of Lipton’s proposals for the debate and argues that Kelp’s interpretation does not exhaust the challenge they pose to any theory of understanding. The paper then examines the best articulated critique of Lipton’s account provided by Khalifa and rejects it as inadequate. It ends by sketching out a list of positive reasons that support the continued examination of UwE.
Link: https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2021.0009
Oleksandr Gabovich, Institute of Physics of the NAS of Ukraine; Volodymyr Kuznetsov, H.S. Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy of the NAS of Ukraine / National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy” .
Overview of modern philosophy of science (art. 1) (in Ukrainian). Philosophical Thought.
Abstract:
Varieties of modern philosophies of mathematical and natural sciences are represented. Specific features of those sciences are analyzed based on graph classifications of the respective philosophies. The importance of reconstructions of practical theories is emphasized for all kinds of philosophies of science used by them.
The first part outlines the purpose of the article and considers subject and theoretical, the second — evaluative, nominal, theoretical-reconstructive and linguistic-reconstructive classifications of philosophies of science. The conclusions are made about the problematic application of these classifications to the philosophies of social sciences and humanities.
Keywords:
global/general and local/science-centered philosophies of sciences; features and classifications of philosophies of mathematical and natural sciences; a network of specific theories as the core of the relevant science; practical theories and their reconstructions.
Link: https://doi.org/10.15407/fd2022.01.115
Volodymyr Kuznetsov, H.S. Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy of the NAS of Ukraine / National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy”
Modified structure-nominative reconstruction of practical physical theories as a frame for the philosophy of physics. Epistemological Studies in Philosophy, Social and Political Sciences.
Abstract:
Physical theories are complex and necessary tools for gaining new knowledge about their areas of application. A distinction is made between abstract and practical theories. The last are constantly being improved in the cognitive activity of professional physicists and studied by future physicists. A variant of the philosophy of physics based on a modified structural-nominative reconstruction of practical theories is proposed. Readers should decide whether this option is useful for their understanding of the philosophy of physics, as well as other philosophies of particular sciences.
The article is written within the theme “Communicative transformations in modern science” of “Program-targeted and competitive topics of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine”.
Keywords:
practical physical theories; physical lingua franca; subsystems of theories; subsystem flexibilities; main and auxiliary components; basic and satellite levels.
Link: https://doi.org/10.15421/342103
Volodymyr Kuznetsov, National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy”, H.S. Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy of the NAS of Ukraine.
Syllabus: Philosophy of Physics (in English/Ukrainian).
Abstract:
Philosophical Problems of Physics (Philosophy of Physics) is a philosophical discipline that consists of three interrelated parts. Epistemology of physics studies 1) the construction of physics as a branched coherent complex set of knowledge systems about the fundamental components of the material world, their properties, and patterns; 2) the internal construction of physical theories as systems of knowledge and the relationship between them; 3) the role of physical theories as tools for gaining new knowledge about their subject areas. The methodology of physics explores the methods, procedures, and processes of obtaining, forming, evaluating (substantiation, verification), development and application of systems of physical knowledge. The ontology (metaphysics) of physics 1) explains the ideas about the material world that follow from the physical systems of knowledge and 2) analyzes the worldview problems posed by these ideas.
Oleksandr Gabovich, Institute of Physics of the NAS of Ukraine; Volodymyr Kuznetsov, H.S. Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy of the NAS of Ukraine / National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy”.
Western science humiliation as a symptom of the whole civilization decline (in Ukrainian).
Abstract:
Some aspects of the radical change of value orientations in modern western science are considered. Influenced by leftist ideology and under the slogans of abstract justice, the leadership of European and North American institutions is trying to expand the presence of new members in the scientific and educational spheres on the quota basis, taking into account racial and gender rather than meritocratic characteristics (high-quality basic and university education level, persistence to obtain new knowledge, developed mental abilities in this area). It has been shown that the rapid legislative or illegal introduction of quotas for minorities instead of increasing their scientific level and well-being can only limit the recruiting of talented people of any gender or race into science and will result in the decline of the world science as a whole.
Keywords: trends of value orientations in science, meritocracy, melanocracy
Link: https://doi.org/10.18524/1815-7459.2021.2.235210
Aleksandr Gabovich, Institute of Physics of the NAS of Ukraine; Volodymyr Kuznetsov, H.S. Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy of the NAS of Ukraine / National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy”.
Evaluation of Anatoly Vlasov: A Sixty-Year Opposition (in Russian).
Abstract:
Anatoly Vlasov is a Soviet physicist known for his equations. His work was a significant contribution to plasma physics. The scientific problem that was not clarified then (to a certain extent even now) related to an allegedly purely “technical” (mathematical) question.
This article is written based on a section of our future book on the philosophy of science, considered within the framework of a modified structural-nominative reconstruction of practical physical theories. One of the goals of the philosophy of science is the analysis of emerging theoretical knowledge per se, understood as the most adequate representation of its domain now and abstracted from all cultural, social, political and psychological factors of its design. However, a detailed description of the properties, structures, types of consistency and functions of scientific theories as carriers of acquired and generators of new knowledge opens prospects for identifying the specific influence of these factors on the processes of its creation and recognition by scientific science community.
Link: https://7i.7iskusstv.Com/Y2022/Nomer5/Gabovich/
Vlasta Sikimić (University of Tübingen) and Sandro Radovanović (University of Belgrade)
Machine learning in scientific grant review: algorithmically predicting project efficiency in high energy physics, European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 2022
Abstract:
As more objections have been raised against grant peer-review for being costly and time-consuming, the legitimate question arises whether machine learning algorithms could help assess the epistemic efficiency of the proposed projects. As a case study, we investigated whether project efficiency in high energy physics (HEP) can be algorithmically predicted based on the data from the proposal. To analyze the potential of algorithmic prediction in HEP, we conducted a study on data about the structure (project duration, team number, and team size) and outcomes (citations per paper) of HEP experiments with the goal of predicting their efficiency. In the first step, we assessed the project efficiency using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) of 67 experiments conducted in the HEP laboratory Fermilab. In the second step, we employed predictive algorithms to detect which team structures maximize the epistemic performance of an expert group. For this purpose, we used the efficiency scores obtained by DEA and applied predictive algorithms – lasso and ridge linear regression, neural network, and gradient boosted trees – on them. The results of the predictive analyses show moderately high accuracy (mean absolute error equal to 0.123), indicating that they can be beneficial as one of the steps in grant review. Still, their applicability in practice should be approached with caution. Some of the limitations of the algorithmic approach are the unreliability of citation patterns, unobservable variables that influence scientific success, and the potential predictability of the model.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-022-00478-6
Twitter: @VlastaSikimic
Vlasta Sikimić (University of Tübingen)
How to Improve Research Funding in Academia? Lessons From the COVID-19 Crisis, Frontiers in Research Metrics and Analytics, 2022
Abstract:
The current COVID-19 crisis has put both public and private funding of life sciences in the spotlight. One of the most frequent critiques of the scientific research conducted in industry is that researchers working for companies lack intellectual freedom. Moreover, from the perspective of the general public, industry research is always questioned because monetary interests might influence it. Sponsorship bias—a tendency of researchers working in the private sector to align their results with the interest of their funders—has been widely discussed in philosophy of science (e.g., Holman and Elliott, 2018; Leefmann, 2021). Some authors even go as far as opposing intellectual property in life sciences (Brown, 2008). Having all this in mind, epistemic trust in research conducted by companies is often lacking. However, it is questionable whether the academic sector alone, in its current state, can appropriately respond to global challenges. I argue that academic research requires substantial restructuring as similar objections can be raised both in the case of research done by academic institutions and in industry. Additionally, there are specific dangers connected with the current academic system such as elitism in science that are epistemically harmful. Though similar tendencies can also be detected in industry, academia has its own outdated rules that are reflected in its current culture.
https://doi.org/10.3389/frma.2022.777781
Twitter: @VlastaSikimic
Aleksandra Vučković (University of Belgrade) and Vlasta Sikimić (University of Tübingen)
How to Fight Linguistic Injustice in Science: Equity Measures and Mitigating Agents, Social Epistemology, 2022
Abstract:
Though a common language of science allows for easier communication of the results among researchers, the use of lingua franca also comes with the cost of losing some of the diverse ideas and results arising from the plurality of languages. Following Quine’s famous thesis about the indeterminacy of translation, we elaborate on the inherent loss of diverse ideas when only one language of science is used. Non-native speakers sometimes experience epistemic injustice due to their language proficiency and consequently, their scientific insights get marginalized. Thus, it is important epistemically to include the results of all researchers independent of their native language. As a solution, we promote epistemic equity and inclusion both on the individual level and on the level of the scientific community. Epistemic equity means that researchers who suffer disadvantages because of their language skills get support from the rest of the scientific community that will compensate for their disadvantage and at the same time facilitate their epistemic inclusion. This can be achieved through the introduction of mitigating agents – the individuals and organizations that ought to serve as a communication bridge between individual researchers and the scientific community.
https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2022.2109531
Twitter: @VlastaSikimic
Vlasta Sikimić (University of Tübingen) and Ole Herud-Sikimić (Max Planck Institute for Developmental Biology, Tübingen)
Modelling efficient team structures in biology, Journal of Logic and Computation, 2022
Abstract:
We used agent-based modelling to highlight the advantages and disadvantages of several management styles in biology, ranging from centralized to egalitarian ones. In egalitarian groups, all team members are connected with each other, while in centralized ones, they are only connected with the principal investigator. Our model incorporated time constraints, which negatively influenced weakly connected groups such as centralized ones. Moreover, our results show that egalitarian groups outperform others if the questions addressed are relatively simple or when the communication among agents is limited. Complex epistemic spaces are explored best by centralized groups. They outperform other team structures because the individual members can develop their own ideas with less interference of the opinions of others. The optimal ratio between time spent on experimentation and dissemination varies between different organizational structures. Furthermore, if the evidence is shared only after a relevant degree of certainty is reached, all investigated groups epistemically profit. We discovered that the introduction of seminars to the model changes the epistemic performance in favour of weakly connected teams. Finally, the abilities of the principal investigator do not seem to outperform cognitive diversity, as group performances were not strongly influenced by the increase of her abilities.
https://doi.org/10.1093/logcom/exac021
Twitter: @VlastaSikimic
Vlasta Sikimić (University of Tübingen), Mike Stuart (National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University) and Jamie Shaw (University of Toronto)
Science funding policy and the COVID-19 pandemic, The International Journal of Risk & Safety in Medicine, 2022
Abstract:
Science funding policy is constantly evolving as a result of geopolitical, technological, cultural, social, and economic shifts. The last major upheaval of science funding policy happened in response to a catastrophic series of events: World War II. The newest worldwide catastrophe, the COVID-19 pandemic, has prompted similar reflections on fundamental questions about the roles of the sciences in society and the relationships between governments, private industry, public bodies, and the broader public. Contained in this special section of the International Journal of Risk & Safety in Medicine is a series of reflections and insights from four interdisciplinary scholars, most of which urge drastic and urgent changes that should be made.
https://doi.org/10.3233/jrs-227015
Twitter: @VlastaSikimic, @miikeessttuuart
Janko Nešić ( Department of Philosophy, Institute of Philosophy, Belgrade, Serbia)
Towards a Neutral-Structuralist Theory of Consciousness and Selfhood. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science.
Abstract:
Recently, an information-theoretic structural realist theory of the self and consciousness has been put forward (Beni, 2019). The theory is presented as a form of panpsychism. I argue against this interpretation and show that Beni’s structuralist theory runs into the hard problem of consciousness in a similar way as the Integrated Information theory of consciousness. Since both of these theories are structuralist and based on the notion of information, I propose to use a solution that has been employed for Integrated Information Theory, namely introducing the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic structure and dynamics (intrinsic information and intrinsic structure). Making these metaphysical enhancements to Beni’s structuralist theory of consciousness will give the theory a better chance of overcoming the hard problem. In terms of the metaphysics of consciousness, it takes us beyond physicalism. I then suggest that the information-theoretic structuralist theory of consciousness should, instead of panpsychism and physicalism, be combined with neutral monist ontology which is a better fit. These reworkings could lead to an improved naturalistic account of consciousness – the neutral-structuralist theory of consciousness and the self.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2022.2092825
Boer, N., Kostić, D., Ross, M., de Bruin, L., Glas, G. (2022) “Using network models in person-centered care in psychiatry: How perspectivism could help to draw boundaries.” Frontiers in Psychiatry, 13:925187.
Abstract:
In this paper, we explore the conceptual problems that arise when using network analysis in person-centered care (PCC) in psychiatry. Personalized network models are potentially helpful tools for PCC, but we argue that using them in psychiatric practice raises boundary problems, i.e., problems in demarcating what should and should not be included in the model, which may limit their ability to provide clinically-relevant knowledge. Models can have explanatory and representational boundaries, among others. We argue that perspectival reasoning can make more explicit what questions personalized network models can address in PCC, given their boundaries.
KEYWORDS: boundary problem, network analysis, person-centered care, personalized models, perspectivism, psychiatry, topological explanation.
Link: https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyt.2022.925187
Published in 2021
Adam P. Kubiak and Paweł Kawalec (Faculty of Philosophy, John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin)
The epistemic consequences of pragmatic value-laden scientific inference
European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 11(52), 2021.
Abstract:
In this work, we explore the epistemic import of the value-ladenness of Neyman-Pearson’s Theory of Testing Hypotheses (N-P) by reconstructing and extending Daniel Steel’s argument for the legitimate influence of pragmatic values on scientific inference. We focus on how to properly understand N-P’s pragmatic value-ladenness and the epistemic reliability of N-P. We develop an account of the twofold influence of pragmatic values on N-P’s epistemic reliability and replicability. We refer to these two distinguished aspects as “direct” and “indirect”. We discuss the replicability of experiments in terms of the indirect aspect and the replicability of outcomes in terms of the direct aspect. We argue that the influence of pragmatic values is beneficial to N-P’s epistemic reliability and replicability indirectly. We show that while the direct influence of pragmatic values can be beneficial, its negative effects on reliability and replicability are also unavoidable in some cases, with the direct and indirect aspects possibly being incongruent.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-021-00370-9
Adam P. Kubiak, Paweł Kawalec (Faculty of Philosophy, John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin) and Adam Kiersztyn (Department of Computer Science, Lublin University of Technology)
Neyman-Pearson Hypothesis Testing, Epistemic Reliability and Pragmatic Value-Laden Asymmetric Error Risks. Axiomathes.
Abstract:
We show that if among the tested hypotheses the number of true hypotheses is not equal to the number of false hypotheses, then Neyman-Pearson theory of testing hypotheses does not warrant minimal epistemic reliability (the feature of driving to true conclusions more often than to false ones). We also argue that N-P does not protect from the possible negative effects of the pragmatic value-laden unequal setting of error probabilities on N-P’s epistemic reliability. Most importantly, we argue that in the case of a negative impact no methodological adjustment is available to neutralize it, so in such cases the discussed pragmatic-value-ladenness of N-P inevitably compromises the goal of attaining truth.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-021-09541-y
Borut Trpin (MCMP/LMU Munich)
Against methodological gambling. Erkenntnis.
Abstract:
Should a scientist rely on methodological triangulation? Heesen et al. (2019) recently provided a convincing affirmative answer. However, their approach requires belief gambles if the evidence is discordant. We instead propose epistemically modest triangulation (EMT), according to which one should withhold judgement in such cases. We show that for a scientist in a methodologically diffident situation the expected utility of EMT is greater than that of Heesen et al.’s (2019) triangulation or that of using a single method. We also show that EMT is more appropriate for increasing epistemic trust in science. In short: triangulate, but do not gamble with evidence.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-021-00386-w
Daniel Kostić (Radboud University, The Netherlands).
“Topological Explanations, an Opinionated Appraisal.” In Lawler, I., Shech, E. and Khalifa, K. (eds): Scientific Understanding and Representation: Mathematical Modeling in the Life and Physical Sciences, Routledge.
Abstract:
In this chapter I provide a systematic overview of topological explanations in the philosophy of science literature. I do so by presenting an account of topological explanation that I have developed in other publications and then comparing this account to other accounts of topological explanation. Finally, this appraisal is opinionated because it highlights some problems in alternative accounts of topological explanations, and also it outlines responses to some of the main criticisms raised by the so-called new mechanists.
Daniel Kostić (Radboud University, The Netherlands) and Kareem Khalifa (Middlebury College, USA.).
"The directionality of topological explanations”. Synthese.
Abstract:
Proponents of ontic conceptions of explanation require all explanations to be backed by causal, constitutive, or similar relations. Among their justifications is that only ontic conceptions can do justice to the ‘directionality’ of explanation, i.e., the requirement that if X explains Y, then not-Y does not explain not-X. Using topological explanations as an illustration, we argue that non-ontic conceptions of explanation have ample resources for securing the directionality of explanations. The different ways in which neuroscientists rely on multiplexes involving both functional and anatomical connectivity in their topological explanations vividly illustrate why ontic considerations are frequently (if not always) irrelevant to explanatory directionality. Therefore, directionality poses no problem to non-ontic conceptions of explanation.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03414-y
Daria Jadreškić (University of Klagenfurt)
"Adapt to Translate – Adaptive Clincal Trials and Biomedical Innovation", European Journal of Analytic Philosophy.
Abstract:
The article presents the advantages and limitations of adaptive clinical trials for assessing the effectiveness of medical interventions and specifies the conditions that contributed to their development and implementation in clinical practice. I advance two arguments by discussing different cases of adaptive trials. The normative argument is that responsible adaptation should be taken seriously as a new way of doing clinical research insofar as a valid justification, sufficient understanding, and adequate operational conditions are provided. The second argument is historical. The development of adaptive trials can be related to lessons learned from research in cases of urgency and to the decades-long efforts to end the productivity crisis of pharmaceutical research, which led to the emergence of translational, personalized, and, recently, precision medicine movements.
https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.17.3.2
Daria Jadreškić (University of Klagenfurt)
"Diversity as an Epistemic Value – From Individual to Social Objectivity", in Radhika Natarajan (ed.) Sprache – Bildung – Geschlecht: Interdisziplinäre Ansätze in Flucht- und Migrationskontexten. Springer VS, Wiesbaden.
