EENPS online seminar
Information about our seminars
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Dear members,
We are announcing an online seminar in scope of the East European Network for Philosophy of Science (EENPS) with the aim of bringing together researchers from different parts of Europe, increasing their visibility, and facilitating dialog among them. The seminar will cover a wide range of topics with the goal of presenting a multitude of approaches to philosophy of science and its importance. The meetings will be online (via Zoom).
For the videos of the talks, please see the links below in section Past seminars.
The seminar will take place on the following dates with the following confirmed speakers:
Past seminars
For more information please contact eenphilsci@gmail.com.
Borut Trpin and Vlasta Sikimić, the organizers
We are announcing an online seminar in scope of the East European Network for Philosophy of Science (EENPS) with the aim of bringing together researchers from different parts of Europe, increasing their visibility, and facilitating dialog among them. The seminar will cover a wide range of topics with the goal of presenting a multitude of approaches to philosophy of science and its importance. The meetings will be online (via Zoom).
For the videos of the talks, please see the links below in section Past seminars.
The seminar will take place on the following dates with the following confirmed speakers:
Past seminars
- March 4, 2021. 17:30 (CET). Charlotte Werndl, University of Salzburg. "On Defining Climate and Climate Change"
Video: EENPS Facebook page
Abstract:
How to define climate and climate change is conceptually interesting, but choosing good definitions is also vital from a pragmatic perspective. Adopting definitions with serious problems can lead to wrong judgments about climate and climate change and may imply that there is no relation to observational records such as the past mean surface temperature changes. This paper aims to provide a clear and thorough conceptual analysis of the main candidates for a definition of climate and climate change. Five desiderata on a definition of climate are presented: it should be empirically applicable, it should correctly classify different climates, it should not depend on our knowledge, is should be applicable to the past, present and future and it should be mathematically well-defined. Then three of the most important definitions are discussed: climate as distribution over time when the external conditions vary as in reality, climate as distribution over time relative to regimes of varying external conditions, and climate as the ensemble distribution when the external conditions vary as in reality. The conclusion is that most definitions encounter serious problems and that the second Definition is most promising. - March 18, 2021. 17.00 (CET). Henk W. de Regt, Radboud University. "Understanding, values and the aims of science"
Video: EENPS Facebook page
Abstract:
The understanding that comes with scientific explanation is regarded as one of the central epistemic aims of science. In my book Understanding Scientific Understanding (OUP 2017) I have argued that scientists achieve understanding of phenomena by basing their explanations on intelligible theories, where intelligibility is a contextually determined value. In this presentation, I address the question of how the aim of understanding relates to other epistemic aims of science, such as prediction of empirical evidence and accurate description of the phenomena. I will examine the associated values and analyze their role and interaction through a historical case study of a controversy between James Clerk Maxwell and Ludwig Boltzmann, concerning the kinetic theory of gases. - April 1, 2021. 17.00 (CET). Martin Zach, Czech Academy of Sciences and Charles University. "Mouse Models of Cancer: On Representation and Similarity"
Video: EENPS Facebook page
Abstract:
In this talk I will identify and analyze different epistemic roles of similarity judgments concerning a model and its target. In particular, mouse models such as the immunocompetent and immunodeficient transplantable models, genetically engineered models and humanized models used in cancer research and cancer immunology will be discussed. By distinguishing three research modes – model selection, extrapolation and creation - it will be argued that similarity judgments play different epistemic roles in each of the modes, which has some implications for the debate on scientific representation. - April 22, 2021. 17.00 (CET). Samir Okasha, University of Bristol. "Is there a Bayesian justification of the hypothetico-deductive method?"
Video: EENPS Facebook page
Abstract:
Many philosophers have claimed that Bayesianism can provide a simple justification for hypothetico‐deductive (H‐D) inference, long regarded as a cornerstone of the scientific method. Following up a remark of van Fraassen (1985), we analyze a problem for the putative Bayesian justification of H‐D inference in the case where what we learn from observation is logically stronger than what our theory implies. Firstly, we demonstrate that in such cases the simple Bayesian justification does not necessarily apply. Secondly, we identify a set of sufficient conditions for the mismatch in logical strength to be justifiably ignored as a “harmless idealization”. Thirdly, we argue, based upon scientific examples, that the pattern of H‐D inference of which there is a ready Bayesian justification is only rarely the pattern that one actually finds at work in science. Whatever the other virtues of Bayesianism, the idea that it yields a simple justification of a pervasive pattern of scientific inference appears to have been oversold. - May 6, 2021. 17.00 (CET). Magdalena Małecka, University of Helsinki/IAS Princeton. "Towards a novel philosophy of science perspective on behavioural public policy"
Video: EENPS Facebook page
Abstract:
I present the main findings of my recently published paper in which I question the epistemic presuppositions of applying behavioural science in public policymaking. I also would like to explore how to further develop my analysis. Philosophers of science who have examined the recent applications of the behavioural sciences to policy have contributed to discussions on causation, evidence, and randomised controlled trials. These have focused on epistemological and methodological questions about the reliability of scientific evidence and the conditions under which we can predict that a policy informed by behavioural research will achieve the policymakers’ goals. I argue that the philosophical work of Helen Longino can help us to have a better and fuller understanding of the knowledge which the behavioural sciences provide. I advance an analysis of the claims that are made in the context of policy applications of behavioural science and compares them with the behavioural research on which they are based. This allows us to show that behavioural policy and the debates accompanying it are based on an oversimplified understanding of what knowledge behavioural science actually provides. Recognising this problem is important as arguments that justify reliance on the behavioural sciences in policy typically presume this simplification. - May 13, 2021. 17.00 (CET). Maria Kronfeldner, Central European University. "Going beyond a progressivist defense of academic freedom"
Abstract:
Academic freedom has often been defended in a progressivist manner: without academic freedom, the advancement of knowledge, i.e. epistemic progress, would be in peril. In this paper, I want to critically discuss the limits of such a progressivist defense of academic freedom, also known under the label ‘argument from truth.’ The critique is offered, however, with a constructive goal in mind, namely to offer an alternative account that goes beyond mere reference to epistemic progress and involves reference to the freedom to think independently as the freedom we mean when we point to academic freedom. The resulting causal independence account is not only epistemologically stronger than a progressivist account, it also allows to counter the curbing of academic freedom in the name of progress. The latter becomes key, for instance, when authoritarian political regimes limit or negate academic freedom with reference to an epistemic progress suitably defined for that regime. - May 27, 2021. 17.00 (CET). Dunja Šešelja, TU Eindhoven. "Scientific Disagreements, Fast Science and Higher-Order Evidence"
(joint work with Daniel Cserhalmi Friedman, Stanford University)
Video: EENPS Facebook page
Abstract:
Scientific disagreements are commonly considered an important catalyst of scientific progress. But what happens if scientists disagree while society is depending on them for quick yet reliable results? In this paper we aim to provide a normative account for how scientists facing a disagreement in the context of ‘fast science’ should handle it, and how policy makers should evaluate it. Starting from an argumentative, pragma-dialectic account of scientific controversies (Rodriguez & Zamora Bonilla 2013), we argue for the importance of ‘higher-order evidence’, which has largely been neglected in previous discussions on scientific disagreements and controversies. Moreover, we provide guidelines for how legitimate higher-order evidence is acquired in scientific practice. We illustrate our point with a recent disagreement on the aerosol transmission of COVID-19 virus.
For more information please contact eenphilsci@gmail.com.
Borut Trpin and Vlasta Sikimić, the organizers