Abstract:
The paper presents the role of diversity in ensuring the objectivity of scientific research as understood in recent ‘values in science’ debates within philosophy of science. Along with traditional epistemic values, i.e. values that promote the attainment of truth, such as accuracy and consistency, the new picture of desirable epistemic values includes diversity as an indispensable indicator of critical scrutiny which is not only beneficial for the goal of attaining knowledge, but also for the goal of attaining social justice. Objectivity is in this new understanding achieved through diversity and inclusion of different perspectives open to mutual criticism. Diversity as a safeguard against individual and group biases is especially acknowledged in its critical role by feminist contributions to philosophy of science.
The paper starts by introducing the focus of philosophy of science in general and values in science debates in particular, followed by an overview of standard accounts of epistemic and non-epistemic values and their often conflicting roles in decision making in science. Subsequently, the benefits of diversity are discussed and exemplified by Anke Bueter’s case study (Bueter, 2015) on female health research. Several normative ideals for science are put forward and certain problems and solutions of each are outlined.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-28341-4_11
Gabriel Târziu (University of Bucharest)
Can We Have Physical Understanding of Mathematical Facts?
Acta Analytica. Forthcoming.
Abstract:
A lot of philosophical energy has been devoted recently in trying to determine if mathematics can contribute to our understanding of physical phenomena. Not many philosophers are interested, though, if the converse makes sense, i.e., if our cognitive interaction (scientific or otherwise) with the physical world can be helpful (in an explanatory or non-explanatory way) in our efforts to make sense of mathematical facts. My aim in this paper is to try to fill this important lacuna in the recent literature. My answer to the question of this paper is negative. As I will argue, there are serious problems with the main reasons for believing in the first place that it is possible to have physical understanding of mathematical facts.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-021-00470-4
Gabriel Târziu (University of Bucharest)
How Do We Obtain Understanding with the Help of Explanations?
Axiomathes 31 (2): 173-197. 2021.
Abstract:
What exactly do we need in order to enjoy the cognitive benefit that is supposed to be provided by an explanation? Some philosophers (most notably Khalifa 2012; 2013; 2015; 2017) would say that all that we need is to know the explanation. Others (e.g. Newman 2012; Strevens 2013) would say that achieving understanding with the help of an explanation requires more than that, that it requires a grasping or an understanding of the explanation. My aim in this paper is to come up with a new answer to this problem by exploring the shortcomings of the received view of understanding. In my view, besides having (at least) testimonial knowledge of an explanation, obtaining explanatory understanding requires full cognitive access to the explanation.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-020-09488-6
Magdalena Małecka (University of Helsinki & Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton)
Knowledge, behaviour, and policy: questioning the epistemic presuppositions of applying behavioural science in public policymaking. Synthese (online first, open access).
Abstract:
The aim of this article is to question the epistemic presuppositions of applying behavioural science in public policymaking. Philosophers of science who have examined the recent applications of the behavioural sciences to policy have contributed to discussions on causation, evidence, and randomised controlled trials. These have focused on epistemological and methodological questions about the reliability of scientific evidence and the conditions under which we can predict that a policy informed by behavioural research will achieve the policymakers’ goals. This paper argues that the philosophical work of Helen Longino can also help us to have a better and fuller understanding of the knowledge which the behavioural sciences provide. The paper advances an analysis of the knowledge claims that are made in the context of policy applications of behavioural science and compares them with the behavioural research on which they are based. This allows us to show that behavioural policy and the debates accompanying it are based on an oversimplified understanding of what knowledge behavioural science actually provides. Recognising this problem is important as arguments that justify reliance on the behavioural sciences in policy typically presume this simplification.
Link: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-021-03026-6
Magdalena Małecka (University of Helsinki & Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton)
Values in economics: a recent revival with a twist. Journal of Economic Methodology (online first, open access).
Abstract:
This article reviews the relatively recent trend in economic methodology that consists in bringing insights from the debate in philosophy of science on values in science in order to analyse value-ladenness of economic research. The text claims that these insights from philosophy of science offer a slightly new approach to the topic of value judgments in economics that has been discussed in philosophy of economics for decades. It suggests that the perspective of philosophy of science reviewed in the article invites to rethinking analyses of feminist economists as important contributions to economic methodology.
Link: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1350178X.2020.1868776?needAccess=true
Mariusz Maziarz (Interdisciplinary Centre for Ethics and Institute of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland),
Martin Zach (Department of Analytic Philosophy, Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences)
Assessing the quality of evidence from epidemiological agent-based models for the COVID-19 pandemic. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, 43(1).
Abstract:
Agent-based models (ABMs) are one of the main sources of evidence for decisions regarding mitigation and suppression measures against the spread of SARS-CoV-2. These models have not been previously included in the hierarchy of evidence put forth by the evidence-based medicine movement, which prioritizes those research methods that deliver results less susceptible to the risk of confounding. We point out the need to assess the quality of evidence delivered by ABMs and ask the question of what is the risk that assumptions entertained in ABMs do not include all the key factors and make model predictions susceptible to the problem of confounding.
Link: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40656-020-00357-4
Milena Ivanova (University of Cambridge)
Duhem and Holism. Cambridge Elements: Cambridge University Press.
Abstract:
The holistic thesis developed by Pierre Duhem challenges the idea that our evidence can conclusively falsify a theory. Given that no scientific theory is tested in isolation, a negative experiment can always be attributed to components other than the theory we test – to the auxiliary hypotheses and background assumptions. How do scientists decide whether the experimental result undermines the theory or points at an error in the underlying assumptions? Duhem argues that we cannot offer a rule that directs when the scientist should employ a radical or conservative strategy in light of a negative result, and ultimately they will appeal to their intuition. More recently philosophers have offered a number of strategies of how to locate error and justify the abandonment of a theory or an auxiliary hypothesis. This Element analyses Duhem's response to holism and subsequent accounts of how the problem can be resolved.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009004657
Milena Ivanova (University of Cambridge).
The Aesthetics of Scientific Experiments. Philosophy Compass.
Abstract
This article explores the aesthetic dimensions of scientific experimentation, addressing specifically how aesthetic features enter the construction, evaluation and reception of an experiment. I highlight the relationship between experiments and artistic acts in the early years of the Royal Society where experiments do not serve only epistemic aims but also aim to generate feelings of awe and pleasure. I turn to analysing which aspects of experiments are appreciated aesthetically, identifying several contenders, from the ability of an experiment to uncover nature's beauty, to encapsulating original designs and human creativity. Following this analysis, I focus on the notion of beauty: what makes an experiment beautiful? Several common qualities are explored, from the simplicity and economy of the experiment, to the significance of the experimental results.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12730
Natalia Carrillo and Tarja Knuuttila (University of Vienna)
“An artefactual perspective on idealization: Galvanic cells and electric circuits in nerve signal research.” In: Alejandro Cassini y Juan Redmond (ed.) Models and Idealizations in Science: Fictional and Artefactual Approaches (Cham: Springer).
Abstract:
There are two traditions of thinking about idealization offering almost opposite views on their functioning and epistemic status. While one tradition views idealizations as epistemic deficiencies, the other one highlights the epistemic benefits of idealization. Both of these accounts agree in that idealizations are deliberate misrepresentations. In this article, we approach idealization from the artifactual account of models, comparing it to the traditional accounts of idealization as misrepresentation, and exemplifying it through the case of the Hodgkin and Huxley model of nerve impulse. From the artifactual perspective, the epistemic benefits and deficiencies introduced by idealization frequently come in a package due to the way idealization draws together different resources in model construction. Accordingly, idealization tends to be holistic in that it is not often easily attributable to just some specific parts of the model. We argue that the artifactual approach lends a unifying view into idealization in that it is able to recover several basic philosophical insights motivating both the deficiency and epistemic benefit accounts, being simultaneously detached from the idea of distortion by misrepresentation.
Keywords: scientific modeling, representation, artifactual account, Hodgkin and Huxley Model
Links: https://philpapers.org/rec/KNUAAP, https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783030658014
Poliseli, L (Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution and Cognition Research); Russo, F. (University of Amsterdam).
Philosophy of science in practice and weak scientism together apart. In. Mizrahi M (ed) For and Against Scientism: science, methodology and the future of philosophy (Roman & Littlefield). forthcoming
Abstract:
The term ‘scientism’ has not attracted consensus about its meaning or about its scope of application. In this paper, we consider Mizrahi’s suggestion to distinguish ‘Strong’ and ‘Weak’ scientism, and the consequences this distinction may have for philosophical methodology. While we side with Mizrahi that his definitions help advance the debate, by avoiding verbal dispute and focussing on questions of method, we also have concerns about his proposal as it defends a hierarchy of knowledge production. Mizrahi’s position is that Weak Scientism should be adopted, stating that “of all the knowledge we have, scientific knowledge is the best knowledge”. This version of scientism, however, has consequences for philosophical methodology. In particular, if one conceives of philosophy as an a priori discipline and holds Weak Scientism, the introduction of empirical methods in philosophy may threaten its very essence or soul. In this chapter, we will defend the move to adopt empirical methods in philosophy and argue that, rather than threatening its essence or soul, these methods put philosophy in a better position to contribute to knowledge production, an endeavour shared with the sciences, and in a very interdisciplinary spirit. Our point of disagreement with Mizrahi is that we should avoid any hierarchy of knowledge, and instead focus on what each perspective -- scientific, philosophical, historical, or other -- can contribute to understanding phenomena.
Ludwig, D. (Wageningen University & Research); Inkeri, K (Tampere University); Mncube, Z (University of Johannesburg); Poliseli, L. (Konrad Lorenz Insitute for Evolution and Cognition Research); Reyes-Galindo, L. (Wageningen University).
Global Epistemologies and Philosophies of Science. Routledge, 2021.
Abstract:
In bringing together a global community of philosophers, Global Epistemologies and Philosophies of Science develops novel perspectives on epistemology and philosophy of science by demonstrating how frameworks from academic philosophy (e.g. standpoint theory, social epistemology, feminist philosophy of science) and related fields (e.g. decolonial studies, transdisciplinarity, global history of science) can contribute to critical engagement with global dimensions of knowledge and science
Global challenges such as climate change, food production, and infectious diseases raise complex questions about scientific knowledge production and its interactions with local knowledge systems and social realities. As academic philosophy provides relatively little reflection on global negotiations of knowledge, many pressing scientific and societal issues remain disconnected from core debates in epistemology and philosophy of science.
This book is an invitation to broaden agendas of academic philosophy by presenting epistemology and philosophy of science as globally engaged fields that address heterogeneous forms of knowledge production and their interactions with local livelihoods, practices, and worldviews. This integrative ambition makes the book equally relevant for philosophers and interdisciplinary scholars who are concerned with methodological and political challenges at the intersection of science and society.
Link: https://www.routledge.com/Global-Epistemologies-and-Philosophies-of-Science/Ludwig-Koskinen-Mncube-Poliseli-Reyes-Galindo/p/book/9780367461379
Poliseli, L (Konrad Lorenz Insitute for Evolution and Cognition Research); Leite, CMP (Federal University of Bahia).
Developing transdisciplinary practices: an interplay between disagreement and trust. In.: Ludwig, D; Inkeri, K; Mncube, Z; Poliseli, L; Reyes-Galindo, L. . Global Epistemologies and Philosophies of Science. Routledge, 2021.
Abstract:
Inter- and transdisciplinary research arise as necessary conditions to address societal problems. These collaborations, by definition, encompass experts from distinct domains, demanding an epistemic dependence between researchers. In such cases where, additionally, epistemic asymmetry exists, this might then lead to tensions and enhance epistemic disagreements. How should scholars behave when in peer disagreement? On the one hand, in philosophical literature on epistemology of disagreement, normative accounts about how one should respond when facing an epistemic disagreement are usually built upon hypothetical scenarios that do not portray real-life disagreements in scientific settings. On the other hand, Science and Technology Studies (STS) research that deals with academic and scientific disagreement typically uses a descriptive, empirical approach. We argue that before a normative account of responses to disagreement is developed, we need to understand how academic disagreement actually takes place in real interdisciplinary scientific practice. In this chapter, we address a case of academic disagreement within an interdisciplinary research team in Brazil during their development of a framework for transdisciplinary collaboration. Data was collected with ethnographic tools, while the analytic perspective of the investigation is grounded on recent debates about research groups in social epistemology and in the epistemology of disagreement. We will show that an interplay between trust and disagreement is required for dealing with inter- and transdisciplinary research practices. We hold that shedding light into disagreements and communications between collaborators may improve the epistemic performance of collaborative research teams by refining the dynamics of inter- and transdisciplinary investigations.
Link: https://www.routledge.com/Global-Epistemologies-and-Philosophies-of-Science/Ludwig-Koskinen-Mncube-Poliseli-Reyes-Galindo/p/book/9780367461379
Duško Prelević (Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade)
The Chalmers Trilemma Re-examined
Journal of Philosophical Research 46: 345‒361, 2021.
Abstract:
The Continuum Hypothesis seems to be a counterexample to David Chalmers's A Priori Scrutability thesis, according to which there is a compact class of truths (the scrutability base) from which all truths are a priori scrutable. Chalmers's three-part answer to this problem (which I call the “Chalmers trilemma”) runs as follows: either the Continuum Hypothesis is indeterminate; or adding a new axiom will settle the issue; or, if these two options do not work, we should add the Continuum Hypothesis (or its negation) to the scrutability base. I argue that Chalmers's answer is unsatisfactory: the first horn of the trilemma can be interpreted in several ways, and either it departs from common mathematical practice and rests on weak analogies, or it shares the same problems with two other horns; the second horn does not provide good reasons to believe that from a fixed system of axioms all truths about our world are scrutable; the third horn of the trilemma renders Chalmers's project empty.
Link: https://doi.org/10.5840/jpr2021825172
Tomáš Marvan (Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences)
Was Wegner Rejecting Mental Causality? Theory and Psychology.
Abstract:
Daniel Wegner’s theory of apparent mental causation is often misread. His aim was not to question the causal effectiveness of conscious mental states, such as intentions. Rather, he attempted to show that our subjective sense of agency is not a completely reliable indicator of the causality of action, and needs to be replaced by more objective means of inquiry.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1177/09593543211000820
Tomáš Marvan (Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences)
Marek Havlík (National Institute of Mental Health, Klecany)
Is Predictive Processing a Theory of Perceptual Consciousness? New Ideas in Psychology 61.
Abstract:
Predictive Processing theory, hotly debated in neuroscience, psychology and philosophy, promises to explain a number of perceptual and cognitive phenomena in a simple and elegant manner. In some of its versions, the theory is ambitiously advertised as a new theory of conscious perception. The task of this paper is to assess whether this claim is realistic. We will be arguing that the Predictive Processing theory cannot explain the transition from unconscious to conscious perception in its proprietary terms. The explanations offer by PP theorists mostly concern the preconditions of conscious perception, leaving the genuine material substrate of consciousness untouched.
Link: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0732118X20302129?via%3Dihub
Published in 2020
Agustina Borella (ESEADE University Institute, Argentina)
TRAZOS Ensayos de Filosofía para el Mundo Social. Grupo Unión, Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires.
Abstract:
Entender algo sobre un mundo que se nos presenta de modo desordenado e incompleto constituye buena parte de la tarea de la filosofía y de la ciencia.
La racionalidad, los modelos, y el mundo social introducen preocupaciones propias de la filosofía de la ciencia en general y de la epistemología de la economía en particular.
Los aportes de Popper, Lawson, Mäki, Hayek y Cartwright se expresan en estos trazos como intentos abiertos para alcanzar a comprender nuestro mundo.
English:
To understand something about a world, that is presented to us in a disorderly and incomplete way, is a large part of the task of philosophy and science.
Rationality, models and the social world introduce specific issues of philosophy of science in general and of epistemology of economics in particular.
The contributions of Popper, Lawson, Maki, Hayek and Cartwright are expressed in these strokes as open attempts to understand our world.
Link to the book: https://www.amazon.com/dp/B08FMSXNQV/ref=cm_sw_r_fa_dp_DcSnFb3XRPQQH?fbclid=IwAR1XsryCgzcCZjlbztz_hI17g1XMm0FFSpPDKNff11um1p03I3_qHmiqDi8
Anguel S. Stefanov (Institute of Philosophy and Sociology at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences)
Space and Time: Philosophical Problems. Minkowski Institute Press, Montreal.
Abstract:
The monograph comprises interconnected philosophical analyses of issues related to the nature of space, time and spacetime – that of the very existence of space and time, transcendental philosophy of space and time, whether there exists a middle way between the A- and B-theories of time, the growing block theory, the phenomenology of temporal passage, whether time flows at any rate, the relationalist-substantivalist debate and time travel. Two essays on Zeno’s paradoxes and on the arrow of time and irreversible processes are included as appendices. The book can also serve as a textbook of a course on the philosophy of space, time and spacetime.
Link: http://www.minkowskiinstitute.org/mip/books/stefanov2.html
Benjamin Wilck (Humboldt-Universitaet zu Berlin, Department of Philosophy)
Euclid’s Kinds and (Their) Attributes. History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis, 23(2), 362-397.
Abstract:
Relying upon a very close reading of all of the definitions given in Euclid’s Elements, I argue that this mathematical treatise contains a philosophical treatment of mathematical objects. Specifically, I show that Euclid draws elaborate metaphysical distinctions between (i) substances and non-substantial attributes of substances, (ii) different kinds of substance, and (iii) different kinds of non-substance. While the general meta-physical theory adopted in the Elements resembles that of Aristotle in many respects, Euclid does not employ Aristotle’s terminology, or indeed, any philosophical terminology at all. Instead, Euclid systematically uses different types of definition to distinguish between metaphysically different kinds of mathematical object.
Link: https://philpapers.org/rec/WILEKA
Benjamin Wilck (Humboldt-Universitaet zu Berlin, Department of Philosophy)
Can the Pyrrhonian Sceptic Suspend Belief Regarding Scientific Definitions?: Geometry and Scepticism Reconsidered. History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis, 23(1), 253-288.
Abstract:
In this article, I tackle a heretofore unnoticed difficulty with the application of Pyrrhonian scepticism to science. Sceptics can suspend belief regarding a dogmatic proposition only by setting up opposing arguments or considerations for and against that proposition. Since Sextus provides arguments exclusively against particular geometrical definitions in Adversus Mathematicos III, commentators have argued that Sextus’ method is not scepticism, but negative dogmatism. However, commentators have overlooked the fact that arguments or considerations in favour of particular geometrical definitions were absent in ancient geometry, and hence unavailable to Sextus. While this might explain why they are also absent from Sextus’ text, I survey and evaluate various strategies to supply arguments in support of particular geometrical definitions.
Link: https://philpapers.org/rec/WILCTP-9
Borut Trpin (MCMP/LMU Munich)
Jeffrey conditionalization: proceed with caution. Philosophical Studies, 177(10), 2985-3012.
Abstract:
It has been argued that if the rigidity condition is satisfied, a rational agent operating with uncertain evidence should update her subjective probabilities by Jeffrey conditionalization (JC) or else a series of bets resulting in a sure loss could be made against her (the Dynamic Dutch Book Argument). We show, however, that even if the rigidity condition is satisfied, it is not always safe to update probability distributions by JC because there exist such sequences of non-misleading uncertain observations where it may be foreseen that an agent who updates her subjective probabilities by JC will end up nearly certain that a false hypothesis is true. We analyze the features of JC that lead to this problem, specify the conditions in which it arises and respond to potential objections.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01356-3
Daniel Kostić (Institute for Science in Society (ISiS), Radboud University, The Netherlands)
General Theory of Topological Explanations and Explanatory Asymmetry. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 375: 20190321.
Abstract:
In this paper, I present a general theory of topological explanations, and illustrate its fruitfulness by showing how it accounts for explanatory asymmetry. My argument is developed in three steps. In the first step, I show what it is for some topological property A to explain some physical or dynamical property B. Based on that, I derive three key criteria of successful topological explanations: a criterion concerning the facticity of topological explanations, i.e. what makes it true of a particular system; a criterion for describing counterfactual dependencies in two explanatory modes, i.e. the vertical and the horizontal and, finally, a third perspectival one that tells us when to use the vertical and when to use the horizontal mode. In the second step, I show how this general theory of topological explanations accounts for explanatory asymmetry in both the vertical and horizontal explanatory modes. Finally, in the third step, I argue that this theory is universally applicable across biological sciences, which helps in unifying essential concepts of biological networks.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2019.0321
Daniel Kostić (Institute for Science in Society (ISiS), Radboud University, The Netherlands)
Claus C. Hilgetag (Institute of Computational Neuroscience, University Medical Center Hamburg-Eppendorf, Hamburg, Germany)
Marc Tittgemeyer (Max-Planck-Institut for Metabolism Research, Translational Neurocircuitry, and Cluster of Excellence in Cellular Stress and Aging-Associated Disease (CECAD), Cologne, Germany)
Unifying the Essential Concepts of Biological Networks. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 375: 20190314.
Abstract:
Over the last decades, network-based approaches have become highly popular in diverse fields of biology, including neuroscience, ecology, molecular biology and genetics. While these approaches continue to grow very rapidly, some of their conceptual and methodological aspects still require a programmatic foundation. This challenge particularly concerns the question of whether a generalized account of explanatory, organizational and descriptive levels of networks can be applied universally across biological sciences. To this end, this highly interdisciplinary theme issue focuses on the definition, motivation and application of key concepts in biological network science, such as explanatory power of distinctively network explanations, network levels and network hierarchies.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2019.0314
Jaana Eigi (University of Tartu)
Are Experts Representative of Non-Experts? Elective Modernism, Aspects of Representation, and the Argument from Inductive Risk
Perspectives on Science 28(4), 459-481
Abstract:
The approach to expert communities and political representation of non-experts in Harry Collins and Robert Evans’ elective modernism reflects the conviction that experts are not representative of ordinary citizens. I use an analysis of aspects of representation and the argument from inductive risk to argue that experts can be seen as representative of (some) non-experts, when we understand representation as resemblance based on shared social perspectives and acknowledge the inevitable involvement of such perspectives in decisions under inductive risk. This, in turn, has implications for some of the proposals about practices and institutions made in elective modernism.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1162/posc_a_00347
Luana Poliseli (Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution and Cognition Research (KLI), Klosterneuburg, Austria)
Emergence of scientific understanding in real-time ecological research practice. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences
Abstract:
Scientific understanding as a subject of inquiry has become widely discussed in philosophy of science and is often addressed through case studies from history of science. Even though these historical reconstructions engage with details of scientific practice, they usually provide only limited information about the gradual formation of understanding in ongoing processes of model and theory construction. Based on a qualitative ethnographic study of an ecological research project, this article shifts attention from understanding in the context of historical case studies to evidence of current case studies. By taking de Regt’s (Understanding scientific understanding. Oxford University Press, New York, 2017) contextual theory of scientific understanding into the field, it confirms core tenets of the contextual theory (e.g. the crucial role of visualization and visualizability) suggesting a normative character with respect to scientific activities. However, the case study also shows the limitations of de Regt’s latest version of this theory as an attempt to explain the development of understanding in current practice. This article provides a model representing the emergence of scientific understanding that exposes main features of scientific understanding such as its gradual formation, its relation to skills and imagination, and its capacity for knowledge selectivity. The ethnographic evidence presented here supports the claim that something unique can be learned by looking into ongoing research practices that can’t be gained by studying historical case studies.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40656-020-00338-7
Tomáš Marvan (Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences)
Michal Polák (University of West Bohemia, Pilsen)
Generality and content-specificity in the study of the neural correlates of perceptual consciousness. Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, 1(II).
Abstract:
The claim of this paper is that the NCC notion, as applied to conscious perceptual episodes, needs to be reconceptualized. It mixes together the processing related to the perceived contents and the neural substrate of consciousness proper, i.e. mechanisms making the perceptual contents conscious. We thus propose that the perceptual NCC be divided into two constitutive subnotions. The main theoretical idea that emerges as a consequence of this reconceptualization is that the neural correlate of a perceptual episode is formed in the neural interaction between content-processing and consciousness-conferring mechanisms. The paper elaborates this distinction, marshals some initial arguments in its favour, and tests it against some of the most debated theories of consciousness.
Link: https://philosophymindscience.org/index.php/phimisci/article/view/61
Vassil Vidinsky (Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski”)
(Post) phenomenological Approach to Homo Sapiens Technicus. Balkan Journal of Philosophy, 12(1), 31-36.
Abstract:
In this paper I use a (post)phenomenological approach to clarify the objective cultural expansion of our technology. Thus, I establish a conceptual analogy between two different philosophical analyses of human–machine relations – one historical and one phenomenological. I develop the analogy between them and their corresponding concepts in several steps. (1) First, I present the Homo sapiens technicus tendency and then the phenomenological differentiation between body schema and body image. All of these elucidate our involvement with machines. (2) Then, I conceptualize the term ‘context’, coupling its structural stability with the idea of distextaulity in order to achieve a better empirical understanding of our technological contradictions. (3) I continue to develop and enrich the analogy by illuminating the functional similarities – fluid boundary, automation, complexity – between contextual structures on the one hand and body schemata on the other. (4) Finally, I explore a deeper causal and narrative connection between those strands, shedding light on an interesting twofold circularity: a circular causation and a double narrative within Homo sapiens technicus.
Link: https://doi.org/10.5840/bjp20201215
Vlasta Sikimić (University of Tübingen)
Tijana Nikitović (University of Belgrade)
Miljan Vasić (University of Belgrade)
Vanja Subotić (University of Belgrade)
Do Political Attitudes Matter for Epistemic Decisions of Scientists? Review of Philosophy and Psychology.
Abstract:
The epistemic attitudes of scientists, such as epistemic tolerance and authoritarianism, play important roles in the discourse about rivaling theories. Epistemic tolerance stands for the mental attitude of an epistemic agent, e.g., a scientist, who is open to opposing views, while epistemic authoritarianism represents the tendency to uncritically accept views of authorities. Another relevant epistemic factor when it comes to the epistemic decisions of scientists is the skepticism towards the scientific method. However, the question is whether these epistemic attitudes are influenced by their sociopolitical counterparts, such as the researcher’s degree of conservatism. To empirically investigate the interplay between epistemic and sociopolitical attitudes of scientists, we conducted a survey with researchers (N = 655) across different disciplines. We propose scales for measuring epistemic tolerance and epistemic authoritarianism, as well as a scale for detecting the participants' readiness to question the scientific method. Furthermore, we investigate the relationship between epistemic tolerance and epistemic authoritarianism on the one hand, and career stage and sociopolitical views on the other hand. Interestingly, our study found only small correlations between the participants' degree of conservatism and their epistemic attitudes. This suggests that sociopolitical views, against common argumentation, actually do not play an important role in one’s scientific decisions. Moreover, social scientists scored higher on the epistemic tolerance and lower on the epistemic authoritarianism scale than natural scientists. Finally, the results indicate that natural scientists question the scientific method less than social scientists.
Link: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13164-020-00504-7
34th round
Sebastian Fortin, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, Argentina
Matias Pasqualini, Instituto de Investigaciones “Dr. Adolfo Prieto”, Universidad Nacional de Rosario, Rosario, Argentina
Emergence-free duality: Phonons and vibrating atoms in crystalline solids, Foundations of Physics, 55, article number 24, 2025. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-025-00834-5
ABSTRACT
The crystalline solids admit two models: the one of vibrating atoms and the one of phonons. The model of phonons allows explaining certain properties of crystalline solids that the model of vibrating atoms does not allow. Usually, the model of phonons is assigned a diminished ontological status as quasi-particles. Recently, there has been a proposal to homologate the ontological status of phonons with that of emergent particles, such as photons. In this article, this proposal will be critically examined, and it will be proposed that the model of phonons and the model of vibrating atoms could be considered in ontological parity.
Anna Alexandrova, Cambridge University
The inexact and separate science of economics: by D. M. Hausman, Cambridge University Press, 2023, 2nd edition Cambridge, UK, $44.99 (paperback), ISBN: 9781009320276, Length: 450 pages, Journal of Economic Methodology, 1–4. https://doi.org/10.1080/1350178X.2025.2499379
Anna Alexandrova
Social science: A constructivist account, forthcoming in Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 2025. https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.115918
ABSTRACT
What sort of inquiry is social science? This question used to preoccupy philosophers but fell off their agenda due to a stalemate between so-called naturalists, who took the ideal to be natural science, and exceptionalists, who allied social sciences with humanities. I show that both positions commit the error of contrastivism, namely defining social science in contrast to these two traditions, which inevitably ends up caricaturing and essentialising them. Using recent advances in social epistemology and political theory, I formulate constructivism about social sciences, a view that denies an essence to this inquiry and grounds it in the needs of communities to understand and improve themselves.
Dimitrios Panayotopoulos-Tsiros, Owen Garling, Rosa Marks, Anna Alexandrova, Diane Coyle, & Michael Kenny
Measuring social and cultural infrastructure. The British Academy: London, 2025 (report). doi.org/10.5871/infrastructure/measuring
Anguel Stefanov, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences
Changing views of space, time, and the universe, Lambert Academic Publishing, 2025.
ABSTRACT
The book explores how and why contemporary scientific knowledge undergoes conceptual shifts in its understanding of space, time, and the Universe. It argues for the substantive nature of spacetime and presents gravitational interaction not as a force field - unlike electromagnetic, weak, and strong interactions. The narrative revisits Einstein's so-called "biggest blunder" in light of his philosophical realism. It also examines how philosophical and aesthetical preferences influence modern cosmological theories. Finally, the book offers a critical analysis of the three main versions of the Anthropic Principle.
33rd round
Richard David-Rus, Institute of Anthropology Romanian Academy
Defending understanding without explanation. In: Mărăşoiu, A.I., & Dumitru, M. (Eds.). (2024). Understanding and Conscious Experience: Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives (1st ed.). Routledge, pp. 258. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003437239
ABSTRACT
The present chapter aims to reject a bold critique raised against understanding without explanation (UwE). It begins by reviewing the way UwE was reflected during the last two decades of the debate on understanding. It continues by introducing Lipton’s account of UwE and the general lines along which Khalifa articulates his critique of UwE. The critique is rejected in two ways. First, it discloses Khalifa’s incorrect reconstruction of Lipton’s basic assumptions and argument. The second challenge rejects the more general argumentative strategy deployed by Khalifa in dealing with UwE cases in showing that the explanatory sort of understanding always surpasses the non-explanatory form. The case of UwE through merely potential explanation will be used to exemplify the argument.
Chapter link: https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003437239-6/defending-understanding-without-explanation-richard-david-rus
Andrei Ionuț Mărăşoiu Mircea Dumitru, University of Bucharest
Understanding and Conscious Experience: Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives (1st ed.). (2024). Routledge, pp. 258. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003437239
ABSTRACT
This volume explores how understanding relates to conscious experience. In doing so, it builds bridges between different philosophical disciplines and provides a metaphysically robust characterization of understanding, both in and beyond science. The past two decades have witnessed growing interest from epistemologists, philosophers of science, philosophers of mind and ethicists in the nature and value of intellectual understanding. This volume features original essays on understanding and the phenomenal experiences that underlie it. The chapters are divided into three thematic sections. Part 1 provides theoretical characterizations of understanding, including Henk de Regt’s defense of a contextual theory of scientific understanding and a debate on whether scientific inference and explanatory power are necessary or central features of understanding. Part 2 explores how conscious experience and understanding are related. The chapters articulate a phenomenal theory of understanding and address themes that are connected to understanding, including awareness, transformative experiences and exemplification. Finally, Part 3 is devoted to domain-specific inquiries about understanding, such as logical proofs, particle physics and moral understanding. Understanding and Conscious Experience will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in the philosophy of science, epistemology, philosophy of mind, ethics and phenomenology.
Link: https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/edit/10.4324/9781003437239/understanding-conscious-experience-andrei-ionu%C8%9B-m%C4%83r%C4%83%C5%9Foiu-mircea-dumitru?refId=69378ecd-b362-43a3-8c4b-26c330cdfcb7&context=ubx
Lilia Gurova, New Bulgarian University
Understanding and inference in recent works on scientific understanding. In: Mărăşoiu, A.I., & Dumitru, M. (Eds.). (2024). Understanding and Conscious Experience: Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives (1st ed.). Routledge, pp. 258. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003437239
ABSTRACT
Over the past two decades, the literature on scientific understanding has been dominated by discussions on topics such as ‘understanding and knowledge’, ‘understanding and truth’, ‘explanation and understanding’, and similar. These topics inspired heated debates among the scholars of understanding, but they also blurred certain important similarities in their views. It is possible, however, to look at the seemingly diverse accounts of understanding from a different perspective. This chapter shows how the explications of the relationship between understanding and inference found in three recent books point to a minimal inferential account of understanding, built on the assumption that the recognized manifestations of understanding are always associated with certain demonstrations of inferential abilities. The most interesting corollaries of this assumption are discussed to illuminate the connections between prediction and understanding, and between categorization and understanding.
Chapter link: Understanding and inference in recent works on scientific understandin
Anna Martin, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Science
Shared agency in complex settings. Philosophy and Science Philosophical and Interdisciplinary Studies (pol. Filozofia i Nauka. Studia Filozoficzne i Interdyscyplinarne, vol. 13, 2025, pp. 133–152. https://filozofiainauka.studiafilozoficzne.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Martin_133.pdf
ABSTRACT
The paper begins by identifying two opposing approaches to (shared) agency— the standard model and the dynamical model. Despite differences between them, both models essentially converge upon the belief that shared agency entails direct mutual influence between agents, in the form of either mutual control or mutual responsiveness, respectively. This assumption becomes problematic when applied to interdisciplinary practices, like interdisciplinary research, which involve role specialization and thus do not lend themselves to an explanation in terms of direct mutual influence. In response to this difficulty, the paper advances a third approach— referred to here as the regulatory model (e.g., Schore, 2000)—which explains shared agency in terms of loose coupling (Gruber, Bödeker, 2005) understood as a pattern of cyclical organization of action in the course of which different positions (perspectives, agendas) are first differentiated during the exploratory phase and then integrated, giving rise to a dialogical from of self-organization.
Kadri Simm, Jaana Eigi-Watkin, University of Tartu
Diverse Sources of Normativity in Open Science and Their Implications for Ethical Governance. Royal Society Open Science (2024). https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rsos.240480
ABSTRACT
Over the past decade, open science (OS) has emerged as a global science policy and research initiative with implications for most aspects of research, including planning, funding, publishing, evaluation, data sharing and access. As OS has gained increasing prominence, it has also faced substantial criticism. Whether it is the worries about the equality of access associated with open-access publishing or the more recent allegations of OS benefitting those who act in the private interest without giving back to OS, there are, indeed, many potential as well as actual harms that can be linked to the practice of OS. These criticisms often revolve around ethical challenges and fairness concerns, prompting the question of whether a comprehensive ethical governance framework is needed for OS. This commentary contends that owing to the heterogeneous nature of the normative foundations of OS and the inherent diversity within scientific practices, a pluralistic and deliberative approach to governance is needed.
32rd round (3/25)
Kubiak, A.P., (Warsaw University of Technology), (2025). "Perspectival Realism and Frequentist Statistics: The Case of Jerzy Neyman’s Methodology and Philosophy." Synthese 205, 13
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-024-04842-2
Abstract In this article I investigate the extent to which perspectival realism (PR) agrees with frequentist statistical methodology and philosophy, with an emphasis on J. Neyman’s frequentist statistical methods and philosophy. PR is clarified in the context of frequentist statistics. Based on the example of the stopping rule problem, PR is shown to be able to naturally be associated with frequentist statistics in general. I show that there are explicit and implicit aspects of Neyman’s methods and philosophy that are incompatible and both partially agree and disagree with PR. Additionally, I provide clarifications and interpretations to make Neyman’s methods and philosophy more coherent with the realist aspect of PR. Furthermore, I deliver an argument that, based on Neyman’s methods and philosophy, one is dealing with genuine and non-trivial perspectives. I argue that, despite Neyman being a normative anti-pluralist, there are some elements of perspectival pluralism present in his methods and philosophy. In conclusion, firstly, due to their ambivalence, Neyman’s conceptions align more closely with PR than with alternative, less moderate stances. Secondly, from the perspective of the statistical approach analysed, PR should be treated as a descriptive rather than a normative position, and as case (or aspect)-dependent, rather than a universal, absolute, or binding stance.
Greif, H., Kubiak, A.P., Stacewicz, P., (Warsaw University of Technology), (2024). “Selection, growth and form. Turing’s two biological paths towards intelligent machinery.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 106, pp. 126-135.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.05.017
Abstract We inquire into the role of Turing’s biological thought in the development of his concept of intelligent machinery. We trace the possible relations between his proto-connectionist notion of ‘organising’ machines in Turing (1948) on the one hand and his mathematical theory of morphogenesis in developmental biology (1952) on the other. These works were concerned with distinct fields of inquiry and followed distinct paradigms of biological theory, respectively postulating analogues of Darwinian selection in learning and mathematical laws of form in organic pattern formation. Still, these strands of Turing’s work are related, first, in terms of being amenable in principle to his (1936) computational method of modelling. Second, they are connected by Turing’s scattered speculations about the possible bearing of learning processes on the anatomy of the brain. We argue that these two theories form an unequal couple that, from different angles and in partial fashion, point towards cognition as a biological and embodied phenomenon while, for reasons inherent to Turing’s computational approach to modelling, not being capable of directly addressing it as such. We explore ways in which these two distinct-but-related theories could be more explicitly and systematically connected, using von Neumann’s contemporaneous and related work on Cellular Automata and more recent biomimetic approaches as a foil. We conclude that the nature of ‘initiative’ and the mode of material realisation are the key issues that decide on the possibility of intelligent machinery in Turing.
31st round (12/24)
Fabian, Mark, Anna Alexandrova, Diane Coyle, Matthew Agarwala, and Marco Felici. (2024). "Wellbeing public policy needs more theory." International Journal of Wellbeing, 14(3).
Abstract Advocacy for ‘wellbeing public policy’ (WPP) requires suitable evidence. Endorsing the ambition to focus policy on wellbeing outcomes, we nevertheless argue that the current evidence base is deficient due to a lack of theory. For the purposes of our analysis, we identify theory narrowly with conceptual clarity and the modelling of causal mechanisms underlying statistical regularities. The prevailing focus on identifying ‘drivers’ of wellbeing and their effect sizes is not well suited for such theorising. We show that this status quo creates potential for conceptual confusion, incorrect aggregation, poor robustness and external validity of policy evaluations, inept interventions, and raises the prospect of a ‘Lucas critique’ in wellbeing economics. We discuss what sort of theory addresses these pitfalls, and where WPP could proceed fruitfully even in the absence of such theory. Ultimately, we call upon wellbeing experts to invest in developing theory as this would improve the basis for WPP and outcomes for those affected by it. Moreover, such theoretical contributions from the field of WPP could spillover to other disciplines, extending the reach and influence of wellbeing research.
Elena Popa (2024). Just pluralism: thinking about concepts of mental disorder in global context. Synthese, 204(3), 83. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-024-04724-7
Abstract This paper will investigate justice requirements that a pluralist stance on concepts of mental disorder should meet for use on a global scale. This is important given that different concepts of mental disorder are connected to particular interventions which may be more or less successful in specific contexts. While taking a broadly normative view on mental disorders, I will describe relevant concepts in a more fine grained manner, referring to their connections to particular approaches to biology, the self, or community. Drawing on research on epistemic injustice, I highlight the requirement that the set of multiple concepts be sufficiently flexible to enable the participation of those possessing relevant local knowledge. Using insights from health justice, I point out that the set of concepts should be conducive to distributive and procedural justice with regard to mental health and should support interventions on social determinants of health. These requirements apply to two dimensions of pluralism: regarding what concepts to include and how to relate them to one another. I conclude by explaining how an ontology of partial overlaps connected to a concept of health as metaphysically social can help address the challenges arising particularly regarding the latter dimension.
Elena Popa (Jagiellonian University). (2024). Values in public health: an argument from trust. Synthese, 203(6), 200. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-024-04650-8
Abstract Research on the role of values in science and objectivity has typically approached trust through its epistemic aspects. Yet, recent work on public trust in science has emphasized the role of non-epistemic values in building and maintaining trust. This paper will use a concept of trust that adds concerns about justice to epistemic conditions to investigate this problem in relation to public health. I will argue that trust-conducive values, particularly justice, are relevant in deciding which value influences are legitimate in scientific decision-making. Drawing on public health ethics, I will provide a consequentialist justification for employing trust-conducive values. While several concepts of justice have been explored in the context of public health, I will further draw on public health ethics, focusing on a view that brings together both distributive and procedural aspects. For illustration, I will use the case of cardiovascular disease prevention, particularly how concerns about justice apply when choosing between population-based and individual-based approaches.
30th round (07/2024)
Yilmaz, Ö. (2024). Return of the organism? The concept in plant biology, now and then. Theoretical and Experimental Plant Physiology, 1-14. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40626-024-00334-3
Abstract This essay argues for the importance of an organismic perspective in plant biology and considers some of its implications. These include an increased attention to plant-environment interaction and an emphasis on integrated approaches. Furthermore, this essay contextualizes the increased emphasis on the concept of organism in recent years and places the concept in a longer history. Recent developments in biology and worsening environmental crises have led researchers to study plant responses to chang- ing environments with whole plant approaches that situate plants in their environments, emphasizing the intricate and dynamic interaction between them. This renewed attention to the organism recalls the debates of the early twentieth century, when organicism was one of the three main frameworks in biology (along with vitalism and mechanism). Some scholars see this renewed importance today as a “return” of this earlier period. This essay argues that including insights from plant biology will benefit philosophy of biology research that examines the concept of organism and organicism now and in earlier periods. A comprehensive account of the concept of organism should involve a botanical conception of the organism as well as a zoological one (which is more frequently considered). Although this essay does not aim to present a conceptual analysis, it presents examples of how an organismic perspective can be useful for understanding concepts (such as phenotype, stress, etc.) and research processes (such as experiment set-ups, data processes, etc.) in plant biology. Philosophy of biology investigations that aim at a comprehensive understanding of the concept of organism can benefit greatly from examinations of cases in plant biology, both now and in the past.
Eigi-Watkin, J., Velbaum, K., Talpsepp, E., Lõhkivi, E. (all University of Tartu) (2024). How interdisciplinary researchers see themselves: plurality of understandings of interdisciplinarity within a field and why it matters. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 14, 13. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00572-x
Abstract: It is widely acknowledged that interdisciplinarity (ID) is very diverse. Our contribution is a demonstration that considerable diversity exists also on the level of understandings of ID that researchers working in the same ID field express. Specifically, we analyse qualitatively, building on the method of culture contrast, six interviews with researchers working in computational linguistics and language technology in Estonia. We identify six understandings of ID expressed by the interviewees: centred on an ID method; a disciplinary method in an ID field; an ID way of seeing and thinking; ID education; ID interests; one’s field as naturally ID. We show how understandings of ID are significant for analysing research practice, since they are involved in how researchers form a positive picture of themselves and their colleagues. We also show how an awareness of different understandings of ID is useful for discussing the significance of integration in ID.
Mets, A. (University of Tartu), Lõhkivi E., (University of Tartu), Müürsepp P. (Tallinn University of Technology), Eigi-Watkin, J. (University of Tartu) (eds.) (2024). Practical Realist Philosophy of Science Reflecting on Rein Vihalemm’s Ideas. Lexington Books.
https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781666937220/Practical-Realist-Philosophy-of-Science-Reflecting-on-Rein-Vihalemm%E2%80%99s-Ideas
Abstract: The Estonian philosopher of science Rein Vihalemm (1938–2015) left two prominent and fruitful philosophical-methodological legacies that continue to captivate philosophers of science: a methodological distinction of scientific disciplines and the practical realist philosophy of science. Edited by Ave Mets, Endla Lõhkivi, Peeter Müürsepp, and Jaana Eigi-Watkin, Practical Realist Philosophy of Science: Reflecting on Rein Vihalemm's Ideas explores some of these fruits that have sprung from philosophy of science, and the applications of those approaches through three main ideas: (back)grounds of the practical approach, metaphysics of practices, and special sciences. The first part features authors who juxtapose Vihalemm’s approach with those of prominent philosophers on the practical and material basis of cognition, providing support and refinement to his framework. The second part delves into the metaphysical aspects of science and practices, and comprehending them. The third part centers around examples of Vihalemm’s approach to specific scientific disciplines within chemistry, biology and humanities. These diverse implications outlined in this book, supported by solid ground and compelling argumentation, offer an original contribution to this field.
Special issue “The Philosophical Legacy of Rein Vihalemm. Reflections and Expansions” of Acta Baltica Historiae et Philosophiae Scientiarum (vol. 12, no. 1, Spring 2024). Edited by Ave Mets, Endla Lõhkivi and Peeter Müürsepp. With contributions from Jean-Pierre Llored, Juho Lindholm and Ave Mets, and a translation of Rein Vihalemm’s 1969 paper “On the Transition to Theoretical Stage of Cognition (on the Example of the History of the Study of Chemical Affinity)” (originally in Russian).
The special issue is available open access here: https://www.bahps.org/acta-baltica/abhps-12-1/
29th round (05/2024)
Seppälä, P., & Małecka, M. (2024). AI and discriminative decisions in recruitment: Challenging the core assumptions. Big Data & Society, 11(1). https://doi.org/10.1177/20539517241235872
Abstract: In this article, we engage critically with the idea of promoting artificial intelligence (AI) technologies in recruitment as tools to eliminate discrimination in decision-making. We show that the arguments for using AI technologies to eliminate discrimination in personnel selection depend on presuming specific meanings of the concepts of rationality, bias, fairness, objectivity and AI, which the AI industry and other proponents of AI-based recruitment accept as self-evident. Our critical analysis of the arguments for relying on AI to decrease discrimination in recruitment is informed by insights gleaned from philosophy and methodology of science, legal and political philosophy, and critical discussions on AI, discrimination and recruitment. We scrutinize the role of the research on cognitive biases and implicit bias in justifying these arguments – a topic overlooked thus far in the debates about practical applications of AI. Furthermore, we argue that the recent use of AI in personnel selection can be understood as the latest trend in the long history of psychometric-based recruitment. This historical continuum has not been fully recognized in current debates either, as they focus mainly on the seemingly novel and disruptive character of AI technologies.
Małecka, M. (2023). Imaginary of Behavioral Governing: From Nudges to Algorithms. Public Culture. 35 (3), 343–354. https://doi.org/10.1215/08992363-10742509
Abstract: The article introduces the concept of the imaginary of behavioral governing to capture the view on the role of behavioral research in governing behavior that is widely shared in the academic and public discussions about behavioral policy (nudging), including the recent debates about reliance on big data and algorithms to influence people's behavior. It is believed that behavioral science provides knowledge of stable regularities of behavior and of the cognitive processes that lead to them, and that policymakers/governments act upon this knowledge to change behavior of individuals. I argue that this set of claims about the knowledge provided by the behavioral sciences is not substantiated in behavioral research. The formal theoretical frameworks of behavioral science come to be interpreted — via the imaginary of behavioral governing — as relating to human agents that power can act upon. I reflect on the possible point of entry for critique of this imaginary and its effects.
Gabovich, A.M., Kuznetsov, V., Scientific realism from a polysystemic view of physical theories and their functioning. Global Philosophy 33, 53 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-023-09703-0
Abstract: One of the vividly discussed topics in the contemporary philosophy of science (especially physics) is the opposition between Realism and Anti-Realism. The supporters of the first way of thinking trust in the objective existence of realities studied by science. They consider theories as approximate descriptions of these realities (Psillos 1999, xvii), whereas their opponents do not. However, both sides base their argumentation on simplified notions of scientific theories. In this paper, we present a more general approach, which can be coined as “Theoretical Physics Realism” (TPR). It is based on the detailed reconstruction of the polysystemic nature of physical theories. The consequences of this reconstruction for understanding the genuine relationship between theories and experiments in studying the realities are indicated. The paper distinguishes between abstract (general) and domain-dependent theories and appeals to specific physical theories together with their application domains rather than general speculations.
Gabovich, A.M., Kuznetsov, V.I., Anatoly Vlasov heritage: 60-year-old controversy. EPJ H 48, 5 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1140/epjh/s13129-023-00051-6
Abstract: We analyzed remarkable stories linked to the famous Anatoly Vlasov equations in plasma physics. Their creation, modification, and application are interesting from a scientific viewpoint. We also show the relations between those equations dealing with electromagnetism and analogous Jeans equations describing, in particular, gravitational instability in astrophysics. The second half of the essay is devoted to the controversies and political struggle in Soviet (before 1991) and Russian (after 1991) physical communities related to Vlasov’s personality, career, and posthumous recognition. The never-ending destructive influence of Russian totalitarianism on science is demonstrated.
Alexander M. Gabovich and Volodymyr I. Kuznetsov. Eponyms in physics: useful tools and cultural heritage. European Physical Society, Eur. J. Phys. 45 035802. https://doi.org/10.1088/1361-6404/ad2fd7
Abstract: The recent proposition to eliminate eponyms from physical publications is discussed. The role of eponyms in research and education is analyzed. We show that eponyms constitute an integral part of physical texts and ensure the continuity of scientific research. Their proposed elimination is dangerous for science and the entire human culture and must be rejected.
Gabovich A., Kuznetsov V., Philosophy of Scientific Theories. The First Essay: Names and Realities Naukova Dumka. ISBN 978-966-00-1896-0 2023. (In Ukrainian)
Abstract: The book presents an original and generalizing substantive vision of the philosophy of science through the prism of a detailed analysis of the polysystem structure of scientific theories. Theories are considered, firstly, as complex, specialized forms of developed scientific thinking about the realities studied by natural science; secondly, as constantly improving tools for producing new knowledge in interaction with experimental research; and thirdly, as carriers of ordered and verified knowledge. Emphasis is placed on their nominal and ontic subsystems. The book develops personal and joint research of the authors (theoretical physicist and philosopher), the experience of teaching philosophy of physics at NaUKMA, philosophy of science at the Higher School of Philosophy at the H. Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and theoretical physics at the National Technical University "Ihor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute". The research is based on a significant source base covering works of modern Western researchers in natural science and philosophy of science. It is for students, teachers, and scientists who are interested in the problems of modern philosophy of science and have a certain amount of scientific knowledge. It will also be useful for high school students who are eager to become scientists.
Vladimir I. Kuznetsov, H. Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine; National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Kyiv, Ukraine. TO THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF SCIENTIFIC THEORIES. https://doi.org/10.15407/visn2023.11.03
Abstract: The article examines the relationship between science and the philosophy of science through the prism of modeling scientific theories, which are much more complex systems than are usually described in professional literature. Many specialists related to science, its teaching, and administration have simplified ideas about the component composition of theories, which are the main tools of scientific thinking. It is, therefore, necessary to develop a unifying yet detailed view of the theories. It is appropriate to base it on analyzing theories used in scientific practice. The author proposes to place a polysystemic vision of theories at the centre of the philosophy of science and other metasciences about science (the science of science, history of science, sociology of science, psychology of science, science management, etc.). Such a vision is useful for philosophers and scientists, teachers of scientific disciplines and students, those who manage science as a social institution for producing new knowledge, and those who evaluate its results. Keywords: philosophy of science, philosophy of physics, scientific theory, subsystems of scientific theories, polysystem approach.
Vladimir Kuznetsov. Chief researcher of the Department of Logic and Methodology of Science of the H. S. Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Doctor of Philosophy, Professor of Chair of Physical and Mathematical Disciplines of the National University "KyivMohyla Academy" (part-time). Philosophy of Science in Ukraine. A Personal Story. The HPS&ST Newsletter, 2023, April, Vol. 36 (3). P. 4-12. ISSN: 2652-2837. hps^l0st_news__2023_april_.pdf (hpsst.com)
Abstract: The author’s view on the Ukrainian philosophy of science in the context of his participation in its development.
28th round (03/2024)
Popa, Elena (Jagiellonian University) & Zawiła-Niedźwiecki, Jakub (University of Warsaw) & Zabdyr-Jamróz, Michał (Jagiellonian University Medical College). Policy change without ethical analysis? Commentary on the publication of Smajdor. Theor Med Bioeth 44, 379–385 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-023-09631-5
Abstract: This commentary addresses the proposal and argumentative line presented in the paper ‘Whole Body Gestational Donation’ (WBGD) by Anna Smajdor (2023), published as an intended ‘outrageous argument’ in a dedicated special issue of Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics. We believe that the paper is fatally flawed due to its lack of engagement with relevant approaches in ethics and essential sources in health sciences as well as its insufficient, superficial, and rash argumentation. Its critical weaknesses include, among others, that it does not take any explicit ethical stance, it does not consider the societal impacts of its premise, and it hastily assumes a large degree of equivalency between WBGD and the usual organ donations. These scholarly flaws are made worse by the fact that the paper is not merely an academic thought experiment but contains important policy change proposals. As a consequence, the paper feeds into more general and systemic worries about the suitability of philosophy for public policy.
Popa, Elena (Jagiellonian University). Loneliness as Cause. Topoi 42, 1175–1184 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-023-09933-2.
Abstract: While loneliness has been linked to various mental and physical health problems, the sense in which loneliness is a cause of these conditions has so far attracted little philosophical attention. This paper aims to fill this gap by analyzing research on health effects of loneliness and therapeutic interventions through current approaches to causality. To deal with the problem of causality between psychological, social, and biological variables, the paper endorses a biopsychosocial model of health and disease. I will investigate how three main approaches to causality used in psychiatry and public health apply to loneliness: interventionism, mechanisms, and dispositional theories. Interventionism can specify whether loneliness causes specific effects, or whether a treatment works, incorporating results from randomized controlled trials. Mechanisms help explain how loneliness brings about negative health effects, spelling out psychological processes involved in lonely social cognition. Dispositional approaches help stress particular features of loneliness connected to negative social interactions, such as defensiveness. I will conclude by showing that previous research alongside emerging approaches to health effects of loneliness lend themselves to analysis in terms of the causal models under discussion.
Pokropski, M. (Faculty of Philosophy, University of Warsaw), Suffczynski, P. (Faculty of Physics, University of Warsaw). First-person constraints on dynamic-mechanistic explanations in neuroscience: The case of migraine and epilepsy models. Synthese 202, 153 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04396-9
Abstract: According to recent discussion, cross-explanatory integration in cognitive science might proceed by constraints on mechanistic and dynamic-mechanistic models provided by different research fields. However, not much attention has been given to constraints that could be provided by the study of first-person experience, which in the case of multifaceted mental phenomena are of key importance. In this paper, we fill this gap and consider the question whether information about first-person experience can constrain dynamic-mechanistic models and what the character of this relation is. We discuss two cases of such explanatory models in neuroscience, namely that of migraine and of epilepsy. We argue that, in these cases, first-person insights about the target phenomena significantly contributed to explanatory models by shaping explanatory hypotheses and by indicating the dynamical properties that the explanatory models of these phenomena should account for, and thus directly constraining the space of possible explanations.
Csaba Pléh, Laying the Foundations of Independent Psychology: The Formation of Modern Psychology, Volume 1. By Routledge: https://www.routledge.com/Laying-the-Foundations-of-Independent-Psychology-The-Formation-of-Modern-Psychology-Volume-1/Pleh/p/book/9781032502762
Abstract: Part of a two-volume series, this book offers a multicentric perspective on the history of psychology, situating its development in relation to developments made in other social sciences and philosophical disciplines.
This first volume, Laying the Foundations of Independent Psychology, provides a detailed exploration of the origins and development of European psychology. The book examines psychology’s beginnings as an independent discipline in the late 19th century through to the emergence of the dominant new schools of behaviorism, Gestalt psychology and psychoanalysis in the early 1900s. This volume also offers a broad overview of the early impact of Darwinism, not only on the psychological study of individual differences and on American functionalism, but also on the early evolutionary treatments of cognition in William James, James Baldwin, Ernst Mach and even Sigmund Freud. Taking this wider perspective, the book shows that European psychology was continuously present and active, placing these European developments in their own context in their own time.
An invaluable introductory text for undergraduate students of the history of psychology, the book will also appeal to postgraduates, academics and those interested in psychology or the history of science, as well as graduate students of psychology, biology, sociology and anthropology with a theoretical interest.
Csaba Pléh, Diversification and Professionalization in Psychology: The Formation of Modern Psychology, Volume 2. By Routledge: https://www.routledge.com/Diversification-and-Professionalization-in-Psychology-The-Formation-of-Modern-Psychology-Volume-2/Pleh/p/book/9781032625775
Abstract: Diversification and Professionalization in Psychology offers readers a multicentric perspective on the history of social science and compares the developments in psychology in relation to the developments made in the other social and natural sciences.
This is the second volume about the formation of modern psychology and provides a comprehensive look into the origins and developments of modern psychology. With a large geographical coverage, European developments are put into their own context in their own time. In doing this, the book explores different early schools, from social reductionists like Durkheim, Charles Blondel, and Maurice Halbwachs, to the social debates about relativism in Lévy-Bruhl, early Piaget, the beginnings of ethology, and the semiotic approach of Karl Bühler. These thinkers are placed in relation to the recent upsurge of different social and biological theories of the mind. Throughout, the author develops a detailed presentation of the thematic development of psychology and links the history of psychology to an outline of contemporary psychology.
This is an invaluable introductory text for undergraduate students of the history of psychology and will also appeal to postgraduates, academics, and anyone interested in psychology or the history of science. It will also be of interest to graduate students of psychology, biology, sociology, and anthropology with a theoretical interest in the history of the field.
Garber, I. (2024). Meta-Anthropology: An Attractive Catchword or a Scientific Discipline?
Three Stages in the Formation of Meta-Anthropology. Human Arenas, 1-18.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s42087-024-00404-7
https://rdcu.be/dzHOi
Abstract: The purpose of the article is to present meta-anthropology as an independent scientific discipline that can be developed in the image and likeness of other meta-sciences—metamathematics and metalogic, metaethics, and meta-sociology. This means identifying and formulating key meta-problems, creating a special meta-language, developing meta-theories, and obtaining non-trivial results, at least at the level of meta-classifications. The history of meta-anthropology, summarized in the article, shows that only the first three steps have been taken along this long path. These include the creation and justification of the term, the choice of a higher-level theory for constructing the theory of the discipline (world hypotheses and root metaphors), and the proposal of a normative model. The whole process entails a transformation of the whole anthropology due to the anthropologists’ transition from thinking/thought to meta-thinking/meta-thought. We will try to show that the meta-level of analysis is useful for anthropology, generates new knowledge and ideas, and unites different areas of anthropology. Some prospects for the further development of meta-anthropology and the limitations of this study are discussed.
Subotić, V., Exploring, expounding & ersatzing: a three-level account of deep learning models in cognitive neuroscience. Synthese 203, 94 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04514-1
Abstract: Deep learning (DL) is a statistical technique for pattern classification through which AI researchers train artificial neural networks containing multiple layers that process massive amounts of data. I present a three-level account of explanation that can be reasonably expected from DL models in cognitive neuroscience and that illustrates the explanatory dynamics within a future-biased research program (Feest Philosophy of Science 84:1165–1176, 2017; Doerig et al. Nature Reviews: Neuroscience 24:431–450, 2023). By relying on the mechanistic framework (Craver Explaining the brain: Mechanisms and the mosaic unity of neuroscience. Clarendon, 2007; Stinson Eppuor si muove: Doing history and philosophy of Science with Peter Machamer. Springer, 2017, The Routledge Handbook of the computational mind. Routledge, 2018), I develop an account that corresponds to the stages of mechanism discovery, i.e., our shifting epistemic position and epistemic goals, and propose a representative model for each level. Generic, theoretical DL models at Level 1 address the general features of a cognitive phenomenon through exploration and provide us with how-possibly explanations. On the other hand, DL models at Level 2 either identify the interaction between the features or represent the epistemic stage when the researcher is still unsure if the modeled features are crucial or arbitrary. These models should provide us with how-plausibly explanations. Finally, specific DL models of specific brain areas, i.e., ersatz models filled with relevant cognitive and neuroscientific details, are at Level 3. At this level, a researcher can advance how-actually explanations of cognitive phenomena. The main strength of this account is that it elucidates both global explanatory dynamics and local explanatory dynamics (cf. Dresow Synthese 199:10441–10474, 2021). The former occurs when the transition between levels happens in accordance with the process of obtaining more details about a particular cognitive phenomenon through multiple DL models. The latter, meanwhile, involves cases in which the transition between levels takes place within a single DL model by elucidating internal mechanisms (e.g., using Explainable AI techniques for rendering models more transparent).
Published in 2023 (roughly)
27th round
Kostić, Daniel (Leiden University), Halffman, Willem (Radboud University). (2023). “Mapping Explanatory Language in Neuroscience”. Synthese 202, 112. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04329-6.
Abstract:
The philosophical literature on scientific explanation in neuroscience has been dom- inated by the idea of mechanisms. The mechanist philosophers often claim that neuroscience is in the business of finding mechanisms. This view has been chal- lenged in numerous ways by showing that there are other successful and widespread explanatory strategies in neuroscience. However, the empirical evidence for all these claims was hitherto lacking. Empirical evidence about the pervasiveness and uses of various explanatory strategies in neuroscience is particularly needed because exam- ples and case studies that are used to illustrate philosophical claims so far tend to be hand-picked. The risk of confirmation bias is therefore considerable: when looking for white swans, all one finds is that swans are white. The more systematic quantitative and qualitative bibliometric study of a large body of relevant literature that we present in this paper can put such claims into perspective. Using text mining tools, we identify the typical linguistic patterns used in the alleged mechanistic, dynamical, and topo- logical explanations in the literature, their preponderance and how they change over time. Our findings show abundant use of mechanistic language, but also the presence of a significant neuroscience literature using topological and dynamical explanatory language, which grows over time and increasingly differentiates from each other and from mechanistic explanations.
Keywords Scientific explanation · Neuroscience · Text mining · Explanatory pluralism
Kostić, Daniel (Leiden University, (2023). “On the Role of Erotetic Constraints in Non-causal Explanations”. Philosophy of Science, 1-15. doi:10.1017/psa.2023.114.
Abstract:
In noncausal explanations, some noncausal facts (such as mathematical, modal, or metaphysical) are used to explain some physical facts. However, precisely because these explanations abstract away from causal facts, they face two challenges: (1) it is not clear why one rather than the other noncausal explanantia would be relevant for the explanandum; and (2) why would standing in a particular explanatory relation (e.g., “counterfactual dependence,” “constraint,” “entailment,” “constitution,” and “grounding”), and not in some other, be explanatory. I develop an explanatory relevance account that is based on erotetic constraints and show how it addresses these two challenges.
Commentary (no abstract)
Miłkowski, Marcin (Polish Academy of Sciences), and Kostić, Daniel (Leiden University) (2023). “Forging Connections: Uniting Neuroscience and Philosophy of Science.” eLetter, Levenstein, Daniel, et al. "On the role of theory and modeling in neuroscience." Journal of Neuroscience, 43.7 (2023): 1074-1088. https://www.jneurosci.org/content/43/7/1074/tab-e-letters#forging-connections-uniting-neuroscience-and-philosophy-of-science.
26th round
Anand Vaidya and Duško Prelević (eds.) (2023)
Epistemology of Modality and Philosophical Methodology.
New York and London: Routledge.
Abstract:
This book collects original essays on the epistemology of modality and related issues in modal metaphysics and philosophical methodology.
The contributors utilize both the newer "metaphysics-first" and the more traditional "epistemology-first" approaches to these issues. The chapters on modal epistemology mostly focus on the problem of how we can gain knowledge of possibilities, which have never been actualized, or necessities which are not provable either by logico-mathematical reasoning or by linguistic competence alone. These issues are closely related to some of the central issues in philosophical methodology, notably: to what extent is the armchair methodology of philosophy a reliable guide for the formation of beliefs about what is possible and necessary. This question also relates to the nature of thought experiments that are extensively used in science and philosophy.
Epistemology of Modality and Philosophical Methodology will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working on the epistemology and metaphysics of modality, as well as those whose work is concerned with philosophical methodology more generally.
Link: https://www.routledge.com/Epistemology-of-Modality-and-Philosophical-Methodology/Vaidya-Prelevic/p/book/9780367431679
To order, use the promotional flyer: epistemology_of_modality_flyer.pdf
Duško Prelević (University of Belgrade) (2023)
"The Explanatory Power of Modal Rationalism".
In: A. Vaidya and D. Prelević (eds.), Epistemology of Modality and Philosophical Methodology. New York and London: Routledge.
Abstract:
Probably, the main objection to Chalmersian conceivability-based modal rationalism is that it cannot explain non-trivial essentialist de re modal knowledge. In particular, Sonia Roca-Royes has argued that the proponents of that view are not capable of elucidating our knowledge of interesting essentialist principles, such as the Essentiality of Origin and the Essentiality of Kind (let us say, by arguing that scenarios in which these principles are false are inconceivable) without presupposing essentialism in advance. I argue that this criticism is not metaphysically innocent, and that it can be handled once it is unfolded which theory of objecthood it presupposes. By using Gilbert Ryles’s distinction between strong and weak reductio ad absurdum and pluralism in geometry as illustrations (elsewhere, I have argued that such pluralism is in accordance with modal rationalism independently of whether modal monism is true or not), I draw the distinction between absolute and relative conceivability, arguing that the conceivability (or inconceivability) of scenarios that falsify the Essentiality of Kind and the Essentiality of Origin depends on which system of metaphysical axioms (or a set of beliefs) is presupposed. In the former case, conceivability is premised on a conception of objecthood one endorses, whereas in the latter case, some other metaphysical axioms are relevant as well. An advantage of the proposed reply to Roca-Royes’s criticism over David Chalmers’s own reply is that it does not depend on the validity of an anti-realist view of modality.
Link: https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003002192-11/explanatory-power-modal-rationalism-duško-prelević
Borut Trpin (Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy)
Trpin, B.
Against Methodological Gambling.
Erkenntnis 88, 907–927 (2023).
Abstract:
Should a scientist rely on methodological triangulation? Heesen et al. (Synthese 196(8):3067–3081, 2019) recently provided a convincing affirmative answer. However, their approach requires belief gambles if the evidence is discordant. We instead propose epistemically modest triangulation (EMT), according to which one should withhold judgement in such cases. We show that for a scientist in a methodologically diffident situation the expected utility of EMT is greater than that of Heesen et al.’s (2019) triangulation or that of using a single method. We also show that EMT is more appropriate for increasing epistemic trust in science. In short: triangulate, but do not gamble with evidence.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-021-00386-w
Tomáš Marvan (Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences)
Tomáš Marvan, Hanne Andersen, Hasok Chang, Benedikt Lōwe and Ivo Pezlar, eds,
Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science and Technology.
Bridging Across Academic Cultures. Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Congress in Prague. College Publications 2022.
Description:
This volume contains papers based on invited lectures from the 16th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science and Technology, descriptions of congress symposia, and other materials relating to the congress and DLMPST.
Link: https://www.collegepublications.co.uk/lmps/?00017
Direct OA download: http://www.collegepublications.co.uk/downloads/lmps00017.pdf
T. Marvan, M. Polák, Neurocentrist identity theory and neuro-phenomenal typing. A commentary on Manzotti, 'The boundaries and location of consciousness as identity theories deem fit'. Frontiers in Psychology 13:1058325, section Consciousness Research, 2022.
Abstract:
Manzotti (2021) surveys recent variants of identity theories, defending his own preferred version, mind-object identity theory (MOI). According to this view, experiences are identical with the external objects, and the mind is thus literally “spread” in the world. Manzotti supports this view with considerations about indiscernibility of properties and other theoretical considerations. He claims that brain-mind accounts of identity commit the “fallacy of the center,” locating conscious mind inside the skull. Amongst other recent works, he comments on our (Polák and Marvan, 2018) article, in which we defended a standard, neurocentrist version of type identity theory, and supplemented it with a sketch of neuro-phenomenal typing. Manzotti holds that although we appeal to neuro-phenomenal types in our account of mind-brain identity, we nevertheless “lack a convincing explanation as to why the type of neural processes should be identical to the type of one's experience.” This is a fair point. We didn't do much in our 2018 article to support our views on the principles of neuro-phenomenal typing, either by detailed theoretical considerations or by empirical evidence. In this short rejoinder, we offer the missing argument. By doing so, we also respond both to Manzotti's cited objection and to the charge of the “fallacy of the center.”
Link: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.1058325/full
Anguel S. Stefanov (Bulgarian Academy of Sciences) & Gregorie Dupuis-Mc Donald (Department of Philosophy, University of Salzburg) (Editors):
Spacetime Conference 2022.
Minkowski Institute Press.
Abstract:
This volume contains original contributions made at the sixth session of the Minkowski Institute international conference “Nature and Ontology of Spacetime”. It continues the ambition of debating open ontological and epistemological problems in the philosophy and physics of spacetime. In this volume, topics covered include the reality of Minkowski spacetime ontology, the nature of time, quantum gravitation, inertia and relativistic phenomena, as well as aspects of the mathematical structure of the special and general theory of relativity. The volume will be of interest to students in philosophy of science, researchers in spacetime physics, and to any reader who wants to study contemporary issues and debates in modern philosophy and physics.
Link: http://minkowskiinstitute.org/mip/
Magdalena Małecka (Aarhus University, Aarhus Institute of Advanced Studies / Practical Philosophy, University of Helsinki)
Małecka M., 2022,
Economics as value-laden science: Lessons from the philosophy of science on the normative/positive distinctions and the rational choice theory, [in:] The Positive and the Normative in Economic Thought, Badiei S., Grivaux A., Routledge: 214-230
Abstract:
The topic of values in economics has a long history. According to already established narratives, the view of economics as a value-free science was solidified by the neoclassical school that defined economics as a positive science free from any value judgements. However, some philosophers of economics and historians of economic thought teach us that debates about the role of value judgements in economics, as well as the division of economics into positive and normative branches, were much richer and more ambiguous than what the standard narrative might suggest. This chapter does not intend to contribute further to these debates. Instead, its aim is to draw readers’ attention to yet another take on values in economics that has become present in philosophy of economics. The chapter reviews current attempts to bring insights from philosophy of science on how to analyse values in science to economic methodology. First, it reflects on whether these insights shed new light on discussions about the positive and the normative in economics. Second, it shows that they allow us to approach theoretical discussions on so-called rational choice theory from a novel and illuminating angle. The chapter concludes by listing the main lessons that can be learnt from the vibrant debates on values in science in philosophy of science.
Link: https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003247289-15/economics-value-laden-science-magdalena-ma%C5%82ecka
Małecka M., 2022,
Chasing the human in modern economics, Review of Deirdre McCloskey’s Bettering humanomics: A new, and old, approach to economic science, MetaScience.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11016-022-00810-z
Other publications
Anna Alexandrova (University of Cambridge)
Anna Alexandrova’s work on wellbeing was publicized in No Man Is an Island: Well-Being as a Collective Endeavor By Alene Dawson.
LInk: https://www.templeton.org/news/no-man-is-an-island-well-being-as-a-collective-endeavor
25th round
Ivan Loginov
(Department of Philosophy & History of Science, Faculty of Science, Charles University)
The Subjective Perception of Music: Stanislav Vomela and Subjective Research in Psychophysiology in 1930s Czechoslovakia
Abstract:
This paper explores the subjective psychophysiological research of the so-called subjective audition conducted by the Czech physician and endocrinologist Stanislav Vomela in the 1930s. It examines Vomela’s attempts to analyze his own peculiar experience of hearing what he called subjective music (music heard only by the subject) and introduces the concept of acousmatics Vomela developed to study this kind of auditory perception. Vomela’s methodology is studied against the background of J. E. Purkyně’s understanding of the subjective empiricist methodology of self-knowing in the physiology of the senses and in the context of research into eidetic imagery by E. R. Jaensch and Victor Urbantschitsch.
Link: https://doi.org/10.46938/tv.2022.542
Twitter: https://twitter.com/l0ginov
24th round
Oleksandr Gabovich, Institute of Physics of the NAS of Ukraine
Volodymyr Kuznetsov, H.S. Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy of the NAS of Ukraine / National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy”
Overview of modern philosophy of science (art. 2) (in Ukrainian). Philosophical Thought
Abstract:
Varieties of modern philosophies of mathematical and natural sciences are represented. Specific features of those sciences are analyzed based on graph classifications of the respective philosophies. The importance of reconstructions of practical theories is emphasized for all kinds of philosophies of science used by them.
The first part outlines the purpose of the article and considers subject and theoretical, the second — evaluative, nominal, theoretical-reconstructive and linguistic-reconstructive classifications of philosophies of science. The conclusions are made about the problematic application of these classifications to the philosophies of social sciences and humanities.
Keywords: global/general and local/science-centered philosophies of sciences; features and classifications of philosophies of mathematical and natural sciences; a network of specific theories as the core of the relevant science; practical theories and their reconstructions.
Link: https://doi.org/10.15407/fd2022.02.137
Anguel S. Stefanov (Professor of Philosophy, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences)
Suggested Answers to Philosophical Puzzles (Book)
Publishing House: Cambridge Scholars Publishing
Abstract:
Link:
Published in 2022/forthcoming
Publications are listed by year, then in alphabetical order or by order of notification
Adam P. Kubiak (Faculty of Administration and Social Sciences, Warsaw University of Technology)
& Paweł Kawalec (Faculty of Philosophy, John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin)
“Prior Information in Frequentist Research Designs: The Case of Neyman’s Sampling Theory”.
Journal for General Philosophy of Science.
Abstract:
We analyse the issue of using prior information in frequentist statistical inference. For that purpose, we scrutinise different kinds of sampling designs in Jerzy Neyman’s theory to reveal a variety of ways to explicitly and objectively engage with prior information. Further, we turn to the debate on sampling paradigms (design-based vs. model-based approaches) to argue that Neyman’s theory supports an argument for the intermediate approach in the frequentism vs. Bayesianism debate. We also demonstrate that Neyman’s theory, by allowing non-epistemic values to influence evidence collection and formulation of statistical conclusions, does not compromise the epistemic reliability of the procedures and may improve it. This undermines the value-free ideal of scientific inference.
Link: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10838-022-09600-x
Jaana Eigi-Watkin (University of Tartu)
“Applying the notion of epistemic risk to argumentation in philosophy of science”. European Journal for Philosophy of Science.
Abstract:
I analyse an empirically informed argument in philosophy of science to show that it faces several varieties of risk commonly discussed as inductive risk. I argue that this is so even though the type of reasoning used in this argument differs from the reasoning in some of the arguments usually discussed in connection with inductive risk. To capture the variety of risks involved, I use the more general notion of epistemic risk proposed by Justin Biddle and Quill Kukla. I show how the argument in question faces several of the epistemic risks already described in connection with empirical reasoning. Importantly, I also argue that the subtype of inductive reasoning used in the argument merits a separate discussion. To analyse it, I recommend using the model of colligation, or reasoning through offering synthesising expressions. I then argue that it is desirable to recognise the risk in colligating inductive reasoning as a distinct type of epistemic risk that is relevant for understanding risk in other fields as well. Thus, I suggest that philosophy of science is one of the fields subject to non-trivial epistemic risk; I characterise several of these risks on the example of a specific argument; and I describe epistemic risk that accompanies colligation – colligating inductive risk.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-022-00455-z
Yılmaz, Özlem . "Biyoloji Felsefesinde Organizma Kavramı". Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi 1 / 1 (April 2022): 78-86,
Kilikya Journal of Philosophy.
Özet: Çevre sorunlarının katlanarak arttığı ve biyoloji biliminin büyük sıçramalarla geliştiği günümüzde organizma kavramının incelenmesi, hem kendi doğamızı (dolayısıyla da diğer canlılarla etkileşimlerimizi) hem de günümüz biyolojisindeki değişimleri daha iyi anlayabilmemiz için faydalı olacaktır. Bu çalışma, organizma kavramını özellikle organizma-çevre etkileşimi üzerinden inceleyerek günümüz biyolojisindeki önemini vurgulayacaktır. Organizma kavramı özellikle Modern Sentezden, Genişletilmiş Evrimsel Senteze geçişle birlikte ayrı bir önem kazanmıştır. Köklerini yirminci yüzyılın başlarındaki organizma-merkezci biyolojiden alan bu kavramın gelişimi, son birkaç on yıldır biyoloji biliminde gerçekleşmiş olan gelişmelerle (özellikle gelişim biyolojisi, sistem biyolojisi ve ekoloji dallarında) iyice dinamikleşmiştir. Organizma kavramının gelişimini incelemek sadece biyoloji biliminin felsefesi açısından değil, bunun yanında, insan olarak kendi biyolojik varlığımızı -organizma- ve çevremizle (hem abiyotik hem de biyotik) olan etkileşimlerimizi, tekrar düşünmek açısından değerlidir.
Link: https://dergipark.org.tr/en/pub/kilikya/issue/69763/1111764
Kostić, Daniel, and Khalifa, Kareem, (2022).
"Decoupling Topological Explanations from Mechanisms.” Philosophy of Science.
Abstract:
We provide three innovations to recent debates about whether topological or “network” explanations are a species of mechanistic explanation. First, we more precisely characterize the requirement that all topological explanations are mechanistic explanations and show scientific practice to belie such a requirement. Second, we provide an account that unifies mechanistic and non-mechanistic topological explanations, thereby enriching both the mechanist and autonomist programs by highlighting when and where topological explanations are mechanistic. Third, we defend this view against some powerful mechanist objections. We conclude from this that topological explanations are autonomous from their mechanistic counterparts.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2022.29
Khalifa, Kareem. Islam, Farhan. Gamboa, J.P. Wilkenfeld, Daniel. Kostić, Daniel. (2022).
“Integrating Philosophy of Understanding with the Cognitive Sciences”, Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience.
Abstract:
We provide two programmatic frameworks for integrating philosophical research on understanding with complementary work in computer science, psychology, and neuroscience. First, philosophical theories of understanding have consequences about how agents should reason if they are to understand that can then be evaluated empirically by their concordance with findings in scientific studies of reasoning. Second, these studies use a multitude of explanations, and a philosophical theory of understanding is well suited to integrating these explanations in illuminating ways.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3389/fnsys.2022.764708.
Marek Pokropski (Faculty of Philosophy, University of Warsaw, Poland).
Mechanisms and Consciousness. Integrating Phenomenology with Cognitive Science, Routledge.
Abstract:
This book develops a new approach to naturalizing phenomenology. The author proposes to integrate phenomenology with the mechanistic framework for explanation in cognitive sciences, and offers new methodological perspectives for studying complex mental phenomena such as consciousness.
Link:
https://www.routledge.com/Mechanisms-and-Consciousness-Integrating-Phenomenology-with-Cognitive-Science/Pokropski/p/book/9780367465254#
Milena Ivanova (University of Cambridge).
“What is a Beautiful Experiment?” Erkenntnis.
Abstract:
This article starts an engagement on the aesthetics of experiments and offers an account for analysing how aesthetics features in the design, evaluation and reception of experiments. I identify two dimensions of aesthetic evaluation of experiments: design and significance. When it comes to design, a number of qualities, such as simplicity, economy and aptness, are analysed and illustrated with the famous Meselson-Stahl experiment. Beautiful experiments are also regarded to make significant discoveries, but I argue against a narrow construal of experimental aims. By drawing on the plurality of goals experimenters have and diversity of aesthetic responses, I argue that experiments are aesthetically appreciated both when they discover and when they produce disruptive results.
URL: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10670-021-00509-3
M. Efe Ates (Department of Philosophy, MSKÜ, Turkey).
“Pioneers of the ice age models: a brief history from Agassiz to Milankovitch”. History of Geo- and Space Sciences.
Abstract:
It is now widely accepted that astronomical factors trigger the emergence of glacial and interglacial periods. However, nearly two centuries ago, the overall situation was not as apparent as it is today. In this article, I briefly discuss the astronomical model of ice ages put forward in the 19th and early 20th centuries. This period was indeed anni mirabiles for scientists to understand the ice age phenomenon. Agassiz, Adhémar and Croll laid the foundation stones for understanding the dynamics of ice ages. But it was Milankovitch who combined empirical geology with mathematical astronomy. Specifically, he identified the shortcomings of the preceding ice age models and modified his model accordingly. In what follows, I review earlier approaches to the ice age problem and show how they failed to meet their objectives. Next, I show how Milankovitch's model managed to capture all sufficient astronomical elements. The final sections focus on Milutin Milankovitch's successful approach, including his accomplishment of tackling the problem mathematically.
Link: https://doi.org/10.5194/hgss-13-23-2022
Martin Zach (Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Faculty of Arts, Charles University in Prague)
“Revisiting abstraction and idealization: how not to criticize mechanistic explanation in molecular biology”. European Journal for Philosophy of Science.
Abstract:
Abstraction and idealization are the two notions that are most often discussed in the context of assumptions employed in the process of model building. These notions are also routinely used in philosophical debates such as that on the mechanistic account of explanation. Indeed, an objection to the mechanistic account has recently been formulated precisely on these grounds: mechanists cannot account for the common practice of idealizing difference-making factors in models in molecular biology. In this paper I revisit the debate and I argue that the objection does not stand up to scrutiny. This is because it is riddled with a number of conceptual inconsistencies. By attempting to resolve the tensions, I also draw several general lessons regarding the difficulties of applying abstraction and idealization in scientific practice. Finally, I argue that more care is needed only when speaking of abstraction and idealization in a context in which these concepts play an important role in an argument, such as that on mechanistic explanation.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-022-00453-1
Richard David-Rus (Francisc I. Rainer Institute of Anthropology, Romanian Academy, Bucharest, Romania)
“Understanding without Explanation: A Still Open Issue”. Filozofia Nauki.
Abstract:
This paper takes a stance in the debate concerning scientific understanding. It claims that the case for a specific type of understanding, understanding without explanation (UwE), is still open, despite the tendency in the current literature that might suggest otherwise. The paper begins by situating the distinction between an explanatory and non-explanatory understanding in the debate on understanding by introducing Lipton’s account of UwE. The paper then discusses the significance of Lipton’s proposals for the debate and argues that Kelp’s interpretation does not exhaust the challenge they pose to any theory of understanding. The paper then examines the best articulated critique of Lipton’s account provided by Khalifa and rejects it as inadequate. It ends by sketching out a list of positive reasons that support the continued examination of UwE.
Link: https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2021.0009
Oleksandr Gabovich, Institute of Physics of the NAS of Ukraine; Volodymyr Kuznetsov, H.S. Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy of the NAS of Ukraine / National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy” .
Overview of modern philosophy of science (art. 1) (in Ukrainian). Philosophical Thought.
Abstract:
Varieties of modern philosophies of mathematical and natural sciences are represented. Specific features of those sciences are analyzed based on graph classifications of the respective philosophies. The importance of reconstructions of practical theories is emphasized for all kinds of philosophies of science used by them.
The first part outlines the purpose of the article and considers subject and theoretical, the second — evaluative, nominal, theoretical-reconstructive and linguistic-reconstructive classifications of philosophies of science. The conclusions are made about the problematic application of these classifications to the philosophies of social sciences and humanities.
Keywords:
global/general and local/science-centered philosophies of sciences; features and classifications of philosophies of mathematical and natural sciences; a network of specific theories as the core of the relevant science; practical theories and their reconstructions.
Link: https://doi.org/10.15407/fd2022.01.115
Volodymyr Kuznetsov, H.S. Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy of the NAS of Ukraine / National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy”
Modified structure-nominative reconstruction of practical physical theories as a frame for the philosophy of physics. Epistemological Studies in Philosophy, Social and Political Sciences.
Abstract:
Physical theories are complex and necessary tools for gaining new knowledge about their areas of application. A distinction is made between abstract and practical theories. The last are constantly being improved in the cognitive activity of professional physicists and studied by future physicists. A variant of the philosophy of physics based on a modified structural-nominative reconstruction of practical theories is proposed. Readers should decide whether this option is useful for their understanding of the philosophy of physics, as well as other philosophies of particular sciences.
The article is written within the theme “Communicative transformations in modern science” of “Program-targeted and competitive topics of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine”.
Keywords:
practical physical theories; physical lingua franca; subsystems of theories; subsystem flexibilities; main and auxiliary components; basic and satellite levels.
Link: https://doi.org/10.15421/342103
Volodymyr Kuznetsov, National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy”, H.S. Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy of the NAS of Ukraine.
Syllabus: Philosophy of Physics (in English/Ukrainian).
Abstract:
Philosophical Problems of Physics (Philosophy of Physics) is a philosophical discipline that consists of three interrelated parts. Epistemology of physics studies 1) the construction of physics as a branched coherent complex set of knowledge systems about the fundamental components of the material world, their properties, and patterns; 2) the internal construction of physical theories as systems of knowledge and the relationship between them; 3) the role of physical theories as tools for gaining new knowledge about their subject areas. The methodology of physics explores the methods, procedures, and processes of obtaining, forming, evaluating (substantiation, verification), development and application of systems of physical knowledge. The ontology (metaphysics) of physics 1) explains the ideas about the material world that follow from the physical systems of knowledge and 2) analyzes the worldview problems posed by these ideas.
Oleksandr Gabovich, Institute of Physics of the NAS of Ukraine; Volodymyr Kuznetsov, H.S. Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy of the NAS of Ukraine / National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy”.
Western science humiliation as a symptom of the whole civilization decline (in Ukrainian).
Abstract:
Some aspects of the radical change of value orientations in modern western science are considered. Influenced by leftist ideology and under the slogans of abstract justice, the leadership of European and North American institutions is trying to expand the presence of new members in the scientific and educational spheres on the quota basis, taking into account racial and gender rather than meritocratic characteristics (high-quality basic and university education level, persistence to obtain new knowledge, developed mental abilities in this area). It has been shown that the rapid legislative or illegal introduction of quotas for minorities instead of increasing their scientific level and well-being can only limit the recruiting of talented people of any gender or race into science and will result in the decline of the world science as a whole.
Keywords: trends of value orientations in science, meritocracy, melanocracy
Link: https://doi.org/10.18524/1815-7459.2021.2.235210
Aleksandr Gabovich, Institute of Physics of the NAS of Ukraine; Volodymyr Kuznetsov, H.S. Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy of the NAS of Ukraine / National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy”.
Evaluation of Anatoly Vlasov: A Sixty-Year Opposition (in Russian).
Abstract:
Anatoly Vlasov is a Soviet physicist known for his equations. His work was a significant contribution to plasma physics. The scientific problem that was not clarified then (to a certain extent even now) related to an allegedly purely “technical” (mathematical) question.
This article is written based on a section of our future book on the philosophy of science, considered within the framework of a modified structural-nominative reconstruction of practical physical theories. One of the goals of the philosophy of science is the analysis of emerging theoretical knowledge per se, understood as the most adequate representation of its domain now and abstracted from all cultural, social, political and psychological factors of its design. However, a detailed description of the properties, structures, types of consistency and functions of scientific theories as carriers of acquired and generators of new knowledge opens prospects for identifying the specific influence of these factors on the processes of its creation and recognition by scientific science community.
Link: https://7i.7iskusstv.Com/Y2022/Nomer5/Gabovich/
Vlasta Sikimić (University of Tübingen) and Sandro Radovanović (University of Belgrade)
Machine learning in scientific grant review: algorithmically predicting project efficiency in high energy physics, European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 2022
Abstract:
As more objections have been raised against grant peer-review for being costly and time-consuming, the legitimate question arises whether machine learning algorithms could help assess the epistemic efficiency of the proposed projects. As a case study, we investigated whether project efficiency in high energy physics (HEP) can be algorithmically predicted based on the data from the proposal. To analyze the potential of algorithmic prediction in HEP, we conducted a study on data about the structure (project duration, team number, and team size) and outcomes (citations per paper) of HEP experiments with the goal of predicting their efficiency. In the first step, we assessed the project efficiency using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) of 67 experiments conducted in the HEP laboratory Fermilab. In the second step, we employed predictive algorithms to detect which team structures maximize the epistemic performance of an expert group. For this purpose, we used the efficiency scores obtained by DEA and applied predictive algorithms – lasso and ridge linear regression, neural network, and gradient boosted trees – on them. The results of the predictive analyses show moderately high accuracy (mean absolute error equal to 0.123), indicating that they can be beneficial as one of the steps in grant review. Still, their applicability in practice should be approached with caution. Some of the limitations of the algorithmic approach are the unreliability of citation patterns, unobservable variables that influence scientific success, and the potential predictability of the model.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-022-00478-6
Twitter: @VlastaSikimic
Vlasta Sikimić (University of Tübingen)
How to Improve Research Funding in Academia? Lessons From the COVID-19 Crisis, Frontiers in Research Metrics and Analytics, 2022
Abstract:
The current COVID-19 crisis has put both public and private funding of life sciences in the spotlight. One of the most frequent critiques of the scientific research conducted in industry is that researchers working for companies lack intellectual freedom. Moreover, from the perspective of the general public, industry research is always questioned because monetary interests might influence it. Sponsorship bias—a tendency of researchers working in the private sector to align their results with the interest of their funders—has been widely discussed in philosophy of science (e.g., Holman and Elliott, 2018; Leefmann, 2021). Some authors even go as far as opposing intellectual property in life sciences (Brown, 2008). Having all this in mind, epistemic trust in research conducted by companies is often lacking. However, it is questionable whether the academic sector alone, in its current state, can appropriately respond to global challenges. I argue that academic research requires substantial restructuring as similar objections can be raised both in the case of research done by academic institutions and in industry. Additionally, there are specific dangers connected with the current academic system such as elitism in science that are epistemically harmful. Though similar tendencies can also be detected in industry, academia has its own outdated rules that are reflected in its current culture.
https://doi.org/10.3389/frma.2022.777781
Twitter: @VlastaSikimic
Aleksandra Vučković (University of Belgrade) and Vlasta Sikimić (University of Tübingen)
How to Fight Linguistic Injustice in Science: Equity Measures and Mitigating Agents, Social Epistemology, 2022
Abstract:
Though a common language of science allows for easier communication of the results among researchers, the use of lingua franca also comes with the cost of losing some of the diverse ideas and results arising from the plurality of languages. Following Quine’s famous thesis about the indeterminacy of translation, we elaborate on the inherent loss of diverse ideas when only one language of science is used. Non-native speakers sometimes experience epistemic injustice due to their language proficiency and consequently, their scientific insights get marginalized. Thus, it is important epistemically to include the results of all researchers independent of their native language. As a solution, we promote epistemic equity and inclusion both on the individual level and on the level of the scientific community. Epistemic equity means that researchers who suffer disadvantages because of their language skills get support from the rest of the scientific community that will compensate for their disadvantage and at the same time facilitate their epistemic inclusion. This can be achieved through the introduction of mitigating agents – the individuals and organizations that ought to serve as a communication bridge between individual researchers and the scientific community.
https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2022.2109531
Twitter: @VlastaSikimic
Vlasta Sikimić (University of Tübingen) and Ole Herud-Sikimić (Max Planck Institute for Developmental Biology, Tübingen)
Modelling efficient team structures in biology, Journal of Logic and Computation, 2022
Abstract:
We used agent-based modelling to highlight the advantages and disadvantages of several management styles in biology, ranging from centralized to egalitarian ones. In egalitarian groups, all team members are connected with each other, while in centralized ones, they are only connected with the principal investigator. Our model incorporated time constraints, which negatively influenced weakly connected groups such as centralized ones. Moreover, our results show that egalitarian groups outperform others if the questions addressed are relatively simple or when the communication among agents is limited. Complex epistemic spaces are explored best by centralized groups. They outperform other team structures because the individual members can develop their own ideas with less interference of the opinions of others. The optimal ratio between time spent on experimentation and dissemination varies between different organizational structures. Furthermore, if the evidence is shared only after a relevant degree of certainty is reached, all investigated groups epistemically profit. We discovered that the introduction of seminars to the model changes the epistemic performance in favour of weakly connected teams. Finally, the abilities of the principal investigator do not seem to outperform cognitive diversity, as group performances were not strongly influenced by the increase of her abilities.
https://doi.org/10.1093/logcom/exac021
Twitter: @VlastaSikimic
Vlasta Sikimić (University of Tübingen), Mike Stuart (National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University) and Jamie Shaw (University of Toronto)
Science funding policy and the COVID-19 pandemic, The International Journal of Risk & Safety in Medicine, 2022
Abstract:
Science funding policy is constantly evolving as a result of geopolitical, technological, cultural, social, and economic shifts. The last major upheaval of science funding policy happened in response to a catastrophic series of events: World War II. The newest worldwide catastrophe, the COVID-19 pandemic, has prompted similar reflections on fundamental questions about the roles of the sciences in society and the relationships between governments, private industry, public bodies, and the broader public. Contained in this special section of the International Journal of Risk & Safety in Medicine is a series of reflections and insights from four interdisciplinary scholars, most of which urge drastic and urgent changes that should be made.
https://doi.org/10.3233/jrs-227015
Twitter: @VlastaSikimic, @miikeessttuuart
Janko Nešić ( Department of Philosophy, Institute of Philosophy, Belgrade, Serbia)
Towards a Neutral-Structuralist Theory of Consciousness and Selfhood. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science.
Abstract:
Recently, an information-theoretic structural realist theory of the self and consciousness has been put forward (Beni, 2019). The theory is presented as a form of panpsychism. I argue against this interpretation and show that Beni’s structuralist theory runs into the hard problem of consciousness in a similar way as the Integrated Information theory of consciousness. Since both of these theories are structuralist and based on the notion of information, I propose to use a solution that has been employed for Integrated Information Theory, namely introducing the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic structure and dynamics (intrinsic information and intrinsic structure). Making these metaphysical enhancements to Beni’s structuralist theory of consciousness will give the theory a better chance of overcoming the hard problem. In terms of the metaphysics of consciousness, it takes us beyond physicalism. I then suggest that the information-theoretic structuralist theory of consciousness should, instead of panpsychism and physicalism, be combined with neutral monist ontology which is a better fit. These reworkings could lead to an improved naturalistic account of consciousness – the neutral-structuralist theory of consciousness and the self.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2022.2092825
Boer, N., Kostić, D., Ross, M., de Bruin, L., Glas, G. (2022) “Using network models in person-centered care in psychiatry: How perspectivism could help to draw boundaries.” Frontiers in Psychiatry, 13:925187.
Abstract:
In this paper, we explore the conceptual problems that arise when using network analysis in person-centered care (PCC) in psychiatry. Personalized network models are potentially helpful tools for PCC, but we argue that using them in psychiatric practice raises boundary problems, i.e., problems in demarcating what should and should not be included in the model, which may limit their ability to provide clinically-relevant knowledge. Models can have explanatory and representational boundaries, among others. We argue that perspectival reasoning can make more explicit what questions personalized network models can address in PCC, given their boundaries.
KEYWORDS: boundary problem, network analysis, person-centered care, personalized models, perspectivism, psychiatry, topological explanation.
Link: https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyt.2022.925187
Published in 2021
Adam P. Kubiak and Paweł Kawalec (Faculty of Philosophy, John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin)
The epistemic consequences of pragmatic value-laden scientific inference
European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 11(52), 2021.
Abstract:
In this work, we explore the epistemic import of the value-ladenness of Neyman-Pearson’s Theory of Testing Hypotheses (N-P) by reconstructing and extending Daniel Steel’s argument for the legitimate influence of pragmatic values on scientific inference. We focus on how to properly understand N-P’s pragmatic value-ladenness and the epistemic reliability of N-P. We develop an account of the twofold influence of pragmatic values on N-P’s epistemic reliability and replicability. We refer to these two distinguished aspects as “direct” and “indirect”. We discuss the replicability of experiments in terms of the indirect aspect and the replicability of outcomes in terms of the direct aspect. We argue that the influence of pragmatic values is beneficial to N-P’s epistemic reliability and replicability indirectly. We show that while the direct influence of pragmatic values can be beneficial, its negative effects on reliability and replicability are also unavoidable in some cases, with the direct and indirect aspects possibly being incongruent.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-021-00370-9
Adam P. Kubiak, Paweł Kawalec (Faculty of Philosophy, John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin) and Adam Kiersztyn (Department of Computer Science, Lublin University of Technology)
Neyman-Pearson Hypothesis Testing, Epistemic Reliability and Pragmatic Value-Laden Asymmetric Error Risks. Axiomathes.
Abstract:
We show that if among the tested hypotheses the number of true hypotheses is not equal to the number of false hypotheses, then Neyman-Pearson theory of testing hypotheses does not warrant minimal epistemic reliability (the feature of driving to true conclusions more often than to false ones). We also argue that N-P does not protect from the possible negative effects of the pragmatic value-laden unequal setting of error probabilities on N-P’s epistemic reliability. Most importantly, we argue that in the case of a negative impact no methodological adjustment is available to neutralize it, so in such cases the discussed pragmatic-value-ladenness of N-P inevitably compromises the goal of attaining truth.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-021-09541-y
Borut Trpin (MCMP/LMU Munich)
Against methodological gambling. Erkenntnis.
Abstract:
Should a scientist rely on methodological triangulation? Heesen et al. (2019) recently provided a convincing affirmative answer. However, their approach requires belief gambles if the evidence is discordant. We instead propose epistemically modest triangulation (EMT), according to which one should withhold judgement in such cases. We show that for a scientist in a methodologically diffident situation the expected utility of EMT is greater than that of Heesen et al.’s (2019) triangulation or that of using a single method. We also show that EMT is more appropriate for increasing epistemic trust in science. In short: triangulate, but do not gamble with evidence.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-021-00386-w
Daniel Kostić (Radboud University, The Netherlands).
“Topological Explanations, an Opinionated Appraisal.” In Lawler, I., Shech, E. and Khalifa, K. (eds): Scientific Understanding and Representation: Mathematical Modeling in the Life and Physical Sciences, Routledge.
Abstract:
In this chapter I provide a systematic overview of topological explanations in the philosophy of science literature. I do so by presenting an account of topological explanation that I have developed in other publications and then comparing this account to other accounts of topological explanation. Finally, this appraisal is opinionated because it highlights some problems in alternative accounts of topological explanations, and also it outlines responses to some of the main criticisms raised by the so-called new mechanists.
Daniel Kostić (Radboud University, The Netherlands) and Kareem Khalifa (Middlebury College, USA.).
"The directionality of topological explanations”. Synthese.
Abstract:
Proponents of ontic conceptions of explanation require all explanations to be backed by causal, constitutive, or similar relations. Among their justifications is that only ontic conceptions can do justice to the ‘directionality’ of explanation, i.e., the requirement that if X explains Y, then not-Y does not explain not-X. Using topological explanations as an illustration, we argue that non-ontic conceptions of explanation have ample resources for securing the directionality of explanations. The different ways in which neuroscientists rely on multiplexes involving both functional and anatomical connectivity in their topological explanations vividly illustrate why ontic considerations are frequently (if not always) irrelevant to explanatory directionality. Therefore, directionality poses no problem to non-ontic conceptions of explanation.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03414-y
Daria Jadreškić (University of Klagenfurt)
"Adapt to Translate – Adaptive Clincal Trials and Biomedical Innovation", European Journal of Analytic Philosophy.
Abstract:
The article presents the advantages and limitations of adaptive clinical trials for assessing the effectiveness of medical interventions and specifies the conditions that contributed to their development and implementation in clinical practice. I advance two arguments by discussing different cases of adaptive trials. The normative argument is that responsible adaptation should be taken seriously as a new way of doing clinical research insofar as a valid justification, sufficient understanding, and adequate operational conditions are provided. The second argument is historical. The development of adaptive trials can be related to lessons learned from research in cases of urgency and to the decades-long efforts to end the productivity crisis of pharmaceutical research, which led to the emergence of translational, personalized, and, recently, precision medicine movements.
https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.17.3.2
Daria Jadreškić (University of Klagenfurt)
"Diversity as an Epistemic Value – From Individual to Social Objectivity", in Radhika Natarajan (ed.) Sprache – Bildung – Geschlecht: Interdisziplinäre Ansätze in Flucht- und Migrationskontexten. Springer VS, Wiesbaden.
Abstract:
The paper presents the role of diversity in ensuring the objectivity of scientific research as understood in recent ‘values in science’ debates within philosophy of science. Along with traditional epistemic values, i.e. values that promote the attainment of truth, such as accuracy and consistency, the new picture of desirable epistemic values includes diversity as an indispensable indicator of critical scrutiny which is not only beneficial for the goal of attaining knowledge, but also for the goal of attaining social justice. Objectivity is in this new understanding achieved through diversity and inclusion of different perspectives open to mutual criticism. Diversity as a safeguard against individual and group biases is especially acknowledged in its critical role by feminist contributions to philosophy of science.
The paper starts by introducing the focus of philosophy of science in general and values in science debates in particular, followed by an overview of standard accounts of epistemic and non-epistemic values and their often conflicting roles in decision making in science. Subsequently, the benefits of diversity are discussed and exemplified by Anke Bueter’s case study (Bueter, 2015) on female health research. Several normative ideals for science are put forward and certain problems and solutions of each are outlined.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-28341-4_11
Gabriel Târziu (University of Bucharest)
Can We Have Physical Understanding of Mathematical Facts?
Acta Analytica. Forthcoming.
Abstract:
A lot of philosophical energy has been devoted recently in trying to determine if mathematics can contribute to our understanding of physical phenomena. Not many philosophers are interested, though, if the converse makes sense, i.e., if our cognitive interaction (scientific or otherwise) with the physical world can be helpful (in an explanatory or non-explanatory way) in our efforts to make sense of mathematical facts. My aim in this paper is to try to fill this important lacuna in the recent literature. My answer to the question of this paper is negative. As I will argue, there are serious problems with the main reasons for believing in the first place that it is possible to have physical understanding of mathematical facts.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-021-00470-4
Gabriel Târziu (University of Bucharest)
How Do We Obtain Understanding with the Help of Explanations?
Axiomathes 31 (2): 173-197. 2021.
Abstract:
What exactly do we need in order to enjoy the cognitive benefit that is supposed to be provided by an explanation? Some philosophers (most notably Khalifa 2012; 2013; 2015; 2017) would say that all that we need is to know the explanation. Others (e.g. Newman 2012; Strevens 2013) would say that achieving understanding with the help of an explanation requires more than that, that it requires a grasping or an understanding of the explanation. My aim in this paper is to come up with a new answer to this problem by exploring the shortcomings of the received view of understanding. In my view, besides having (at least) testimonial knowledge of an explanation, obtaining explanatory understanding requires full cognitive access to the explanation.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-020-09488-6
Magdalena Małecka (University of Helsinki & Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton)
Knowledge, behaviour, and policy: questioning the epistemic presuppositions of applying behavioural science in public policymaking. Synthese (online first, open access).
Abstract:
The aim of this article is to question the epistemic presuppositions of applying behavioural science in public policymaking. Philosophers of science who have examined the recent applications of the behavioural sciences to policy have contributed to discussions on causation, evidence, and randomised controlled trials. These have focused on epistemological and methodological questions about the reliability of scientific evidence and the conditions under which we can predict that a policy informed by behavioural research will achieve the policymakers’ goals. This paper argues that the philosophical work of Helen Longino can also help us to have a better and fuller understanding of the knowledge which the behavioural sciences provide. The paper advances an analysis of the knowledge claims that are made in the context of policy applications of behavioural science and compares them with the behavioural research on which they are based. This allows us to show that behavioural policy and the debates accompanying it are based on an oversimplified understanding of what knowledge behavioural science actually provides. Recognising this problem is important as arguments that justify reliance on the behavioural sciences in policy typically presume this simplification.
Link: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-021-03026-6
Magdalena Małecka (University of Helsinki & Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton)
Values in economics: a recent revival with a twist. Journal of Economic Methodology (online first, open access).
Abstract:
This article reviews the relatively recent trend in economic methodology that consists in bringing insights from the debate in philosophy of science on values in science in order to analyse value-ladenness of economic research. The text claims that these insights from philosophy of science offer a slightly new approach to the topic of value judgments in economics that has been discussed in philosophy of economics for decades. It suggests that the perspective of philosophy of science reviewed in the article invites to rethinking analyses of feminist economists as important contributions to economic methodology.
Link: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1350178X.2020.1868776?needAccess=true
Mariusz Maziarz (Interdisciplinary Centre for Ethics and Institute of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland),
Martin Zach (Department of Analytic Philosophy, Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences)
Assessing the quality of evidence from epidemiological agent-based models for the COVID-19 pandemic. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, 43(1).
Abstract:
Agent-based models (ABMs) are one of the main sources of evidence for decisions regarding mitigation and suppression measures against the spread of SARS-CoV-2. These models have not been previously included in the hierarchy of evidence put forth by the evidence-based medicine movement, which prioritizes those research methods that deliver results less susceptible to the risk of confounding. We point out the need to assess the quality of evidence delivered by ABMs and ask the question of what is the risk that assumptions entertained in ABMs do not include all the key factors and make model predictions susceptible to the problem of confounding.
Link: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40656-020-00357-4
Milena Ivanova (University of Cambridge)
Duhem and Holism. Cambridge Elements: Cambridge University Press.
Abstract:
The holistic thesis developed by Pierre Duhem challenges the idea that our evidence can conclusively falsify a theory. Given that no scientific theory is tested in isolation, a negative experiment can always be attributed to components other than the theory we test – to the auxiliary hypotheses and background assumptions. How do scientists decide whether the experimental result undermines the theory or points at an error in the underlying assumptions? Duhem argues that we cannot offer a rule that directs when the scientist should employ a radical or conservative strategy in light of a negative result, and ultimately they will appeal to their intuition. More recently philosophers have offered a number of strategies of how to locate error and justify the abandonment of a theory or an auxiliary hypothesis. This Element analyses Duhem's response to holism and subsequent accounts of how the problem can be resolved.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009004657
Milena Ivanova (University of Cambridge).
The Aesthetics of Scientific Experiments. Philosophy Compass.
Abstract
This article explores the aesthetic dimensions of scientific experimentation, addressing specifically how aesthetic features enter the construction, evaluation and reception of an experiment. I highlight the relationship between experiments and artistic acts in the early years of the Royal Society where experiments do not serve only epistemic aims but also aim to generate feelings of awe and pleasure. I turn to analysing which aspects of experiments are appreciated aesthetically, identifying several contenders, from the ability of an experiment to uncover nature's beauty, to encapsulating original designs and human creativity. Following this analysis, I focus on the notion of beauty: what makes an experiment beautiful? Several common qualities are explored, from the simplicity and economy of the experiment, to the significance of the experimental results.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12730
Natalia Carrillo and Tarja Knuuttila (University of Vienna)
“An artefactual perspective on idealization: Galvanic cells and electric circuits in nerve signal research.” In: Alejandro Cassini y Juan Redmond (ed.) Models and Idealizations in Science: Fictional and Artefactual Approaches (Cham: Springer).
Abstract:
There are two traditions of thinking about idealization offering almost opposite views on their functioning and epistemic status. While one tradition views idealizations as epistemic deficiencies, the other one highlights the epistemic benefits of idealization. Both of these accounts agree in that idealizations are deliberate misrepresentations. In this article, we approach idealization from the artifactual account of models, comparing it to the traditional accounts of idealization as misrepresentation, and exemplifying it through the case of the Hodgkin and Huxley model of nerve impulse. From the artifactual perspective, the epistemic benefits and deficiencies introduced by idealization frequently come in a package due to the way idealization draws together different resources in model construction. Accordingly, idealization tends to be holistic in that it is not often easily attributable to just some specific parts of the model. We argue that the artifactual approach lends a unifying view into idealization in that it is able to recover several basic philosophical insights motivating both the deficiency and epistemic benefit accounts, being simultaneously detached from the idea of distortion by misrepresentation.
Keywords: scientific modeling, representation, artifactual account, Hodgkin and Huxley Model
Links: https://philpapers.org/rec/KNUAAP, https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783030658014
Poliseli, L (Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution and Cognition Research); Russo, F. (University of Amsterdam).
Philosophy of science in practice and weak scientism together apart. In. Mizrahi M (ed) For and Against Scientism: science, methodology and the future of philosophy (Roman & Littlefield). forthcoming
Abstract:
The term ‘scientism’ has not attracted consensus about its meaning or about its scope of application. In this paper, we consider Mizrahi’s suggestion to distinguish ‘Strong’ and ‘Weak’ scientism, and the consequences this distinction may have for philosophical methodology. While we side with Mizrahi that his definitions help advance the debate, by avoiding verbal dispute and focussing on questions of method, we also have concerns about his proposal as it defends a hierarchy of knowledge production. Mizrahi’s position is that Weak Scientism should be adopted, stating that “of all the knowledge we have, scientific knowledge is the best knowledge”. This version of scientism, however, has consequences for philosophical methodology. In particular, if one conceives of philosophy as an a priori discipline and holds Weak Scientism, the introduction of empirical methods in philosophy may threaten its very essence or soul. In this chapter, we will defend the move to adopt empirical methods in philosophy and argue that, rather than threatening its essence or soul, these methods put philosophy in a better position to contribute to knowledge production, an endeavour shared with the sciences, and in a very interdisciplinary spirit. Our point of disagreement with Mizrahi is that we should avoid any hierarchy of knowledge, and instead focus on what each perspective -- scientific, philosophical, historical, or other -- can contribute to understanding phenomena.
Ludwig, D. (Wageningen University & Research); Inkeri, K (Tampere University); Mncube, Z (University of Johannesburg); Poliseli, L. (Konrad Lorenz Insitute for Evolution and Cognition Research); Reyes-Galindo, L. (Wageningen University).
Global Epistemologies and Philosophies of Science. Routledge, 2021.
Abstract:
In bringing together a global community of philosophers, Global Epistemologies and Philosophies of Science develops novel perspectives on epistemology and philosophy of science by demonstrating how frameworks from academic philosophy (e.g. standpoint theory, social epistemology, feminist philosophy of science) and related fields (e.g. decolonial studies, transdisciplinarity, global history of science) can contribute to critical engagement with global dimensions of knowledge and science
Global challenges such as climate change, food production, and infectious diseases raise complex questions about scientific knowledge production and its interactions with local knowledge systems and social realities. As academic philosophy provides relatively little reflection on global negotiations of knowledge, many pressing scientific and societal issues remain disconnected from core debates in epistemology and philosophy of science.
This book is an invitation to broaden agendas of academic philosophy by presenting epistemology and philosophy of science as globally engaged fields that address heterogeneous forms of knowledge production and their interactions with local livelihoods, practices, and worldviews. This integrative ambition makes the book equally relevant for philosophers and interdisciplinary scholars who are concerned with methodological and political challenges at the intersection of science and society.
Link: https://www.routledge.com/Global-Epistemologies-and-Philosophies-of-Science/Ludwig-Koskinen-Mncube-Poliseli-Reyes-Galindo/p/book/9780367461379
Poliseli, L (Konrad Lorenz Insitute for Evolution and Cognition Research); Leite, CMP (Federal University of Bahia).
Developing transdisciplinary practices: an interplay between disagreement and trust. In.: Ludwig, D; Inkeri, K; Mncube, Z; Poliseli, L; Reyes-Galindo, L. . Global Epistemologies and Philosophies of Science. Routledge, 2021.
Abstract:
Inter- and transdisciplinary research arise as necessary conditions to address societal problems. These collaborations, by definition, encompass experts from distinct domains, demanding an epistemic dependence between researchers. In such cases where, additionally, epistemic asymmetry exists, this might then lead to tensions and enhance epistemic disagreements. How should scholars behave when in peer disagreement? On the one hand, in philosophical literature on epistemology of disagreement, normative accounts about how one should respond when facing an epistemic disagreement are usually built upon hypothetical scenarios that do not portray real-life disagreements in scientific settings. On the other hand, Science and Technology Studies (STS) research that deals with academic and scientific disagreement typically uses a descriptive, empirical approach. We argue that before a normative account of responses to disagreement is developed, we need to understand how academic disagreement actually takes place in real interdisciplinary scientific practice. In this chapter, we address a case of academic disagreement within an interdisciplinary research team in Brazil during their development of a framework for transdisciplinary collaboration. Data was collected with ethnographic tools, while the analytic perspective of the investigation is grounded on recent debates about research groups in social epistemology and in the epistemology of disagreement. We will show that an interplay between trust and disagreement is required for dealing with inter- and transdisciplinary research practices. We hold that shedding light into disagreements and communications between collaborators may improve the epistemic performance of collaborative research teams by refining the dynamics of inter- and transdisciplinary investigations.
Link: https://www.routledge.com/Global-Epistemologies-and-Philosophies-of-Science/Ludwig-Koskinen-Mncube-Poliseli-Reyes-Galindo/p/book/9780367461379
Duško Prelević (Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade)
The Chalmers Trilemma Re-examined
Journal of Philosophical Research 46: 345‒361, 2021.
Abstract:
The Continuum Hypothesis seems to be a counterexample to David Chalmers's A Priori Scrutability thesis, according to which there is a compact class of truths (the scrutability base) from which all truths are a priori scrutable. Chalmers's three-part answer to this problem (which I call the “Chalmers trilemma”) runs as follows: either the Continuum Hypothesis is indeterminate; or adding a new axiom will settle the issue; or, if these two options do not work, we should add the Continuum Hypothesis (or its negation) to the scrutability base. I argue that Chalmers's answer is unsatisfactory: the first horn of the trilemma can be interpreted in several ways, and either it departs from common mathematical practice and rests on weak analogies, or it shares the same problems with two other horns; the second horn does not provide good reasons to believe that from a fixed system of axioms all truths about our world are scrutable; the third horn of the trilemma renders Chalmers's project empty.
Link: https://doi.org/10.5840/jpr2021825172
Tomáš Marvan (Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences)
Was Wegner Rejecting Mental Causality? Theory and Psychology.
Abstract:
Daniel Wegner’s theory of apparent mental causation is often misread. His aim was not to question the causal effectiveness of conscious mental states, such as intentions. Rather, he attempted to show that our subjective sense of agency is not a completely reliable indicator of the causality of action, and needs to be replaced by more objective means of inquiry.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1177/09593543211000820
Tomáš Marvan (Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences)
Marek Havlík (National Institute of Mental Health, Klecany)
Is Predictive Processing a Theory of Perceptual Consciousness? New Ideas in Psychology 61.
Abstract:
Predictive Processing theory, hotly debated in neuroscience, psychology and philosophy, promises to explain a number of perceptual and cognitive phenomena in a simple and elegant manner. In some of its versions, the theory is ambitiously advertised as a new theory of conscious perception. The task of this paper is to assess whether this claim is realistic. We will be arguing that the Predictive Processing theory cannot explain the transition from unconscious to conscious perception in its proprietary terms. The explanations offer by PP theorists mostly concern the preconditions of conscious perception, leaving the genuine material substrate of consciousness untouched.
Link: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0732118X20302129?via%3Dihub
Published in 2020
Agustina Borella (ESEADE University Institute, Argentina)
TRAZOS Ensayos de Filosofía para el Mundo Social. Grupo Unión, Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires.
Abstract:
Entender algo sobre un mundo que se nos presenta de modo desordenado e incompleto constituye buena parte de la tarea de la filosofía y de la ciencia.
La racionalidad, los modelos, y el mundo social introducen preocupaciones propias de la filosofía de la ciencia en general y de la epistemología de la economía en particular.
Los aportes de Popper, Lawson, Mäki, Hayek y Cartwright se expresan en estos trazos como intentos abiertos para alcanzar a comprender nuestro mundo.
English:
To understand something about a world, that is presented to us in a disorderly and incomplete way, is a large part of the task of philosophy and science.
Rationality, models and the social world introduce specific issues of philosophy of science in general and of epistemology of economics in particular.
The contributions of Popper, Lawson, Maki, Hayek and Cartwright are expressed in these strokes as open attempts to understand our world.
Link to the book: https://www.amazon.com/dp/B08FMSXNQV/ref=cm_sw_r_fa_dp_DcSnFb3XRPQQH?fbclid=IwAR1XsryCgzcCZjlbztz_hI17g1XMm0FFSpPDKNff11um1p03I3_qHmiqDi8
Anguel S. Stefanov (Institute of Philosophy and Sociology at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences)
Space and Time: Philosophical Problems. Minkowski Institute Press, Montreal.
Abstract:
The monograph comprises interconnected philosophical analyses of issues related to the nature of space, time and spacetime – that of the very existence of space and time, transcendental philosophy of space and time, whether there exists a middle way between the A- and B-theories of time, the growing block theory, the phenomenology of temporal passage, whether time flows at any rate, the relationalist-substantivalist debate and time travel. Two essays on Zeno’s paradoxes and on the arrow of time and irreversible processes are included as appendices. The book can also serve as a textbook of a course on the philosophy of space, time and spacetime.
Link: http://www.minkowskiinstitute.org/mip/books/stefanov2.html
Benjamin Wilck (Humboldt-Universitaet zu Berlin, Department of Philosophy)
Euclid’s Kinds and (Their) Attributes. History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis, 23(2), 362-397.
Abstract:
Relying upon a very close reading of all of the definitions given in Euclid’s Elements, I argue that this mathematical treatise contains a philosophical treatment of mathematical objects. Specifically, I show that Euclid draws elaborate metaphysical distinctions between (i) substances and non-substantial attributes of substances, (ii) different kinds of substance, and (iii) different kinds of non-substance. While the general meta-physical theory adopted in the Elements resembles that of Aristotle in many respects, Euclid does not employ Aristotle’s terminology, or indeed, any philosophical terminology at all. Instead, Euclid systematically uses different types of definition to distinguish between metaphysically different kinds of mathematical object.
Link: https://philpapers.org/rec/WILEKA
Benjamin Wilck (Humboldt-Universitaet zu Berlin, Department of Philosophy)
Can the Pyrrhonian Sceptic Suspend Belief Regarding Scientific Definitions?: Geometry and Scepticism Reconsidered. History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis, 23(1), 253-288.
Abstract:
In this article, I tackle a heretofore unnoticed difficulty with the application of Pyrrhonian scepticism to science. Sceptics can suspend belief regarding a dogmatic proposition only by setting up opposing arguments or considerations for and against that proposition. Since Sextus provides arguments exclusively against particular geometrical definitions in Adversus Mathematicos III, commentators have argued that Sextus’ method is not scepticism, but negative dogmatism. However, commentators have overlooked the fact that arguments or considerations in favour of particular geometrical definitions were absent in ancient geometry, and hence unavailable to Sextus. While this might explain why they are also absent from Sextus’ text, I survey and evaluate various strategies to supply arguments in support of particular geometrical definitions.
Link: https://philpapers.org/rec/WILCTP-9
Borut Trpin (MCMP/LMU Munich)
Jeffrey conditionalization: proceed with caution. Philosophical Studies, 177(10), 2985-3012.
Abstract:
It has been argued that if the rigidity condition is satisfied, a rational agent operating with uncertain evidence should update her subjective probabilities by Jeffrey conditionalization (JC) or else a series of bets resulting in a sure loss could be made against her (the Dynamic Dutch Book Argument). We show, however, that even if the rigidity condition is satisfied, it is not always safe to update probability distributions by JC because there exist such sequences of non-misleading uncertain observations where it may be foreseen that an agent who updates her subjective probabilities by JC will end up nearly certain that a false hypothesis is true. We analyze the features of JC that lead to this problem, specify the conditions in which it arises and respond to potential objections.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01356-3
Daniel Kostić (Institute for Science in Society (ISiS), Radboud University, The Netherlands)
General Theory of Topological Explanations and Explanatory Asymmetry. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 375: 20190321.
Abstract:
In this paper, I present a general theory of topological explanations, and illustrate its fruitfulness by showing how it accounts for explanatory asymmetry. My argument is developed in three steps. In the first step, I show what it is for some topological property A to explain some physical or dynamical property B. Based on that, I derive three key criteria of successful topological explanations: a criterion concerning the facticity of topological explanations, i.e. what makes it true of a particular system; a criterion for describing counterfactual dependencies in two explanatory modes, i.e. the vertical and the horizontal and, finally, a third perspectival one that tells us when to use the vertical and when to use the horizontal mode. In the second step, I show how this general theory of topological explanations accounts for explanatory asymmetry in both the vertical and horizontal explanatory modes. Finally, in the third step, I argue that this theory is universally applicable across biological sciences, which helps in unifying essential concepts of biological networks.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2019.0321
Daniel Kostić (Institute for Science in Society (ISiS), Radboud University, The Netherlands)
Claus C. Hilgetag (Institute of Computational Neuroscience, University Medical Center Hamburg-Eppendorf, Hamburg, Germany)
Marc Tittgemeyer (Max-Planck-Institut for Metabolism Research, Translational Neurocircuitry, and Cluster of Excellence in Cellular Stress and Aging-Associated Disease (CECAD), Cologne, Germany)
Unifying the Essential Concepts of Biological Networks. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 375: 20190314.
Abstract:
Over the last decades, network-based approaches have become highly popular in diverse fields of biology, including neuroscience, ecology, molecular biology and genetics. While these approaches continue to grow very rapidly, some of their conceptual and methodological aspects still require a programmatic foundation. This challenge particularly concerns the question of whether a generalized account of explanatory, organizational and descriptive levels of networks can be applied universally across biological sciences. To this end, this highly interdisciplinary theme issue focuses on the definition, motivation and application of key concepts in biological network science, such as explanatory power of distinctively network explanations, network levels and network hierarchies.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2019.0314
Jaana Eigi (University of Tartu)
Are Experts Representative of Non-Experts? Elective Modernism, Aspects of Representation, and the Argument from Inductive Risk
Perspectives on Science 28(4), 459-481
Abstract:
The approach to expert communities and political representation of non-experts in Harry Collins and Robert Evans’ elective modernism reflects the conviction that experts are not representative of ordinary citizens. I use an analysis of aspects of representation and the argument from inductive risk to argue that experts can be seen as representative of (some) non-experts, when we understand representation as resemblance based on shared social perspectives and acknowledge the inevitable involvement of such perspectives in decisions under inductive risk. This, in turn, has implications for some of the proposals about practices and institutions made in elective modernism.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1162/posc_a_00347
Luana Poliseli (Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution and Cognition Research (KLI), Klosterneuburg, Austria)
Emergence of scientific understanding in real-time ecological research practice. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences
Abstract:
Scientific understanding as a subject of inquiry has become widely discussed in philosophy of science and is often addressed through case studies from history of science. Even though these historical reconstructions engage with details of scientific practice, they usually provide only limited information about the gradual formation of understanding in ongoing processes of model and theory construction. Based on a qualitative ethnographic study of an ecological research project, this article shifts attention from understanding in the context of historical case studies to evidence of current case studies. By taking de Regt’s (Understanding scientific understanding. Oxford University Press, New York, 2017) contextual theory of scientific understanding into the field, it confirms core tenets of the contextual theory (e.g. the crucial role of visualization and visualizability) suggesting a normative character with respect to scientific activities. However, the case study also shows the limitations of de Regt’s latest version of this theory as an attempt to explain the development of understanding in current practice. This article provides a model representing the emergence of scientific understanding that exposes main features of scientific understanding such as its gradual formation, its relation to skills and imagination, and its capacity for knowledge selectivity. The ethnographic evidence presented here supports the claim that something unique can be learned by looking into ongoing research practices that can’t be gained by studying historical case studies.
Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40656-020-00338-7
Tomáš Marvan (Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences)
Michal Polák (University of West Bohemia, Pilsen)
Generality and content-specificity in the study of the neural correlates of perceptual consciousness. Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, 1(II).
Abstract:
The claim of this paper is that the NCC notion, as applied to conscious perceptual episodes, needs to be reconceptualized. It mixes together the processing related to the perceived contents and the neural substrate of consciousness proper, i.e. mechanisms making the perceptual contents conscious. We thus propose that the perceptual NCC be divided into two constitutive subnotions. The main theoretical idea that emerges as a consequence of this reconceptualization is that the neural correlate of a perceptual episode is formed in the neural interaction between content-processing and consciousness-conferring mechanisms. The paper elaborates this distinction, marshals some initial arguments in its favour, and tests it against some of the most debated theories of consciousness.
Link: https://philosophymindscience.org/index.php/phimisci/article/view/61
Vassil Vidinsky (Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski”)
(Post) phenomenological Approach to Homo Sapiens Technicus. Balkan Journal of Philosophy, 12(1), 31-36.
Abstract:
In this paper I use a (post)phenomenological approach to clarify the objective cultural expansion of our technology. Thus, I establish a conceptual analogy between two different philosophical analyses of human–machine relations – one historical and one phenomenological. I develop the analogy between them and their corresponding concepts in several steps. (1) First, I present the Homo sapiens technicus tendency and then the phenomenological differentiation between body schema and body image. All of these elucidate our involvement with machines. (2) Then, I conceptualize the term ‘context’, coupling its structural stability with the idea of distextaulity in order to achieve a better empirical understanding of our technological contradictions. (3) I continue to develop and enrich the analogy by illuminating the functional similarities – fluid boundary, automation, complexity – between contextual structures on the one hand and body schemata on the other. (4) Finally, I explore a deeper causal and narrative connection between those strands, shedding light on an interesting twofold circularity: a circular causation and a double narrative within Homo sapiens technicus.
Link: https://doi.org/10.5840/bjp20201215
Vlasta Sikimić (University of Tübingen)
Tijana Nikitović (University of Belgrade)
Miljan Vasić (University of Belgrade)
Vanja Subotić (University of Belgrade)
Do Political Attitudes Matter for Epistemic Decisions of Scientists? Review of Philosophy and Psychology.
Abstract:
The epistemic attitudes of scientists, such as epistemic tolerance and authoritarianism, play important roles in the discourse about rivaling theories. Epistemic tolerance stands for the mental attitude of an epistemic agent, e.g., a scientist, who is open to opposing views, while epistemic authoritarianism represents the tendency to uncritically accept views of authorities. Another relevant epistemic factor when it comes to the epistemic decisions of scientists is the skepticism towards the scientific method. However, the question is whether these epistemic attitudes are influenced by their sociopolitical counterparts, such as the researcher’s degree of conservatism. To empirically investigate the interplay between epistemic and sociopolitical attitudes of scientists, we conducted a survey with researchers (N = 655) across different disciplines. We propose scales for measuring epistemic tolerance and epistemic authoritarianism, as well as a scale for detecting the participants' readiness to question the scientific method. Furthermore, we investigate the relationship between epistemic tolerance and epistemic authoritarianism on the one hand, and career stage and sociopolitical views on the other hand. Interestingly, our study found only small correlations between the participants' degree of conservatism and their epistemic attitudes. This suggests that sociopolitical views, against common argumentation, actually do not play an important role in one’s scientific decisions. Moreover, social scientists scored higher on the epistemic tolerance and lower on the epistemic authoritarianism scale than natural scientists. Finally, the results indicate that natural scientists question the scientific method less than social scientists.
Link: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13164-020-00504-7
